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Wetenschappelijk inzicht is een rijkdom die wordt doorgegeven. Je 
mag steunen op de schouders van je voorgangers. Je eigen beperkte 
ervaring is de toegevoegde waarde aan het menselijk kapitaal. Het is 
met veel nadenken, speuren en ervaren door generaties 
wetenschappers opgebouwd. Deze bijdrage is niet meer dan een 
steentje. Maar om de Nederlandse zanger Bram Vermeulen te 
parafraseren, zou ik durven stellen dat wie een steen in de rivier heeft 
verlegd, tenminste heeft geleefd en een spoor heeft nagelaten. Een 
klein lichtpunt weliswaar, maar dat op zijn beurt weer anderen kan 
inspireren…. (Jef Vermassen, 2004) 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
 
Deze doctoraatsthesis onderzoekt de determinanten van een doeltreffende raad van 
bestuur. De raad van bestuur wordt beschouwd als de hefboom inzake deugdelijk bestuur 
en steeds meer worden raden van bestuur verantwoordelijk gesteld voor het (wan)beleid 
van ondernemingen. De verschillende bedrijfsschandalen, waarvan sommige tot immense 
economische verliezen hebben geleid, doen vragen rijzen over de doeltreffendheid van 
raden van bestuur in het beschermen van de belangen van aandeelhouders en andere 
stakeholders. Als gevolg zijn heel wat van de recente hervormingen gericht op een 
deugdelijker bestuur via een betere werking van de raad van bestuur. Niettegenstaande 
algemeen aangenomen wordt dat de raad van bestuur van essentieel belang is voor de 
continuïteit van een onderneming, werd tot nog toe relatief weinig onderzocht hoe raden 
van bestuur in de praktijk functioneren. In vele landen blijven de raadskamers immers 
verborgen voor het publiek, wat ervoor zorgt dat raden van bestuur moeilijk te bestuderen 
zijn.  
 
Onderzoek naar deugdelijk bestuur en raden van bestuur in het bijzonder wordt in grote 
mate beïnvloed door de agency theorie. Vanuit het agency-perspectief wordt de raad van 
bestuur beschouwd als een intern controlemechanisme, bestemd om (potentiële) 
belangenconflicten tussen aandeelhouders (principal) en het management (agent) te 
beheersen en hun belangen op één lijn te brengen. In een dergelijke optiek wordt de 
doeltreffendheid van een raad van bestuur gewoonlijk benaderd als de mate waarin een 
raad van bestuur in staat is onafhankelijk te opereren van het management, in het belang 
van de aandeelhouders. Structurele karakteristieken van een raad van bestuur (bijv. 
omvang, proportie interne/externe/onafhankelijke bestuurders en splitsing functies van 
voorzitter en CEO) worden in empirische studies gebruikt als proxies om de 
doeltreffendheid van raden van bestuur te onderzoeken. Op dit moment is er echter 
weinig overtuigend bewijsmateriaal voor handen dat aantoont dat dergelijke structurele 
maatstaven een aanzienlijke invloed hebben op de prestaties van een raad van bestuur of 
van een onderneming.  
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Deze doctoraatsthesis probeert een beter inzicht te verschaffen in de factoren die de 
doeltreffendheid van een raad van bestuur bevorderen, de manier waarop deze factoren 
met elkaar in verband staan en de mate waarin de (groeps)dynamiek in de raad van 
bestuur hierbij een invloed uitoefent. De thesis omvat in dit opzicht een onderzoek naar 
de interne werking en het feitelijk functioneren van een raad van bestuur en vormt zo een 
bescheiden poging tot het openen van de “black box”. Onze empirische studies richtten 
zich tot raden van bestuur van Belgische ondernemingen en verliepen volgens een 
zorgvuldig geselecteerde kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethodologie. Een “mixed methods 
research design” (waarin bestuurders uit beursgenoteerde en niet-beursgenoteerde 
ondernemingen alsook experten inzake deugdelijk bestuur betrokken waren) en een 
gevalstudie (van een raad van bestuur van een grote Belgische beursgenoteerde 
onderneming) leverden rijke inzichten in het complexe web van factoren die de 
doeltreffendheid van een raad van bestuur vormgeven. 
 
In een eerste studie verkennen en identificeren wij de diverse criteria die potentieel de 
doeltreffendheid van een raad van bestuur kunnen bevorderen. Om dit te verwezenlijken, 
werd vooreerst een grondige literatuurstudie uitgevoerd. Empirische gegevens werden 
verzameld aan de hand van interviews, aangevuld met twee bondige vragenlijsten. De 
studie onthult drie belangrijke punten. Ten eerste tonen de bevindingen aan dat er een 
belangrijke kloof bestaat tussen enerzijds het beperkt aantal structurele maatstaven die 
consistent in de literatuur terug te vinden zijn en anderzijds de brede set van criteria die 
door de bestuurders zelf benadrukt worden. In het bijzonder stellen wij vast dat in de 
percepties van de bestuurders systematisch een aantal niet-structurele of ontastbare 
factoren als belangrijke ingrediënten van een goede raad van bestuur naar voor komen. 
Ten tweede  suggereren de bevindingen dat de onafhankelijkheid van de raad van bestuur 
wellicht te veel benadrukt wordt, ten koste van het belang van diversiteit. Dit concept is 
tot nu toe grotendeels onderbelicht gebleven in de context van raden van bestuur. Ten 
slotte vinden wij ook dat de informatie waarover bestuurders beschikken en de 
leiderschapsstijl van de voorzitter bijkomende (rand)voorwaarden zijn opdat een raad van 
bestuur een effectieve bijdrage kan leveren in de strategie van en het toezicht op een 
onderneming. Door deze studie is het duidelijk dat heel wat aspecten van een 
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doeltreffende raad van bestuur onzichtbaar zijn voor de doorsnee onderzoeker en zo 
slechts in geringe mate gekend zijn. Onze bevindingen suggereren bijgevolg dat de 
ambigue resultaten uit eerdere onderzoek grotendeels te wijten zijn aan het negeren van 
een reeks structurele- en gedragsfactoren die in werkelijkheid de doeltreffendheid van een 
raad van bestuur mee bepalen. 
 
De tweede studie bouwt verder op deze empirische bevindingen en onderzoekt - vanuit 
een theoretische invalshoek - hoe de verschillende criteria met elkaar in verband staan. 
Daarbij wordt speciale aandacht besteed aan het aspect diversiteit en aan de niet-
structurele of ontastbare aspecten van het functioneren van een raad van bestuur. De 
studie omvat de ontwikkeling van een ‘proces’-georiënteerd onderzoeksmodel voor de 
analyse van de doeltreffendheid van een raad van bestuur en integreert daarbij literatuur 
inzake deugdelijk bestuur met literatuur inzake de effectiviteit van groepen. In wezen 
volgt het model een input-proces-output benadering met drie belangrijke kenmerken. Ten 
eerste wordt de doeltreffendheid van een raad van bestuur (output variabele) gedefinieerd 
in relatie tot de taken die de raad van bestuur geacht wordt te vervullen. In het bijzonder 
benaderen wij een doeltreffende raad van bestuur als een raad die succesvol is in het 
uitvoeren van een tweevoudige rol, met name een strategische en toezichthoudende rol. 
Ten tweede wordt er veel belang gehecht aan de procesvariabelen, cohesie, debat en 
conflict normen. Wij suggereren dat deze een indirect effect veroorzaken van de input 
variabelen op de output variabele. Ten derde introduceren wij, naast de omvang en de 
onafhankelijksgraad van de raad van bestuur, diversiteit als een bijkomende structurele 
input variabele. Daarnaast worden specifieke relaties tussen de verschillende variabelen 
vooropgesteld.  
 
De derde studie onderwerpt het voorgestelde model aan een empirische toets via een 
gevalstudie. Gegevens voor deze gevalstudie werden verzameld op basis van 
verschillende bronnen: interne documenten, een schriftelijke vragenlijst en interviews 
met alle bestuurders van de onderzochte raad van bestuur. De resultaten van de 
gevalstudie suggereren twee belangrijke punten. Ten eerste tonen de bevindingen aan dat 
de structurele karakteristieken van een raad van bestuur fundamentele maar onvoldoende 
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voorwaarden zijn voor de doeltreffendheid van een raad van bestuur. In het bijzonder 
wijzen de bevindingen erop dat de competentie van de bestuurders alsook hun interactie 
veel essentiëler zijn. Ten tweede tonen de bevindingen aan dat de doeltreffendheid van de 
raad van bestuur in het vervullen van zijn rollen afhankelijk is van zijn relatie met de 
andere actoren (management en aandeelhouders) in de corporate governance driehoek. 
Daarnaast blijkt uit de bevindingen dat het initieel voorgestelde model eerder onvolledig 
is en dat het moeilijk is om de effecten van de geïdentificeerde variabelen, gebaseerd op 
theoretische assumpties, te isoleren.  
 
Het onderzoek resulteert in de voorstelling van een ‘congruentie’ model voor de 
doeltreffendheid van een raad van bestuur. Dit model conceptualiseert de raad van 
bestuur als een open, sociaal systeem dat bestaat uit diverse componenten die op elkaar 
inwerken. Van essentieel belang in dit systeemdenken is de assumptie dat de 
verschillende componenten in overeenstemming moeten zijn. De componenten zijn de (i) 
input (de middelen die een raad van bestuur tot zijn beschikking heeft), (ii) processen (de 
interacties en de gedragingen van de bestuurders), (iii) output (de uitvoering van de 
taken), (iv) contingenties (relaties raad van bestuur-management en raad van bestuur-
aandeelhouders) en (v) externe factoren. De basishypothese van het model is: hoe groter 
de graad van overeenstemming of ‘fit’ tussen de componenten, hoe groter de 
doeltreffendheid van de raad van bestuur, hetgeen gedefinieerd wordt als de mate waarin 
de feitelijke invulling van het takenpakket van een raad van bestuur overeenkomt met de 
verwachte invulling.  
 
Deze doctoraatsthesis levert verscheidene bijdragen tot de wetenschap. Een eerste 
bijdrage spruit voort uit het feit dat ons onderzoek gevoerd wordt in een niet-
Amerikaanse context en gebruik maakt van een alternatieve onderzoeksmethodologie. 
Tot op heden werd het merendeel van de empirische studies naar raden van bestuur 
verricht op basis van steekproeven van grote Amerikaanse ondernemingen. Bovendien 
zijn deze studies geënt op een kwantitatieve onderzoekstraditie die gebruik maakt van 
secondaire bronnen. Ten tweede draagt ons onderzoek bij tot de literatuur inzake 
deugdelijk bestuur en raden van bestuur in het bijzonder, door het staven van een 
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indirecte piste, inclusief vernieuwende onderzoeksthema’s, voor de studie van relaties 
tussen raden van bestuur en de financiële prestaties van een onderneming. Traditioneel 
onderzoek legt te veel nadruk op de directe relatie tussen raden van bestuur en de 
financiële prestaties van een onderneming, met conflicterende bevindingen tot resultaat. 
Dit laatste doet twijfels rijzen betreffende de verklarende kracht van dergelijke input-
output modellen voor het onderzoek naar raden van bestuur. Ten derde gaat ons 
onderzoek in op de verscheidene oproepen in de literatuur om bij het onderzoek naar 
raden van bestuur een pluralistische theoretische invalshoek te hanteren (in plaats van 
enkel een agency perspectief). Tot slot levert ons onderzoek ook een bijdrage aan de 
literatuur in andere domeinen, vooral inzake “organizational demography”, doordat wij 
de relevantie van bepaalde theoretische concepten en variabelen, die regelmatig aan bod 
komen in studies van groepen, in de context van raden van bestuur onderzocht hebben. 
 
Deze doctoraatsthesis levert ook een bijdrage voor ondernemingen, de 
beleggers/investeerders en beleidsmakers. Voor ondernemingen vormt een beter begrip 
van de succesfactoren van een doeltreffende raad van bestuur een interessante bron voor 
het uitvoeren van evaluaties van de raad van bestuur. Daarnaast is het onderzoek ook 
relevant voor het selectieproces van (nieuwe) niet-uitvoerende, onafhankelijke 
bestuurders omdat de bevindingen het belang hebben aangetoond van een juiste mix van 
competenties in de raad. Naar institutionele beleggers en rating bureau’s toe duidt dit 
onderzoek op het gevaar enkel oog te hebben voor structurele karakteristieken bij de 
beoordeling van de kwaliteit van het ondernemingsbestuur. De bevindingen onderstrepen 
de nood voor het verfijnen van de scoringscriteria en de wegingmethodologie in hun 
evaluatie-instrumenten alsook voor het toepassen van een flexibele benadering bij de 
evaluaties van raden van bestuur op een wereldwijde schaal. Tot slot is dit onderzoek ook 
relevant voor het beleidsniveau, dat sterk geïnteresseerd is in het stimuleren van een 
aangepaste corporate governance omgeving. Het onderzoek vormt een bescheiden poging 
om enig academisch bewijsmateriaal te leveren ter ondersteuning van huidige en 
toekomstige initiatieven of hervormingen op het vlak van deugdelijk bestuur. In het 
bijzonder suggereren de bevindingen om een brede (ook aandacht voor niet-structurele 
aspecten van deugdelijk bestuur) en flexibele (ook aandacht voor de strategische, 
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sturende rol van de raad van bestuur) invalshoek te hanteren bij het ontwerpen, aanpassen 
en opvolgen van aanbevelingen en codes inzake deugdelijk bestuur. Bovendien laten de 
resultaten ook toe te reflecteren over de kosten en baten van bepaalde maatregelen.  
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SUMMARY 
 
 
This dissertation examines the determinants of board effectiveness. The board of 
directors is considered to be an important governance device and boards are increasingly 
being held accountable for the organisations they govern. High profile corporate 
collapses, leading to major economic losses, have raised serious doubt on the 
effectiveness of boards in protecting the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
As a consequence, much of today’s corporate governance reforms (codes and 
recommendations, regulation etc.) are directed at improving corporate governance 
through upgrading the board’s functioning. Despite the fact that boards of directors are 
presumed to be vital for a company’s survival, there is still relatively little known about 
the way boards actually operate. In most countries, boardrooms have been shielded from 
view, which makes them difficult to study. 
 
Corporate governance and board research have mainly been influenced by agency theory. 
From an agency perspective, the board of directors is an internal control mechanism 
designed to address the conflicts of interest between managers (agent) and shareholders 
(principal) and to bring their interests into congruence. Stimulated by the dominance of 
the agency theory in corporate governance, board effectiveness has commonly been 
viewed as the ability of boards to act independently from management to protect 
shareholders’ interest. Structural board characteristics (e.g. size, insider/outsider 
representation, CEO duality) are treated in empirical studies as appropriate and adequate 
proxies for understanding board effectiveness. However, there is little definitive and 
striking evidence that these structural measures have had considerable impact on board or 
corporate performance.  
 
This dissertation aims at understanding the factors that contribute to the effectiveness of 
boards, how these factors interrelate, and the extent to which board processes have an 
impact. In this respect, it attempts to open up, as much as possible, the “black box” of 
actual board conduct by also examining the inner workings of boards of directors. Our 
field studies focus on boards of directors of Belgian companies and unfold along a 
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carefully chosen qualitative research methodology. A mixed methods research design 
(involving directors of both listed and non-listed Belgian companies as well as experts in 
the field of corporate governance) and a case study (a board of directors of a major listed 
Belgian company) provide rich insights into the complex web of factors which shape the 
effectiveness of boards. 
 
In a first study, we explore and identify the variety of criteria that potentially contribute 
to the effectiveness of boards. For this purpose, we conducted an in-depth review of the 
corporate governance literature. Empirical data was gathered through interviews, 
complemented by two small questionnaires. The study raises three major points. First, the 
findings highlight a gap between the limited number of structural board measures 
consistently found in literature, and the broad set of criteria that is emphasized by the 
directors themselves. In particular, we found a systematic occurrence of a number of 
intangible or behavioural factors in directors’ perceptions of what constitutes a good 
corporate board. Second, the findings suggest that the value of independence may be 
overemphasized at the cost of the broader issue of diversity. Still, the concept of diversity 
is to a large extent under-exposed in board research. Finally, we found that information 
and the leadership style of the chairman are two additional conditions under which a 
board of directors can make an effective contribution to the strategic direction and control 
of a company. What becomes clear by this study is that many aspects of board 
effectiveness are invisible to mainstream researchers and as such poorly understood. Our 
findings suggest that the ambiguity in current research evidence can, to some extent, be 
attributed to the ignorance of a wider range of structural and behavioural factors which 
actually shape the effectiveness of boards in performing their roles. 
 
The second study elaborates these empirical findings by examining - from a theoretical 
point of view - the interrelationship between the different criteria while paying special 
attention to the more intangible aspects of board conduct as well as to the issues of 
diversity. This study encompasses the development of a process-oriented model of board 
effectiveness and integrates the corporate governance literature with literature on group 
effectiveness. In essence, the model follows an input-process-output approach and has 
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three main characteristics. First, board effectiveness (output variable) is defined in 
relation to the tasks the board of directors is expected to perform. In particular, we have 
defined an effective board as one that can successfully execute a dual role set, namely its 
strategic and monitoring role. Second, strong emphasis is placed on board processes. In 
particular, we have identified three intervening variables (cohesiveness, debate and 
conflict norms) which are suggested to mediate the effects of a board’s input factors on a 
board’s output. Third, next to board size and independence, the concept of board diversity 
is introduced as an additional structural input variable. Furthermore, specific relationships 
between the various variables have been proposed.  
 
The third study empirically challenges our proposed model of board effectiveness by 
means of a single case study. Data was collected using multiple sources of evidence: 
documentation, a written questionnaire and interviews with all directors of the board 
under study. The results of the case study suggest two important issues. First, the findings 
show that structural board characteristics are a fundamental but insufficient condition for 
board effectiveness. In particular, they indicate that competent people and the interaction 
amongst people are more critical for the effectiveness of boards. Second, the findings 
show that the effectiveness of a board in performing its roles depends on contingencies 
which relate to the other actors (management, shareholders) in the corporate governance 
tripod. Besides, the empirical findings highlight the incompleteness of our predefined 
board model as well as the difficulties of isolating the effects of separate constructs 
stemming from theoretical assumptions.  
 
The overall result of our studies is the proposition of a congruence model for board 
effectiveness. This model conceptualises the board of directors as an open, social system, 
made up of various components that interact with each other. Of key importance is the 
overall alignment between the specified components. The latter includes (i) input 
(board’s resources), (ii) processes (interaction and behaviour amongst board members), 
(iii) output (board task performance), (iv) contingencies (board-management and board-
shareholder interactions), and (v) boundaries (a set of external ‘givens’). The basic 
hypothesis of this model is that the greater the total degree of congruence or ‘fit’ between 
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the components, the more effective the board will be - effectiveness being defined as the 
degree to which actual board task performance is similar to expected task performance.  
 
This dissertation offers several contributions to management science. A first contribution 
stems from the study of boards of directors in a non-US context using an alternative 
research methodology. So far, mainstream board research has carried out using samples 
of large US corporations and is inspired by quantitative research traditions using 
secondary data sources. Second, our research contributes to corporate governance and 
board literature by documenting an indirect route, including novel research areas, for 
investigating board-performance links. Mainstream board research has tended to 
overemphasize the direct link between board characteristics and financial firm 
performance, resulting in conflicting results. The latter raises doubt on the explanatory 
power of input-output models for the study of boards. A third contribution provided by 
our research is the response to calls for board studies using a pluralistic theoretical lens 
instead of a single (agency) perspective. Finally, our research contributes to other 
research streams, in particular the literature on organizational demography, by examining 
the relevance of theory and a limited number of constructs, frequently applied in group 
and TMT studies, in a board context. 
 
This dissertation also has important implications for practitioners. For companies, the 
findings on the key determinants of board task performance could serve the purpose of 
board evaluations. In addition, this research has practical relevance for the selection 
process of (new) non-executive, independent directors as it highlights the importance of 
having an appropriate mix of competences on board. For institutional investors and rating 
agencies, this research highlights the danger of limiting attention to structural board 
characteristics when assessing the quality of corporate governance at a company level. It 
stresses the need to refine the scoring criteria and weighting methodology of the 
screening devices as well as to apply a flexible approach when evaluating boards of 
directors on a global scale. And finally, this research is also of particular interest to policy 
makers, concerned about stimulating an appropriate corporate governance environment. 
The research is a modest attempt to provide some academic evidence for current and 
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future governance reforms. In particular, the findings suggest that a broad (with attention 
also paid to the ‘soft’ aspects of corporate governance) and flexible (with attention also 
paid to the board’s strategic role) approach should be used when designing, adapting and 
monitoring corporate governance codes. In addition, the findings suggest that policy 
makers should reflect on ways to balance the benefits and costs of governance reforms. 
 xv
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The board of directors : questions about its effectiveness ...................................... 3 
1.2 Research questions .................................................................................................. 6 
1.3 Research approach .................................................................................................. 7 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation .................................................................................... 9 
1.5 References ............................................................................................................. 11 
 
2 THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS WITHIN THE CORPORATE  
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK ....................................................................... 15 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 The board of directors at the heart of corporate governance ................................ 16 
2.2.1 The concept of corporate governance ........................................................... 16 
2.2.2 The organization of boards of directors ........................................................ 18 
2.3 Why a board of directors? The basic theoretical perspectives .............................. 21 
2.3.1 Agency theory ............................................................................................... 22 
2.3.2 Managerial hegemony theory ....................................................................... 22 
2.3.3 Stewardship theory ........................................................................................ 24 
2.3.4 Resource dependency theory ........................................................................ 25 
2.4 The board of directors within the Belgian corporate governance environment .... 27 
2.4.1 Ownership and control of Belgian companies .............................................. 27 
2.4.1.1 The 'dominant firm logic' paradigm .......................................................... 27 
2.4.1.2 Shareholder structure and ownership concentration in Belgium .............. 28 
2.4.1.3 Implication of ownership concentration on managerial hegemony and 
agency theory ............................................................................................ 32 
2.4.2 The board of directors of Belgian companies ............................................... 33 
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 36 
2.6 References ............................................................................................................. 37 
 
 
 xvi
 
3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................... 41 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 41 
3.2 The choice of a coordinated qualitative research methodology ............................ 42 
3.3 Research strategy and methods associated with the first part of the research 
project ................................................................................................................... 45 
3.3.1 Research strategy: a mixed methods research .............................................. 45 
3.3.1.1 Definition .................................................................................................. 45 
3.3.1.2 Strengths and weaknesses of a mixed methods research .......................... 46 
3.3.1.3 Selecting the mixed methods research design .......................................... 47 
3.3.2 Methods ......................................................................................................... 49 
3.3.2.1 Data collection .......................................................................................... 49 
3.3.2.2 Data analysis ............................................................................................. 54 
3.3.3 Legitimation in mixed methods research ...................................................... 58 
3.4 Research strategy and methods associated with the second part of the research 
project ................................................................................................................... 60 
3.4.1 Research strategy: a case study ..................................................................... 60 
3.4.1.1 Definition .................................................................................................. 60 
3.4.1.2 Motivation for the case study strategy ...................................................... 61 
3.4.1.3 Case study designs .................................................................................... 62 
3.4.1.4 Common prejudices against case study research and the actions taken ... 63 
3.4.2 Methods ......................................................................................................... 66 
3.4.2.1 The single case study ................................................................................ 66 
3.4.2.2 Multiple sources of evidence .................................................................... 67 
3.4.2.3 Documentation .......................................................................................... 71 
3.4.2.4 Data analysis ............................................................................................. 72 
3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 75 
3.6 References ............................................................................................................. 77 
 
4 IDENTIFYING KEY DETERMINANTS OF EFFECTIVE BOARDS OF 
DIRECTORS ......................................................................................................... 81 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 81 
 xvii
4.2 Theoretical background ........................................................................................ 83 
4.3 Methods ................................................................................................................. 89 
4.3.1 Sample and data collection for the qualitative phase .................................... 90 
4.3.1.1 Sample ....................................................................................................... 90 
4.3.1.2 Data collection .......................................................................................... 91 
4.3.2 Sample and data collection for the quantitative phase .................................. 92 
4.3.2.1 Sample ....................................................................................................... 92 
4.3.2.2 Data collection .......................................................................................... 93 
4.4 Results ................................................................................................................... 93 
4.4.1 Qualitative analysis ....................................................................................... 93 
4.4.2 Quantitative analysis ..................................................................................... 99 
4.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 105 
4.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 109 
4.7 References ........................................................................................................... 110 
 
5 DEVELOPING A PROCESS-ORIENTED MODEL FOR BOARD 
EFFECTIVENESS .............................................................................................. 116 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 116 
5.2 Explaining the inconclusive findings in board research ..................................... 118 
5.3 Differentiating boards of directors from other organizational teams .................. 120 
5.4 Presenting a theoretical research framework of board effectiveness .................. 123 
5.4.1 Defining board effectiveness ...................................................................... 124 
5.4.2 Cohesiveness and debate as intervening variables ...................................... 128 
5.4.3 The effects of board characteristics on board processes ............................. 131 
5.4.4 The moderating role of conflict norms ....................................................... 136 
5.4.5 Indirect effects of board characteristics : the board processes-task 
performance link ......................................................................................... 138 
5.5 Limitations and boundary conditions of the model ............................................ 139 
5.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 142 
5.7 References ........................................................................................................... 143 
 
 
 xviii
6 BOARD EFFECTIVENESS IN PRACTICE: A CASE STUDY ................... 152 
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 152 
6.2 Background ......................................................................................................... 153 
6.3 Research design .................................................................................................. 155 
6.3.1 Case study method ...................................................................................... 156 
6.3.2 Sources of information ................................................................................ 156 
6.4 Presentation of the case study ............................................................................. 157 
6.4.1 The Company’s environment ...................................................................... 157 
6.4.2 The Company’s mission, strategy and activities ......................................... 158 
6.4.3 The Company’s financial position .............................................................. 160 
6.4.4 The company’s governance structure ......................................................... 162 
6.4.4.1 Shareholder structure .............................................................................. 162 
6.4.4.2 Board of directors ................................................................................... 163 
6.4.4.2.1 The composition of the board of directors .......................................... 163 
6.4.4.2.2 Board committees ............................................................................... 166 
6.4.4.2.3 Comparison with an average board of directors of Belgian listed 
companies ........................................................................................... 167 
6.4.4.3 Management ............................................................................................ 167 
6.4.4.4 Supervision and control .......................................................................... 168 
6.4.5 Concluding remarks .................................................................................... 168 
6.5 Analysis of the relationships between the determinants of board effectiveness . 169 
6.5.1 Board task performance as output ............................................................... 169 
6.5.2 The key inputs: size and composition of the board ..................................... 175 
6.5.3 Board processes: transforming inputs to output .......................................... 177 
6.5.3.1 The effects of board size and composition on debate ............................. 178 
6.5.3.2 The moderating role of conflict norms ................................................... 183 
6.5.3.3 The effects of board size and composition on cohesiveness ................... 184 
6.5.3.4 The effects of debate and cohesiveness on board task performance ...... 188 
6.5.4 Board roles and contingency factors ........................................................... 191 
6.6 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 194 
 xix
6.7 Reconsideration of our research framework: a system view on board effectiveness
 ............................................................................................................................. 196 
6.7.1 Basic systems characteristics ...................................................................... 197 
6.7.2 A congruence model for board effectiveness .............................................. 198 
6.8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 200 
6.9 References ........................................................................................................... 202 
 
7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 207 
7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 207 
7.2 Main findings and conclusions ........................................................................... 208 
7.2.1 Insights into the key drivers of board effectiveness .................................... 208 
7.2.2 The influence of board processes on a  board’s  task performance ............ 215 
7.3 Implications of the study ..................................................................................... 219 
7.3.1 Implications for management science ......................................................... 220 
7.3.2 Implications for practitioners ...................................................................... 223 
7.3.2.1 Companies ............................................................................................... 223 
7.3.2.2 Institutional investors and other market parties ...................................... 225 
7.3.2.3 Policy makers .......................................................................................... 227 
7.4 Limitations of the study ...................................................................................... 230 
7.4.1 Methodological limitations ......................................................................... 230 
7.4.2 Scope limitations ......................................................................................... 233 
7.5 Directions for future research ............................................................................. 234 
7.6 References ........................................................................................................... 240 
 
8 APPENDICES ..................................................................................................... 244 
Appendix 1: code list ...................................................................................................... 244 
Appendix 2: case study protocol ..................................................................................... 248 
Appendix 3: questionnaires ............................................................................................. 256 
Appendix 4: detailed analysis of themes ........................................................................ 258 
Appendix 5: frequency tables ......................................................................................... 261 
Appendix 6: the Company’s corporate governance model ............................................. 263 
 xx
LIST OF TABLES  
 
Table 1: agency theory versus stewardship theory ........................................................... 25 
Table 2: summary of the basic theories and their view on the board of directors ............ 26 
Table 3: shareholder structure of Belgian listed companies ............................................. 28 
Table 4: shareholder structure of Belgian non-listed companies ...................................... 30 
Table 5: descriptive statistics on boards of directors in Belgium versus US and UK ...... 35 
Table 6: traditional comparison of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. 44 
Table 7: strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research ....................................... 47 
Table 8: strengths and weaknesses of main techniques used in the first part of the study 50 
Table 9: overview of the data analysis activities .............................................................. 57 
Table 10: strengths and weaknesses of documentation as a source of evidence .............. 67 
Table 11: documents used in the case study ..................................................................... 72 
Table 12: (qualitative) sample per directors’ role ............................................................. 91 
Table 13: (quantitative) sample per group of respondents ................................................ 92 
Table 14: ingredients of a good corporate board - directors' perspectives ....................... 94 
Table 15: descriptive statistics of importance rate for the full sample (N=150) .............. 99 
Table 16: descriptive statistics of importance rate for sub-samples ............................... 100 
Table 17: descriptive statistics of corrigible rate for the full sample (N=75) ................. 101 
Table 18: descriptive statistics of corrigible rate for sub-samples .................................. 102 
Table 19: characteristics differentiating boards as teams ............................................... 122 
Table 20: a board of directors’ role set ........................................................................... 124 
Table 21: key financial figures of the Company ............................................................. 160 
Table 22: key figures on share performance ................................................................... 161 
Table 23: the Company's shareholder structure .............................................................. 163 
Table 24: composition of the Company's board of directors .......................................... 165 
Table 25: role of the Company's board in strategy ......................................................... 171 
Table 26: benefits and risks of the Strategic and Business Development Committee .... 173 
Table 27: role of the Company's board in monitoring .................................................... 174 
Table 28: descriptive statistics on board diversity at the Company ................................ 176 
 xxi
Table 29: level of debate ................................................................................................. 178 
Table 30: conflict norms in the boardroom ..................................................................... 184 
Table 31: cohesiveness amongst the board members ..................................................... 185 
Table 32: board independence, diversity and cohesiveness ............................................ 187 
Table 33: debate, cohesiveness and board task performance ......................................... 190 
Table 34: information as key aspect of  board-management communication ................ 192 
 
 xxii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: research approach ................................................................................................ 8 
Figure 2: the corporate governance framework ................................................................ 18 
Figure 3: variants of the 1-tier board model ..................................................................... 19 
Figure 4: the agency and managerial hegemony perspectives on the relevance of boards 24 
Figure 5: cumulative holdings of the five largest shareholders in Belgium versus UK ... 29 
Figure 6: control of Belgian listed companies .................................................................. 30 
Figure 7: control of Belgian non-listed companies ........................................................... 31 
Figure 8: power relationships between shareholders and management ............................ 33 
Figure 9: sequential exploratory design ............................................................................ 48 
Figure 10: two-dimensional mixed method sampling design ........................................... 59 
Figure 11: linking importance and corrigible scores of determinants of board 
effectiveness .................................................................................................. 103 
Figure 12: overview of the research framework ............................................................. 123 
Figure 13: the Company share compared to BEL20 and Euro STOKX ......................... 162 
Figure 14: a congruence model for board effectiveness ................................................. 200 
 
 
 1
1 Introduction 
 
 
Since the mid-eighties corporate governance has attracted a great deal of interest. The 
initial impetus was given by the Anglo-American codes of good corporate governance, 
like the Cadbury Code (1992) in the UK, the Principles and Recommendations of the 
American Law Institute (1984) and the Treadway Commission (1987) in the US (Van den 
Berghe and De Ridder, 1999; Wymeersch and Hopt, 1997). By the nineties corporate 
governance had reached Continental Europe as well as other parts of the world. Different 
reasons are given to explain why corporate governance became so prominent on such a 
large scale: (i) the takeover wave of the 1980s, (ii) pension fund reforms and the growth 
of private savings, (iii) the worldwide wave of privatisation of the past two decades, (iv) 
deregulation and the integration of capital markets, (v) the East Asia financial crisis, 
which has put the spotlight on corporate governance in emerging markets, and vi) a series 
of corporate scandals (Becht et.al., 2002). Especially, a number of corporate malpractices 
(Enron, Worldcom, Ahold, Marconi etc.) have recently triggered a fresh round of 
governance reforms. Basic principles and rules are being reviewed and strengthened in 
order to reinstall investor confidence. Several actions have been announced or installed to 
prevent similar failures in the future, the issue of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act being the most 
controversial legislative intervention in this respect. 
 
In Belgium, the debate on corporate governance has been going on since the mid-‘90s. 
Unlike in many other countries, the development was not driven by a financial crisis or 
corporate failures, although some incidents have probably led to a greater interest in 
corporate governance issues (Van den Berghe and Levrau (eds), 1998). More of a 
concern was the danger of gratuitously copying Anglo-American corporate governance 
recommendations without taking into account the particularities of the Belgian corporate 
governance environment (e.g. an overwhelming impact of controlling shareholders). 
However, there was also a growing awareness that Belgian companies would have to live 
up to high corporate governance standards in order to compete in a globalising capital 
market. In this respect, installing the proper corporate governance mechanisms provides 
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companies with a competitive advantage in attracting capital, reducing the financial risks 
for investors, and consequently, the cost of capital (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003). 
 
Corporate governance concerned with setting priorities, delegating power and organizing 
accountability, is seen as an important means to wealth creation (Becht et.al., 2002). In 
particular, institutional investors strongly believe in the positive performance effects of 
good governance, and are important players in fostering and enforcing good corporate 
governance. As corporate governance has an impact on the financial risk of their 
portfolio, it became an integrated part of their investment strategy (McKinsey & 
Company, 2002; Nesbitt, 1995). But due to the fact that corporate governance structures 
and practices vary widely between countries and companies, investors need some way of 
codifying the complex web in order to compare risk/reward profiles of global investment 
recommendations on a common base. Not surprisingly, this development has stimulated 
the rise of numerous corporate governance ratings. The latter provides investors with a 
means of judging the level of corporate governance and are frequently used as a 
screening device in analysing and measuring the related risks when making an investment 
decision (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003; Mallin, 2001). 
 
This direct relationship with practice has incontestably stimulated academic research 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance research is mainly concentrated 
around three topics: ownership and control (Becht and Mayer, 2001; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000; La Porta et. al., 1999; Morck et.al., 1988; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), 
boards of directors (see e.g. the review by Johnson et.al., 1996), and managerial issues 
(such as CEO succession, tenure and compensation) (Coles et.al, 2001; Zajac and 
Westphal, 1996 and 1995). In essence, the overwhelming majority of studies focus on the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms available to protect shareholders’ interest from 
(potential) managerial abuses in settings where organizational ownership and control are 
separated (Daily et.al., 2003). Simultaneously, the literature on corporate governance has 
been dominated by one theoretical perspective, namely agency theory. The latter provides 
a rationale for how a modern organization can be governed, given the assumption that 
managers are self-interested and in a context where they do not bear the full wealth 
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effects of their decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The manager-shareholder conflict 
is of particular relevance in countries where dispersed ownership is prevalent. Much of 
the theoretical thinking and research in governance has been, to a large extent, shaped by 
the observed developments in large US corporations. It may come as no surprise that the 
bulk of empirical studies are conducted in Anglo-American countries, driven by a US-
oriented (quantitative) research tradition (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005).  
 
From these observations, the two-fold desire emerged (i) to investigate the effectiveness 
of one specific governance mechanism, namely the board of directors, within another 
setting, namely in a (Belgian) context which is characterized by concentrated ownership, 
and (ii) to better understand board practices by relying on a pluralistic theoretical lens and 
a qualitative research approach. 
 
1.1 The board of directors : questions about its effectiveness 
 
Questions about the governance of corporations, in particular the role and function of the 
board of directors, are very much alive today. Boards of directors are considered to be an 
important internal governance mechanism to safeguard shareholders’ interest (Walsh and 
Seward, 1990) and they are increasingly held accountable for the organisations they 
govern (Hendry and Kiel, 2004). For years, boards of directors have been the subject of 
considerable scrutiny both in academic research and for the public at large (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004). High profile corporate collapses, leading to major economic 
losses, have raised serious doubts on the effectiveness of boards in protecting the interests 
of shareholders and other stakeholders (Taylor, 2003). A significant message was sent out 
by the Toronto Stock Exchange (1994) when it published its first corporate governance 
report entitled “where were the directors?”. Given the fact that boards of directors are 
expected to independently monitor management and to provide corporate stewardship, it 
is not uncommon for many market parties to attribute, to some extent, the corporate 
failures to the inability of boards to operate effectively.  
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Stimulated by this practical relevance, much of the academic research on boards of 
directors has focused on whether boards are effective in aligning management and 
shareholders’ interest, and derivatively, to what extent boards of directors contribute to a 
company’s financial performance (Coles et.al., 2001). The dominant claim is that 
independent boards of directors are thought to be the most effective because their 
functioning is not compromised by dependence on the CEO or the organisation (Lynall 
et.al., 2003). As such, mainstream board research has been empirically investigating 
direct relationships between board structure and performance outcomes (Huse, 2005(a); 
Johnson et.al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) while considering the number of board 
members, the insider/outsider ratio and CEO duality as important measures for board 
independence, and hence, effectiveness (Huse, 2005(b); Van den Berghe and Levrau, 
2004; Leblanc and Gillies, 2003). Most studies have linked one or more of these board 
attributes to a measure of financial performance. A simple example is the relationship 
between the board size or the ratio of outside independent directors and company 
performance measured by Economic Value Added (EVA) (Coles et.al., 2001; Dalton et. 
al., 1998).   
 
In addition, a second stream of research exists in which the composition of the board is 
linked to the performance of board roles. In particular, a board’s monitoring effectiveness 
is well-studied using critical decisions - in the sense that these decisions involve a 
potential conflict of interest between management and shareholders - as a proxy. These 
critical decisions relate to CEO’s total compensation, CEO’s incentive pay, unrelated 
diversification, R&D expenditure, debt intensity, takeover defences and CEO turnover 
(see Deutsch, 2005 for a review). An important conclusion is that these simple direct 
input-output links have driven board research for almost two decades but have provided 
very little in the way of consistent findings (Daily et.al., 2003; Coles et.al., 2001).  
 
In fact, mainstream board research is strongly influenced by a quantitative research 
tradition treating the board of directors as a “black box” (Huse, 2005(a)). The reason for 
this is that boards of directors are quite difficult to study. Of all the major institutions in 
society, they are probably the most closed and their workings have largely been shielded 
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from (public) view. The practical difficulties of investigating elite groups, such as boards 
of directors, have restricted the information that can be collected, and hence, the range of 
researchable issues. As a consequence, the vast majority of empirical studies have relied 
on easy retrievable data, available through annual reports, regulatory filings and corporate 
releases (Daily et.al., 2003). Only recently, a small subset of notable qualitative board 
studies emerged (e.g. Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Huse et.al., 2005; Roberts et.al., 2005). 
Although previous research has enhanced our insights and knowledge on boards of 
directors, the findings of these recent studies have stressed the need to take another 
course in board research. For example, Roberts et.al. (2005) pointed out that a well-
established body of research into corporate governance exists, based on the assumptions 
of agency theory, yet in comparison, our knowledge on how boards and directors actually 
behave or conduct their roles effectively is relatively limited. 
 
While boards of directors are presumed to be vital for a company’s survival, and attract 
much attention in practice (e.g. the many corporate governance codes and 
recommendations, corporate governance rating systems etc.), recent developments and 
initiatives are based on little robust evidence about significant board-performance 
relationships as well as on a poor understanding of how boards actually work (Leblanc 
and Gillies, 2005). In addition, there is a growing consensus both in literature and 
practice that progress in the field will largely depend on better insights into actual board 
practices, board processes and dynamics. This kind of research, however, highlights the 
need to consider alternative research methods, including various data collection and 
interpretation techniques (Huse, 2005(b)). Pye and Pettigrew (2005), for example, noted 
in their agenda for future research that “although it is some twelve years since Pettigrew 
(1992) first called for more process studies which address the dynamics of boards, their 
behaviour and outcome, the need for such work continues and is to be encouraged, for 
both academics and practitioners…. irrespective of the fact that such intangible matters 
are not easy to address, either theoretically and methodologically”(p.35). 
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1.2 Research questions 
 
Our research tries to fill, at least to some extent, the gap observed before. In particular, 
this dissertation addresses two main research questions: 
 
1) What are the key factors that contribute to the effectiveness of boards of 
directors? 
2) How do board processes influence the task performance of boards of 
directors? 
 
As previously noted, the board of directors is a common target in corporate governance 
reforms. Institutional shareholders, governance activists and many corporate governance 
codes advocate changes in board composition which are assumed to empower boards of 
directors and enhance their effectiveness (Westphal, 1998). In addition, numerous rating 
agencies have started to score the quality of corporate governance at a company level and 
the assessment of board of directors is consistently receiving high priority in this process 
(Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003). It is striking to see that both market and academic 
interest is centred around the same limited number of structural board attributes, which 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) labelled the “usual suspects”, with the independence of 
boards of directors presumed to be the cornerstone of effective governance. At the same 
time, there is an increased awareness that an appropriate structure is an insufficient 
condition for boards of directors to add value and most studies on boards of directors are 
now being criticized for their narrow research approach (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; 
Daily et.al., 2003). The objective of the first research question – investigating the main 
factors that potentially contribute to board effectiveness – is to identify and to explore 
the broad variety of criteria that may influence the effectiveness of boards. In 
particular, the lack of consistent findings in traditional board research create the need to 
go beyond the established formal measures of board effectiveness in order to detect 
additional important criteria that may have been overlooked so far. Until now, 
mainstream board research has not provided a unanimous answer to the question ‘what 
 7
constitutes an effective board of directors’, and by consequence, no convincing evidence 
is provided on what to look for when assessing or evaluating the effectiveness of boards.  
 
The second research question – examining the influence of board processes on the task 
performance of boards of directors – focuses on the more intangible and behavioural 
aspects of board conduct. The objective is to get a better understanding of how structural 
and non-structural factors are interconnected to form a complex set of interrelated criteria 
which actually shape the effectiveness of boards in performing their key tasks. The 
underlying rationale is that the overall emphasis on a limited number of structural 
measures implies a risk of assessing the effectiveness of boards in terms of form rather 
than substance. Unfortunately, too often, boards of directors are judged by living up to 
formal standards or benchmarks. Many of the corporate governance reforms lead to a 
kind of “box ticking” exercise with some superficial or cosmetic adaptations (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2002). The failure of numerous companies has already proven that a 
narrow focus on compliance is dangerous because it creates a false sense of security. 
Similarly, there is a growing belief that effective boards of directors can only add value to 
an organization to the extent they are able to operate as a team (Nadler et.al., 2006; Huse 
et. al., 2005; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Conger et.al., 2001; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
This belief has engendered the need to pay more attention to the inner workings of the 
board of directors in order to better understand the influence of board dynamics on the 
effectiveness of boards. 
 
1.3 Research approach 
 
Boards of directors have been the subject of considerable research efforts. As explained 
in paragraph 1.1, two research streams prevail and show some common features: (i) the 
existence of significant relationships between the input and output variables is not 
systematically supported, (ii) agency theory appears to be the dominant underpinning 
theoretical perspective, and (iii) the empirical studies are characterised by an almost 
exclusive reliance on quantitative research approaches using secondary data (Daily et.al., 
2003). Only very recently has a new stream of board research started evolving. 
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This dissertation links up with this new emerging direction and contributes to the 
literature on board of directors and the field of corporate governance more generally, by 
essentially proposing a new research approach and new research areas. Furthermore, this 
dissertation takes into account the fact that any research method needs to be closely 
interrelated with the nature of the research questions and the required level of analysis 
(Creswell, 1994). Hence, we have decided to realise our research objectives by means of 
a two-fold approach, as illustrated by Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: research approach 
PART 1
Identification of 
determinants of
board effectiveness
PART 2
Relationships and 
interdepencies
between determinants
of board effectiveness
with special attention
to board processes
Mixed methods research
qualitative + quantitative
Theoretical research 
framework
Case study
Explorative
Descriptive
Explanatory
Generating and validating of propositions
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS
  
 
This dissertation is mainly characterised by a coordinated qualitative research 
methodology and - from a conceptual point of view - it can be broken down in two 
subsequent research parts. The first part corresponds with the first research question and 
objective, and is mainly intended to be explorative and descriptive. This part aims at 
getting a more in-depth insight into the ‘true drivers’ of board effectiveness in order to 
reveal some additional proxies for understanding the effectiveness of boards of directors.  
The research strategy that fits this purpose best, is a mixed methods research design 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). The findings of the first part serve as an input for the 
second part which corresponds with the second research question. This part aims at 
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enhancing the knowledge on how multiple factors interrelate, and particularly, to what 
extent ‘board process’ variables impact board effectiveness. In order to obtain this 
objective, a theoretical research framework which - in essence - follows an input-process-
output approach will be developed. Next, the identified relationships will be validated 
using a case study (Yin, 2003). As such, this part is mainly intended to be explanatory by 
empirically challenging our research framework and providing evidence for a new model 
for assessing board effectiveness.  
 
The field studies focus on boards of directors of Belgian companies (listed as well as non-
listed). Empirical data for both parts are gathered by several means. The most important 
source of data is a series of interviews with directors, and - to a lesser extent - with 
experts in the field. Taking into account the subjective nature of qualitative data, and 
particularly, the limitations of generalizability when using a case study approach, much 
attention is paid to the technique of triangulation (Jick, 1979). Moreover, the 
interpretation of data is guided and backboned by theoretical perspectives and existing 
literature. In other words, throughout the whole dissertation there is a continuous 
interplay between theory and empirical findings. 
 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
 
Taking into account the two-fold research approach, the methodological choices involved 
and the chronological development of the research project, this dissertation reflects the 
following structure : 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the research topic and clarifies the research focus. In particular, the 
chapter briefly presents the concept of corporate governance and describes how to frame 
the board of directors within its broader context. In addition, it discusses the prevalent 
theoretical perspectives which underpin board research. Finally, this chapter highlights 
the particularities of the Belgian corporate governance environment with respect to the 
ownership structure as well as to the structure and operation of boards of directors. 
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Chapter 3 provides a more detailed explanation of the methodology used to carry out this 
research project. The research strategies as well as the methods for the collection and 
analysis of the empirical data are discussed in detail. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 represent the core of this dissertation and comprise three studies in 
accordance with our research approach. Chapter 4 presents the results of the first 
empirical study and provides descriptive information about the broad spectrum of factors 
that may contribute to the effectiveness of boards. In Chapter 5, a process-oriented model 
for board effectiveness is developed. This theoretical research framework reflects an 
input-process-output approach and draws on a variety of sources. Chapter 6 presents the 
case of the board of directors of a large Belgian listed company. The case study 
represents the second empirical study and is used to examine and validate the 
propositions derived from the theoretical research model.  
 
Chapter 7 is the final chapter and provides, next to the overall conclusions, an overview 
of the implications of this research, the limitations, and the avenues for further research. 
 
 11
1.5 References 
American Law Institute. (1984). Principles of corporate governance. 
 
Becht M., Bolton P., Röel A. (2002). Corporate Governance and Control. National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper 9371. 
 
Becht M., Mayer C. (2001). Introduction. In Barca F. Becht M. (eds.) (2001). The 
Control of Corporate Europe. Oxford University Press. 1-45. 
 
Cadbury A. (1992). The code of best practice. Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance and Gee and Co. Ltd.  
 
Coles J.W., McWilliams V.B., Sen N. (2001). An examination of the relationship of 
governance mechanisms to performance. Journal of Management. 27(1): 23-50. 
 
Conger J.A., Lawler E.E. III, Finegold D.L. (2001). Corporate Boards. New Strategies 
for adding Value at the Top. Jossey-Bass Inc. A Wiley Company. California. 
 
Creswell J. W. (1994). Research design: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
London: Sage. 
 
Daily C.M., Dalton D.R., Cannella jr. A.A. (2003). Corporate governance: decades of 
dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review. 28(3): 371-382. 
 
Dalton D.R., Daily C.M., Ellstrand A.E., Johnson J.L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of 
board composition leadership structure and financial performance. Strategic Management 
Journal. 19(3): 269-290. 
 
Demsetz H., Lehn K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: causes and 
consequences. Journal of Political Economy. 93: 11-55. 
 
Deutsch Y. (2005). The impact of board composition on firms’ critical decisions: a meta-
analytic review. Journal of Management. 31(3): 424-444. 
 
Finkelstein S., Mooney A.C. (2003). Not the usual suspects: how to use board process to 
make boards better. Academy of Management Executive. 17(2): 101-111. 
 
Forbes D.P., Milliken F. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: understanding 
board of directors as  strategic decision-making groups. Academy of Management Review. 
24(3): 489-505. 
 
Gabrielsson J., Huse M. (2005). Context behavior and evolution. Challenges in research 
on boards and governance. International Studies of Management and Organization. 
34(2): 11-36. 
 
 12
Hendry K., Kiel G.C. (2004). The role of the board in firm strategy: integrating agency 
and organisational control perspectives. Corporate Governance – An international 
Review. 12(4): 500- 519. 
 
Huse M. (2005)(a). Corporate governance: understanding important contingencies. 
Corporate Ownership & Control. 2(4): 41-50. 
 
Huse M. 2005(b). Accountability and creating accountability: a framework for exploring 
behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. Britisch Journal of Management. 16 
Special Issue S65-S79. 
 
Huse M., Minichilli A., Schoning M. (2005). Corporate boards as assets in the new 
Europe: the value of process-oriented boardroom dynamics. Organizational Dynamics. 
34(3): 285-297. 
 
Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency 
costs and ownership structure.  Journal of Financial Economics. 3(4): 305-360. 
 
Jick T.D. (1979). Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods : triangulation in action. 
Administrative Science Quarterly. 24: 602-611. 
 
Johnson J.L., Daily C.M., Ellstrand A.E. (1996). Boards of directors: a review and 
research agenda. Journal of Management. 22(3): 409-438. 
 
La Porta R. Lopez-de-Silanes F. Shleifer A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the 
world Journal of Finance. 54(2): 471-517. 
 
Leblanc R., Gillies J. (2005). Inside the Board Room. How Boards Really work and the 
coming Revolution in Corporate Governance. Jossey-Bass Inc. A Wiley Company. 
California. 
 
Leblanc R., Gillies J. (2003). The coming revolution in corporate governance. Ivey 
Business Journal. Issue September/October. 
 
Lynall M.D., Golden B.R., Hillman A.M. (2003). Board composition from adolescence to 
maturity: a multitheoretic view. Academy of Management Review. 28(3): 416-431. 
 
Mallin C. (2001). Corporate governance rating systems. Corporate Governance – An 
international Review. Editorial. 9(4): 257-258. 
 
McKinsey & Company. (2002). Global Investor Opinion Survey: Key Findings. 
 
Morck R., Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation. 
An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics. 20: 293-315. 
 
 
 13
Nadler D.A., Behan B.A., Nadler M.B. (2006). Building better boards. A blueprint for 
effective governance.  Jossey-Bass. A Wiley Imprint. San Francisco. 
 
Nesbitt S.L. (1995). The CalPERS’ effect: a corporate governance update. Wilshire 
Association Incorporated. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. 200-209. 
 
Pettigrew A. (1992). On studying Managerial Elites. Strategic Management Journal. 
13(8): 163-182.  
 
Pye A., Pettigrew A. (2005). Studying board context process and dynamics: some 
challenges for the future. Britisch Journal of Management. 16 Special Issue S27-S38. 
 
Roberts J.T., Mc Nulty P., Stiles P. (2005). Beyond agency conceptions of the work of 
the non-executive directors: creating accountability in the boardroom. Britisch Journal of 
Management. 16 Special Issue S5-S6. 
 
Shleifer A., Vishny R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance. 
52(2): 737-783. 
 
Taylor B. (2003). Corporate Governance: the crisis investors’ losses and the decline in 
public trust. Corporate Governance – An international Review. 11(3): 155-163. 
 
Teddlie C., Tashakkori A. (eds.) (2003). Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and 
Behavioural Research. Thousand Oaks. Sage Publications. 
 
Thomsen S., Pedersen T. (2000). Ownership structure and economic performance in the 
largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal. 21: 689-705.  
 
Toronto Stock Exchange Committtee on Corporate Governance in Canada.(1994). 
Report: Where were the directors? Guidelines for improved corporate governance in 
Canada. 
 
Treadway Commission. (1987). The Treadway report. Report of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
 
Van den Berghe L., Levrau A. (2004). Evaluating boards of directors: what constitutes a 
good corporate board? Corporate Governance – An international Review. 12(4): 461-
478. 
 
Van den Berghe L., Levrau A. (2003). Measuring the quality of corporate governance: in 
search for a tailormade approach? Journal of General Management. 28(3): 71-86. 
 
Van den Berghe L., De Ridder L. (1999). International Standardisation of Good 
Corporate Governance. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
 14
Van den Berghe L., Levrau A. (eds.) (1998). Corporate Governance- Het Belgisch 
Perspectief. Het Instituut voor Bestuurders. Intersentia. 
 
Walsh J.P., Seward J.K. (1990). On the efficiency of internal and external corporate 
control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review. 15(3): 421-458. 
 
Westphal J.D. (1998). Board games : how CEOs adapt to increases in structural board 
independence from management. Administrative Science Quarterly. 43(3): 511-537. 
 
Wymeersch E., Hopt K.L. (eds.) (1997). Comparative Corporate Governance. Essays 
and materials. De Gruyter. 
 
Yin R.K. (2003). Case study research – design and methods. Applied Social Research 
Methods Series. 5. Sage publications. 
 
Zahra S.A., Pearce II. J.A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance: a review and integrative model. Journal of Management. 15(2): 291-334. 
 
Zajac E.J., Westphal J.D. (1996). Who shall succeed? How CEO/board preferences and 
power affect the choice of new CEOs. Academy of Management Journal. 39: 64-90. 
 
Zajac E.J., Westphal J.D. (1995). Accounting for the explanations of CEO compensation: 
substance ande symbolism. Administrative Science Quarterly. 40: 283-306. 
 15
2  The board of directors within the corporate  
governance framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
As outlined in Chapter 1, much of the academic and public attention is directed to 
corporate governance, in particular to the role and function of the board of directors. The 
latter is commonly viewed as a critical governance device, but despite a well-established 
body of research, many aspects of board effectiveness are still poorly understood. The 
objectives of this dissertation reflect our desire to enhance the insights into board 
practices within a non-US setting. In essence, the research aims at understanding what 
factors contribute to the effectiveness of boards, how these factors interrelate and to what 
extent board processes have an impact. In this respect, it attempts to open up, as much as 
possible, the “black box” of actual board conduct by also examining the inner workings 
of boards of directors. Our field studies focus on boards of directors of Belgian 
companies and depart from the assumption that a board of directors matters for the host 
company. To further clarify our research focus, it is necessary to frame the board of 
directors within the broader context of corporate governance as well as within the specific 
Belgian corporate governance environment. 
 
In this chapter, we first discuss the concept of corporate governance and indicate how the 
board of directors fits in the general corporate governance framework. Second, we touch 
upon the typology of board models to explain the way boards of directors are organized 
(in practice). Third, we describe the prevalent theoretical perspectives on boards of 
directors - as they provide the rationale for mainstream board research. Finally, we 
provide an insight into the particularities of the Belgian corporate governance 
environment with respect to the ownership structure as well as the board structure and 
operation. Understanding the Belgian context is useful because it differs, to a large 
extent, from the Anglo-American governance context where most of the studies on 
boards of directors have taken place.  
 16
2.2 The board of directors at the heart of corporate governance 
 
2.2.1 The concept of corporate governance 
 
Although the concept of corporate governance has only emerged in the last two decades 
(Monks and Minow, 1996), it has exponentially entered the public domain. Still, there are 
widely divergent views on the nature of corporate governance and by consequence it is 
not easy to describe the concept unambiguously (Bain and Band, 1996). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) define corporate governance rather narrowly by stating that “it deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment” (p.737). John and Senbet (1998) propose the more 
comprehensive definition that “corporate governance deals with mechanisms by which 
stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management 
such that their interests are protected” (p.372). These two examples illustrate that the 
notion of corporate governance is perceived differently from one person to another and 
even across countries. Tricker (1993) stated in this respect: “corporate governance can 
mean many things to those concerned. Institutional investors have a different perspective 
from corporate regulators, board members from researchers. Insights can be drawn from 
the professional and theoretical worlds of organisational behaviour, jurisprudence, 
financial economics, accountancy and auditing as well as from the experiential worlds of 
director behaviour and board practices”(p.2). 
 
To embody the varied approaches of defining corporate governance, Van den Berghe 
et.al. (2002) developed a hierarchical governance framework (see Figure 2). The simplest 
view on corporate governance focuses on the make up and operation of the board of 
directors (level 1 in Figure 2). This is the central perspective of most codes and 
recommendations on corporate governance. Taken in a broader context, corporate 
governance is viewed from the angle of the so-called corporate governance tripod (level 
2), whereby special attention is paid to the relationships between shareholders, directors 
and management. This angle relies to a large extent on the premise of separation of 
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ownership and control. It receives the most attention in economic research, in legal 
disciplines and in practice. From a modern management perspective, a more holistic 
approach at the corporate level is advocated (level 3) because companies are becoming 
increasingly structured in national and international groups. Global competition within 
the network and knowledge economy is giving rise to embedding companies in a cluster 
of networks with both suppliers and clients, while talent is becoming a scarce production 
factor. Therefore, greater attention is given to the company’s core stakeholders 
(employers, customers and suppliers). From a socio-economic and chiefly political angle, 
a company is being forced to act as a corporate citizen (level 4). This perspective has 
broadened the purpose of corporate governance by including all kinds of stakeholders and 
ensuring a balanced weighting of their interests. In such an approach, no further 
distinction is made between levels 3 and 4 and one refers simply to the stakeholder 
model. The latter attaches much interest to the sustainable or responsible enterprise. 
Lastly, at level 5, corporate governance relates to the question of the primary reason for a 
company's existence. The fundamental question is whether a company's raison d'être is to 
create shareholder value or to create prosperity for all stakeholders involved. The Anglo-
American corporate governance system favours the shareholder approach, whereas the 
broader stakeholder approach is more characteristic for the Continental European 
corporate governance system. Put differently, this level views corporate governance from 
a macro angle and refers to the national, European or the global level. 
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Figure 2: the corporate governance framework 
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As demonstrated by this framework, the concept of corporate governance spans levels of 
analysis from within the company to the nation-state and beyond. Of importance for this 
study is the recognition that the board of directors is essential to most approaches of 
corporate governance (Cochran and Wartick, 1988). Although we focus our research on 
the board of directors, its embedding in the corporate governance tripod and the broader 
environment can not be ignored. Besides, when studying boards of directors one should 
be aware of the existence of different board models. 
 
2.2.2 The organization of boards of directors 
 
Boards of directors do not come as a single uniform body. They differ substantially 
between companies and countries. In essence, a typology of two board models can be 
identified namely the 1-tier or unitary board and the 2-tier or dual board.  
 
In a 1-tier board model executive directors and non-executive directors are sitting 
together in one organizational layer (the so-called unitary board of directors) (Maasen, 
1999). Executive or inside directors are those who also fulfil a management function 
within the company. In contrast, non-executive directors come from outside the company 
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and some can be considered to be independent when they have no affiliations with the 
company, its shareholders nor its management (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999). 
There are many variants that exist regarding the composition of a 1-tier board as 
illustrated by Figure 3:  
 
A) Insider-dominated board model: the board of directors is composed of a 
predominance of executive (inside) directors. 
B) Outsider-dominated board model: the board of directors is dominated by non-
executive or independent directors.  
C) CEO-model: the CEO is the only executive sitting on the board of directors. 
 
Figure 3: variants of the 1-tier board model 
 
Non-executive / independent director
Executive director
CEO
CEO-MODELINSIDER-DOMINATED BOARD MODEL
OUTSIDER-DOMINATED 
BOARD MODEL
Source: adapted from Tricker (1998)
board of directors
management team
Manager
 
 
In addition, the leadership structure of 1-tier boards differs too. In some cases, the roles 
of chairman of the board and CEO are separated while in others the 1-tier board operates 
under CEO duality. The latter implies that the positions of CEO and chairman are 
combined. Board committees, such as audit-, remuneration- and nomination committees 
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are frequently installed by 1-tier boards in order to improve an effective operation of the 
board (Heidrick & Struggles, 2003; Egon Zehnder, 2003; Demb and Neubauer, 1992).  
 
A 2-tier board model is characterized by two organizational layers. The supervisory 
board (the upper layer) is entirely composed of non-executive directors. The latter may 
represent different parties such as employees, government, institutional investors etc. The 
management board (the lower layer) includes the executive directors (Maasen, 1999). In 
general, there is no overlap of membership between the two boards. In a 2-tier model, the 
executive managing director (CEO) is not allowed to act as chairman of the supervisory 
board. The legal separation of both bodies is a tangible way to distinct the responsibilities 
of managing and running the company from supervising and overseeing those responsible 
for the management function.  
 
The distinction between the two board models is embedded in the cultural and legal 
context. The 1-tier board model is considered to be more shareholder-oriented and is 
internationally the most prevalence. It is by far the only board model in Anglo-American 
countries such as the US, UK, Canada and Australia. In Continental Europe1, the 1-tier 
model can be found in Belgium, Italy and Spain. In contrast, the 2-tier board model is 
considered to be more stakeholder- or societal-oriented and is primarily found in some 
Continental European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. 
In practice, the (legal) differences are often blurred as the two models tend to converge, 
to some extent, across the spectrum of firms and countries (Van den Berghe et.al., 2002; 
Maasen, 1999). Illustrative in this respect is the fact that large companies in countries 
with a 1-tier board regime delegate a substantial amount of their responsibilities to a CEO 
who is assisted by an executive committee. The latter resembles the executive board in a 
2-tier board model. Pettet (2000) noted: “it might be argued that the way the UK boards 
have developed a de-facto division of function in recent years, means that while there are 
many technical differences between these and continental two-tier boards there is 
                                                 
1 In France, Finland, Norway and Switzerland, an optional system exists, implying that the basic board 
model is either 1-tier or 2-tier while an (legal) option is foreseen of the other model. The option to choose 
between a 1-tier or 2-tier board model is also incorporated in the constitution of the European Company. 
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probably not much practical difference in the way companies are actually managed and 
monitored by directors” (p.22).  
 
With respect to academic research on boards of directors, it seems that the distinction 
between the two board models has not been much of a concern to scholars. In fact, 
mainstream board research has focused on US boards and - to a lesser extent - UK 
boards, both being 1-tier in nature (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Little research attention has 
been devoted to dual board models (Turnbull, 1997). In addition, the underlying 
theoretical assumptions in board research are in force irrespective of the way boards of 
directors are organized in practice. 
 
2.3 Why a board of directors? The basic theoretical perspectives  
 
As previously noted, this research departs from the assumption that a board of directors is 
of value-added for its host company, and hence, in our study the board of directors is 
considered to be an important governance device. Still, the actual impact of boards has 
frequently been criticized. Many corporate governance scandals, in the US and abroad, 
reinforce this criticism and questions arise whether a board of directors really matters for 
a company. An answer is provided by the basic theoretical considerations on the role of 
the board of directors. In fact, a variety of theories about what a board of directors is 
supposed to do, are underpinning the work of researchers in different disciplines (Hung, 
1998). While agency theory dominates corporate governance research, managerial 
hegemony theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory provide additional 
theoretical foundations both as complements and contrasts to agency theory (Daily et.al., 
2003). Based on the underlying assumptions, each theoretical perspective leads to other 
prescriptions regarding the role and structure of the board (see also chapters 4 and 5). In 
what follows, the basic theoretical drivers for studying boards of directors will be briefly 
discussed. 
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2.3.1 Agency theory  
 
The dominant theoretical perspective in corporate governance and board research is 
agency theory (Daily et.al., 2003). Rooted in economics and finance, this theory reflects a 
conflict perspective as it is concerned with resolving problems that may occur in the 
relationship between two major parties, the principal (owner) and agent (the manager) 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency problems stem from the fact that 
“managers who initiate and implement important decisions are not the major residual 
claimants (shareholders) and therefore do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of 
their decisions” (Fama and Jensen, 1983:5). Agency theorists believe that managers 
(agents) are self-interested and may pursue opportunistic behaviour that may be in 
conflict with the goals of the owners (principals). This behaviour may ultimately destroy 
shareholder wealth. In this respect, Hoskisson and Turk (1990) noted that: “managers 
who pursue their own best interests may select different strategies than managers who 
pursue the interests of shareholders and maximize firm value”(p.462). Agency theory 
attributes a key role to the board of directors as the latter is considered to be the 
“economic institution that helps to solve the agency problems inherent in managing any 
organization” (Hermalin  and Weisbach, 2000:1). Put differently, the board of directors is 
one of the internal control mechanisms designed to address the conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders and to bring their interests into congruence (Walsh 
and Seward, 1990).  
 
2.3.2 Managerial hegemony theory  
 
Not everyone has sympathized with the agency view on boards of directors. In fact, the 
extent to which a board of directors is of added value for directing a company has been 
subject to considerable debate since the seminal work of Mace (1971). In 1971 he 
published a study, demonstrating that the role of the board was in fact minimal. He found 
that boards of directors failed (i) to establish corporate objectives, policies and strategies, 
(ii) to ask discerning questions, and (iii) to select the CEO. The boards’ questionable 
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performance was also pointed out by Drucker (1974) who described the board of 
directors as “an impotent ceremonial and legal fiction…” and later by Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989) who noted that too many boards act more like pawns of their CEO rather 
than the potentates the law intended them to be. This common view of a rather passive, 
ineffective board of directors is frequently labelled as managerial hegemony theory. 
Succinctly put, this theory suggests that the board of directors is weak, dominated by 
better informed management, ineffective in alleviating conflicts of interest and only 
serves to approve proposals put forward by management, a phenomenon known as 
“rubber stamping” (Herman, 1981). In essence, the weakness and passivity of a board of 
directors is mainly attributed to its dependence on management (Kosnik, 1987). Boards 
are thought to be ‘creatures of the CEO’ whereby management plays a major role in 
designing the board (Patton and Baker, 1987). It is argued that the CEO has a 
considerable influence of the choice of directors whereby loyalty to the CEO instead of 
competence is decisive. Because directors owe their positions to management, they 
depend on the discretion of the latter for their re-appointment (Hart, 1995; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). Related is the argument that the benefits offered by a directorship 
stimulate directors to comply rather than to expose vigilant behaviour (Hendry and Kiel, 
2004).   
 
It must be noted that agency and managerial hegemony perspectives share the same 
starting point, this is the notion of separation of ownership and control. The latter has 
been first identified by Adam Smith (1776) in his commentary on joint stock companies 
and was further elaborated in the twentieth century by the influential work of Berle and 
Means (1932). They argued that the separation of ownership and control leads to a diffuse 
ownership in which the power of shareholders is diluted. The weaker position of 
shareholders affords management a greater level of control and provides a potential 
danger of management entrenchment. Although the two theories represent a managerial 
perspective, their views on the value-added of boards of directors differ substantially. 
Agency theory assumes that boards of directors will identify with shareholder interests 
and use their experience in monitoring and decision-making to prevent management of 
any self-interested tendencies. In contrast, managerial hegemony theory asserts that the 
power of the CEO, to select and compensate directors, refrains the board of directors 
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from taking up an active role in order not to put board seats and associated benefits at 
risk. Figure 4 illustrates agency and managerial hegemony perspectives on the relevance 
of boards. 
 
Figure 4: the agency and managerial hegemony perspectives on the relevance of boards 
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2.3.3 Stewardship theory 
 
Probably the most notable alternative to agency theory is stewardship theory, tapping 
insights form sociology and psychology (Davis et.al., 1997). Proponents of stewardship 
theory argue against the self-interest opportunistic assumption of agency theory, claiming 
that managers are motivated by “a need to achieve, to gain intrinsic satisfaction through 
successfully performing inherently challenging work, to exercise responsibility and 
authority, and thereby gain recognition from peers and bosses” (Donaldson, 1990:375). 
Stewardship theorists perceive managers as good stewards of the company assets because 
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they have a range of non-financial motives which restrains them from misappropriating 
corporate resources at any price (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). A manager acts as a 
steward when he prefers working toward the best interest of the organization’s collective 
needs. Such a manager identifies with the organization and considers organizational 
consequences of his decisions first and foremost (Davis et al., 1997; Block, 1996). In this 
respect, proponents of stewardship theory stress a board-management relationship based 
on collaboration, instead of control as accentuated by agency theorists. Based on these 
assumptions, the stewardship perspective prescribes a service role for the board of 
directors, calling for boards to advise and enhance strategy formulation (Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis, 2003). Table 1 presents a comparison between stewardship theory and agency 
theory. 
Table 1: agency theory versus stewardship theory 
Agency Theory 
 
 Stewardship Theory 
 Assumptions 
 
 
Individualist 
Opportunism and self-interest 
Human tendencies Collectivist 
Cooperation 
 
Extrinsic 
 
Motivation 
 
Intrinsic 
 
Goal conflict 
(risk differential) 
Distrust 
 
Management-owner 
relations 
 
Goal alignment 
(firm identification) 
Trust 
 
Control 
Distrust 
 
Board-management 
relationship 
 
 
Collaboration 
Trust 
 Prescriptions  
 
Discipline and monitor 
 
Board’s primary role 
 
Service and advise 
 
Outsiders 
Non-duality 
 
Board structure 
 
Insiders 
CEO duality 
(Source: adapted from Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) 
 
2.3.4 Resource dependency theory 
 
From a different angle, resource dependency theory has also attracted the attention of 
corporate governance researchers. The resource dependence perspective, mainly 
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grounded in sociology and organizational theory, views a company as an open system, 
embedded in an environment comprised of other organizations on which the company 
depends (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The central postulate of this theory is that external 
parties hold resources which a business organization perceives as crucial for the 
realization of its internal objectives. In order to acquire and maintain these resources, a 
company seeks to establish links with its environment, including competitors and other 
stakeholders (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In this respect, a 
board of directors is considered to be a “cooptative” mechanism to access valuable 
resources that are inevitable for corporate success and to buffer the company against 
adverse environmental change (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Pfeffer, 1972). Proponents of the 
resource dependency theory particularly advocate interlocking directorates and the 
appointment of representatives of important external constituencies to the board of 
directors as a means for obtaining critical resources. The latter may include: (i) advice 
and counsel, (ii) legitimacy, (iii) channels for communicating information to external 
organizations, and (iv) assistance in obtaining commitment from outside parties (Lynall 
et.al., 2003).  
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the basic theoretical perspectives and their view on the 
role of the board of directors. For the sake of completeness, it must be noted that some 
other theoretical perspectives exist that have been applied in corporate governance and 
board research (see for instance the review by Hung, 1998). Our intent was not to provide 
a comprehensive list of the many theories apparent in the corporate governance literature, 
but rather to select and describe those perspectives that are most relevant within the scope 
of this study 
 
Table 2: summary of the basic theories and their view on the board of directors 
Basic theoretical perspectives Board of directors is viewed as  … 
Agency theory An internal control mechanism 
Managerial hegemony theory A rubber-stamping device 
Stewardship theory A partnership model 
Resource dependency theory A “cooptative” vehicle 
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2.4 The board of directors within the Belgian corporate governance 
environment 
 
2.4.1 Ownership and control of Belgian companies 
 
As touched upon in Chapter 1, the major part of the existing schools of thought on boards 
of directors are developed within the Anglo-American corporate governance environment 
and closely linked to the Anglo-American model of corporation (Gabrielsson and Huse, 
2005). The latter corresponds to the public company with dispersed ownership, as 
described by Berle and Means (1932). 
 
2.4.1.1  The 'dominant firm logic' paradigm 
 
Van den Berghe et.al. (2002) developed the concept of the 'dominant firm logic' to refer 
to those governance structures that are used as the reference base for developing theory, 
(national) laws, regulations and self-regulatory recommendations. In the US and the UK, 
it is well-documented that individual shareholders are widespread and neither institutions 
nor individuals hold a large proportion of shares in a company (Becht and Mayer, 2001). 
In these countries, corporate governance theorizing and policy making are primarily, if 
not exclusively, inspired by the ‘Berle and Means’ model of the publicly listed company. 
Yet, the influence of Berle and Means’ analysis has been such that the notion of 
separation of control and dispersed ownership has been presumed to be universally 
applicable. It therefore became the dominant firm logic in corporate governance research 
around the world (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Roe, 1991). As such, the paradigm of the 
‘dominant firm logic’ offers a plausible explanation why research on boards of directors 
strongly relies on a managerial perspective as reflected in the agency and managerial 
hegemony theories.  
 
Meanwhile, the existence of quite different corporate governance environments has been 
documented (La Porta et.al., 1999; Franks and Mayer, 1992) and it is argued that the 
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Berle and Means’ view on the corporation is much less applicable than previously 
thought. In particular, the separation of ownership and control is hard to maintain in 
Continental Europe as listed companies in most European countries show a remarkably 
high level of ownership concentration (Barca and Becht, 2001).  
 
2.4.1.2 Shareholder structure and ownership concentration in Belgium 
 
The evidence of concentrated ownership in (Continental) Europe also applies to Belgium. 
With respect to Belgian listed companies, the largest shareholder possesses on average 
43,5% of share capital and the stake of the second largest shareholder is on average 
10,5%. Table 3 provides an overview of the average shareholder structure of Belgian 
listed companies.  
 
Table 3: shareholder structure of Belgian listed companies 
 Average Median Min. Max. 
Largest shareholder (N=80) 43,48% 44,10% 3,55% 83,89% 
Second largest shareholder (N=68) 10,55% 9,10% 1,04% 42,80% 
Third largest shareholder (N=45) 6,68% 4,97% 0,47% 23,92% 
Fourth largest shareholder (N=28) 3,69% 3,61% 0,15% 11% 
Fifth largest shareholder (N=16) 2,76% 1,65% 0,12% 10% 
 (Source: Belgian Governance Institute, 2004) 
 
In addition, Figure 5 illustrates the cumulative holdings of the five largest shareholders 
compared to results found in the UK.  
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Figure 5: cumulative holdings of the five largest shareholders in Belgium versus UK 
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  (Source: Belgian Governance Institute, 2004) 
 
The concentration of ownership can also be studied from a different angle, namely the 
analysis of control (Becht and Mayer, 2001). More specifically, it is possible to provide 
insight into the number of listed companies that are controlled by a single shareholder. 
Control can be measured in different ways. From a legal point of view, a single 
shareholder controls a company when he holds at least 50% of the shares2. However, a 
single shareholder can obtain control even with a direct stake less then 50%. This is the 
case when single shareholders, holding small stakes, form coalitions through voting pacts 
and similar arrangements (Van Der Elst, 2001; Becht and Mayer, 2001). Figure 6 
presents the results for Belgian listed companies. 43% of Belgian listed companies are 
controlled by a single shareholder holding at least 50% of the shares. Moreover, a small 
number of listed companies (6%) have a dominant shareholder with a minimum stake of 
75%. At 37% of the listed companies in Belgium, a major shareholder could be found 
with a participation in share capital between 25% and 50%. Taken together, 80% of 
Belgian listed companies have a ‘controlling’ shareholder.  
 
                                                 
2 It must be noted that the principle of “one share-one vote” is in force in Belgium. This implies that a 
shareholder who holds at least 50% of the shares, obtains at least 50% of the votes.  
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Figure 6: control of Belgian listed companies 
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The findings for Belgian non-listed companies are even more striking3. The largest 
shareholder of non-listed companies in Belgium possesses on average 77,25% of share 
capital and the stake of the second largest shareholder is on average 19,1%. Table 4 
provides an overview of the average shareholder structure of Belgian non-listed 
companies. 
 
Table 4: shareholder structure of Belgian non-listed companies 
 Average Median Min. Max. 
Largest shareholder (N=243) 77,25% 97,0% 0,3% 100,0% 
Second largest shareholder (N=157) 19,10% 18,5% 0,01% 50,0% 
Third largest shareholder (N=84) 11,37% 10,5% 0,1% 30,0% 
Fourth largest shareholder (N=53) 7,70% 6,6% 0,1% 22,0% 
Fifth largest shareholder (N=33) 5,60% 4,9% 0,1% 12,0% 
(Source: Belgian Governance Institute, 2005) 
 
In addition, 77% of Belgian non-listed companies are controlled by a single shareholder, 
holding at least 50% of the shares. Moreover, a large number of Belgian non-listed 
companies (61%) have a dominant shareholder with a minimum stake of 75%. At 19% of 
                                                 
3 The sample consisted of 250 non-listed companies in Belgium. 
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the non-listed companies in Belgium, a major shareholder could be found with a 
participation in share capital between 25% and 50%. Taken together, 96% of Belgian 
non-listed companies have a ‘controlling’ shareholder. Figure 7 presents the detailed 
results.  
 
Figure 7: control of Belgian non-listed companies 
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The descriptive statistics presented above, illustrate how the shareholder structure of 
Belgian companies differs substantially from the commonly accepted view on the 
ownership of corporations. Although ownership concentration is quite obvious with 
respect to non-listed companies, the findings for listed companies in Belgium suggest that 
widespread shareholdership is not commonplace. This has important implications on the 
relevance of some of the basic theoretical perspectives, in particular managerial 
hegemony and agency perspective, when studying boards of directors of Belgian 
companies. 
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2.4.1.3 Implication of ownership concentration on managerial hegemony and agency 
theory 
 
Managerial hegemony theory, which is to a large extent based on the assumption of an 
unrestrained power position of management to select and nominate board members, is 
suggested to be irrelevant in a context of ownership concentration. Two explanations can 
be given. First, concentrated shareholdership leads to a shift in power relationships. 
Unlike dispersed small owners, large shareholders are in a position to exert direct control 
over corporations and to influence actions taken by management (Denis and McConnell, 
2003). By consequence, concentrated shareholdership leads to a shareholder control bias 
at the expense of management. Second, a very important feature of the Belgian corporate 
governance system is the fact that the nomination and dismissal of directors remains the 
legal responsibility of shareholders (Van Der Elst, 2006). This legal feature dilutes the 
power of management to influence the choice of directors and hence to ‘capture’ the 
board of directors.  
 
Agency theory, on the other hand, is still relevant in a context of closely held companies 
but from a different angle. The issue at stake here is not the conflict relationship between 
owners and managers, but the conflicts of interest that may occur between the dominant 
shareholder and minority shareholders. In a context where shareholders hold a large 
fraction of equity, the problem of managerial control per se is not as severe as it is in a 
context of dispersed ownership. However, ownership by outside blockholders is not an 
unequivocally positive force from the perspective of the other shareholders because 
holders of large blocks of shares are in a position to engage in activities that benefit them 
at the expense of minority shareholders (La Porta et.al., 2000). The exploitation of the 
control position by a major shareholder to derive special benefits is referred to as “private 
benefits” (Van den Berghe et.al., 2002). Succinctly put, with dispersed ownership at one 
end and concentrated ownership at the other end of the spectrum of ownership and 
control, the nature of agency conflicts will vary accordingly to whom is in control. While 
dispersed ownership creates weak shareholders and strong managers, ownership 
concentration creates strong majority shareholders, weak managers and weak minority 
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shareholders (Gugler, 2001). In both cases an unbalanced power position exists, 
providing the potential for misuse of corporate resources and the occurrence of conflicts 
of interest. Therefore, boards of directors can be viewed as an important monitoring 
governance device. In addition, boards are considered to be instrumental for protecting a 
company’s interest in general, and the interests of minority shareholders in particular (see 
Figure 8). 
Figure 8: power relationships between shareholders and management 
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2.4.2 The board of directors of Belgian companies 
  
In the previous section, we briefly described how the shareholdership of Belgian 
companies diverges from the ownership structure of companies in Anglo-American 
countries, and what the implications are on the basic theoretical perspectives. In what 
follows, we further document the differences between Belgian and Anglo-American 
contexts with respect to the composition and operation of the boards of directors.  
 
The composition of the board of directors in Belgium. The average number of 
directors on boards of directors in Belgium is 10 for listed companies and 6 for non-listed 
companies. As for who sits on the board of directors, most boards include a mix of 
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executives, non-executives representing the shareholders and independent directors. The 
average number of independent directors varies between 3 to 4 for listed companies and 2 
to 3 for non-listed companies. 29% of the boards of listed companies are dominated by 
independent directors which mean that the latter represents at least fifty percent of the 
board. With respect to non-listed companies, a majority of independent board members 
can be found in 14% of the cases represented. In addition, boards of directors are mainly 
crowded by men as female board members are rather scarce. Only 37% of listed and 40% 
of non-listed companies include at least one female director in their boards. Regarding 
the leadership structure of Belgian boards, 67% of listed companies and 61% of non-
listed companies have already separated the roles of chairman and CEO.  
 
The operation of the board of directors in Belgium.  Boards of directors of Belgian 
listed companies meet on average 6 to 7 times a year. The corresponding number for non-
listed companies is 4 to 5 times. Listed companies have also set up board committees, 
with remuneration by far the most popular (75%). Other committees include audit (69%) 
and nomination (37%). In contrast, board committees are less commonplace in non-listed 
companies. Audit- and remuneration committees were found in 15% of the cases while a 
nomination committee is set up in only 6%.  
 
Differences and similarities of 1-tier board models between Belgium, US and UK. 
Although the three countries are characterized by a unitary board model, Belgian board 
practices differ from either US or UK practices with respect to key dimensions (see Table 
5). First, the separation of the roles of chairman and CEO is definitely not the standard in 
the US where it is still subject to considerable opposition (Van den Berghe and De 
Ridder, 1999). Only a small percentage of US boards have abandoned CEO duality by 
splitting up the roles. Second, installing board committees has become more and more 
prevalent in US and UK practice, not in the least stimulated by recent (legal) proposals 
for corporate governance reforms (for example the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements). Third, 
because the perceptions of who is considered to be an independent director strongly vary 
according to the country involved (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999), the statistics 
are less comparable with respect to the composition of the board. In contrast, similarities 
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between Belgian boards of directors and US, respectively, UK boards of listed companies 
are reported regarding the average board size and frequency of board meetings.  
 
Table 5: descriptive statistics on boards of directors in Belgium versus US and UK 
Country
Key features 
Belgium US UK 
Listed Non-listed Listed Listed  
Board size (average) 10,0 5,95 10,7 10,6 
Separated board leadership structure 67 % 61% 29 % 97% 
Composition of the board 
- ratio non-executive (NEDs) or 
independent directors (INDs) 
-  one female director 
 
NEDs 7 to 8/10 
INDs 3 to 4/10 
37% 
 
NEDs 4/6 
INDs 2 to 3/6 
40% 
 
n.a. 
INDs 8/10 
88% 
 
NEDs 6/10 
n.a. 
62,7 % 
Board committees 
- audit committee 
- remuneration committee 
- nomination committee 
 
69% 
75% 
37% 
 
15% 
15% 
6% 
 
100 % 
100 % 
98,5 % 
 
100 % 
100 % 
98,7 % 
Board meetings 6 to 7 4 to 5 6 7 to 8 
Data for ….. Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Year 2005 
Sample N=81 N=260 S&P 500  N=Top 150 
(sources: Belgian Governance Institute (2004, 2005); Spencer Stuart (2005)) 
 
The descriptives on board practices of Belgian companies presented above, provide a 
better insight into the extent boards of directors in Belgium resemble those frequently 
studied in Anglo-American countries. Especially, it must be noted that the research 
samples in mainstream board research commonly encompasses the Fortune 500 (or 
similar indices). These firms are important to the national economy, are the target of 
corporate governance reforms and provide the relative ease of data collection (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). However, these indices include the largest listed companies who operate 
within different legal environments and whose size exceed that of most Belgian listed 
companies. This observation is of relevance when assessing and comparing the findings 
of empirical research (see e.g. Chapters 4 and 6). From a different point of view, 
irrespective of the sample used, the descriptives in Table 5 also provide some evidence on 
how boards of directors, as a group, show some unique characteristics compared to other 
organizational groups (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis). 
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2.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided an insight into the concept of corporate governance and has 
positioned the board of directors as the cornerstone. Although it can be argued that 
equating corporate governance with the operation of boards of directors is far too narrow, 
a corporate board is presumed to be instrumental to the accountability of companies and 
the way companies comply with ethical and economic standards. Depending on the 
cultural and legal context, boards of directors are organized in many different ways but, 
in essence, they can be classified in two basic board typologies (1-tier and 2-tier). Up to 
the present, the unitary board model - which is assumed to be more shareholder-oriented - 
has received the most attention both in practice and literature. In fact, (1-tier) boards of 
directors are frequently portrayed as toothless watchdogs, dominated by management 
which do little to protect shareholders’ interest. This description, if ever accurate in the 
past, is difficult to substantiate in the present. Different arguments can be put forward 
indicating that managerial hegemony is flawing. Increasing shareholder activism as well 
as legal and soft law reforms are only a few examples of forces strengthening boards vis à 
vis corporate management. Besides, this picture of ceremonial boards runs counter to 
other views, such as agency, stewardship and resource dependence perspectives, which 
consider the board of directors as an important governance device. In particular, one can 
not ignore the dominance of the agency perspective in both corporate governance 
research and debate. Consequently, boards of directors are commonly approached as 
internal control mechanisms for resolving conflicts of interest between “insiders” and 
outside investors. Who can be considered to be an “insider” (management or controlling 
shareholders) varies from country to country and is primarily dependent on the prevailing 
shareholder structure. Moreover, the shareholder structure is also considered to be a 
significant determinant of the way boards of directors operate. Therefore, when studying 
boards of directors, it is advocated to take into account the particularities of the corporate 
governance environment as well as to embrace a multi-theoretical approach for 
explaining the variety that is found in board composition and functioning. 
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3  Methodological considerations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters introduced the objective of the research - examining the 
determinants of board effectiveness, the area studied - corporate governance, and the 
research focus - the board of directors. This chapter outlines the methodological 
considerations. The purpose is to provide an insight into the approaches used for 
collecting and analyzing empirical data, to describe the limits of the chosen approaches 
and to identify the sources of empirical data. As we discussed in Chapter 1, the 
dissertation is split up in two different but consecutive parts, in accordance with the two 
research questions. 
 
(1) In the first part, which is based on the corporate governance literature, the variety of 
factors that potentially contribute to the effectiveness of boards of directors are identified. 
The purpose of this part is exploration and description in order to get a more in-depth 
insight into the ‘true drivers’ of board effectiveness. The findings serve as an input for the 
development of the theoretical research framework, which is presented in the second part 
of the research. 
 
(2) The second part of the research tries to understand how the different factors 
interrelate and to what extent board processes have an impact on the task performance of 
boards of directors. For that purpose, a theoretical board model is presented and 
empirically challenged. This research part also includes literature on group effectiveness 
as well as top management team (TMT) literature and is mainly intended to be 
explanatory.  
 
Although the two research parts require a different approach, they are characterised by a 
coordinated qualitative research methodology. This chapter starts with the clarification of 
 42
the general methodological choices and goes on to describe the research strategy and 
methods associated with both parts of the research project. 
 
3.2 The choice of a coordinated qualitative research methodology 
 
As noted in Chapter 2, mainstream research on corporate governance and boards of 
directors has primarily used quantitative methodologies in order to investigate causal 
relationships (see also Chapter 4). Moreover, within this quantitative research approach, 
the dominant data collection technique has been secondary or archival data, retrieved 
from public available documents such as annual reports, regulatory filings and corporate 
releases (Daily et.al., 2003). Only a small amount of studies opted for a field study 
approach using questionnaire data (notable examples are Johnson et. al., 1993; Judge and 
Zeithalm, 1992). In contrast, qualitative approaches have been very scarce until now. 
Some scholars studied boards through interview data (Roberts et al. 2005; Pettigrew and 
McNulty, 1998 and 1995; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) while 
others were able to study actual board behaviour by direct observation techniques (Huse 
et.al., 2005; Huse and Schoning, 2004; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005 and 2003). However 
this kind of qualitative empirical research remains rare not in the least because of 
difficulties to get access to directors and the boardroom. Although the general trend in 
board research appears to be in favour of quantitative research, for the purpose of this 
research project qualitative research seems more appropriate.   
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005) offer a generic definition of qualitative research: it involves 
an interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world and it is inherently multi-method in 
focus. Put differently, qualitative researchers study things in their natural setting in an 
attempt to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring 
to them. They seek knowledge through individual experiences of actors, who are directly 
involved in the phenomena under study. Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that this 
entails research conducted through an intense and/or extended contact with a ‘field’ or 
with life situations, trying to capture data on the perceptions of local actors “from the 
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inside”. Qualitative research is effective in capturing the complexity of social interactions 
in daily life and the meanings the participants themselves attribute to these interactions. 
The interest in daily practices in their own context and the meaning behind these 
practices take the qualitative researcher into a natural setting rather than laboratories 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
 
Still, qualitative research is difficult, rigorous and time-consuming and it should not be 
viewed as “an easy substitute for a quantitative approach” (Creswell, 1998:16). 
Researchers should balance the advantages and disadvantages of qualitative research and 
consciously indicate why the research topic is well-suited for a qualitative design. Several 
reasons can be advanced to explain the decision to adopt a qualitative research 
methodology. Above all, the nature of the research questions should demand a 
qualitative research approach (Patton, 2002; Creswell, 1998). Typically qualitative 
studies entail questions starting with how and what, in contrast to the why questions in 
quantitative research. The research questions described in Chapter 1, emphasize the 
importance of understanding how boards of directors actually operate and what drives 
their performance. They stress the need to look at mechanisms which provide 
understanding rather than predictions. Moreover, the methodology required for this kind 
of research calls for interpretation of the topic under discussion within a particular 
context (as indicated in Chapter 2). Maxwell (1998) suggests that qualitative research 
methods are particularly relevant for understanding meanings, contexts (which implies 
how events, actions, and meanings shape and are shaped by unique circumstances in 
which they occur) and processes (which means how events and actions take place over 
time) in their natural settings. Qualitative research does not intend to predict outcomes 
but rather to gain a deeper insight into complex social phenomena. In this respect, the 
richness and holism of the data generated by qualitative research provide a strong 
potential for revealing complexity and building a holistic picture. This is opposite to a 
single-angle and a distant explanation of the research problem. Another important feature 
of qualitative research is its flexibility (data collection times and methods can vary as the 
study proceeds) (see Table 6 for the traditional comparison of quantitative and qualitative 
research methodologies). Those are crucial arguments in the case of our research project. 
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In addition, the access to the site (applied to our study, access to boards of directors and 
board members) and the perspective of the researcher’s role as active learner also 
encourage the selection of a qualitative research methodology.  
 
Table 6: traditional comparison of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies 
Quantitative research methodology Qualitative research methodology 
Philosophical assumption: positivism Philosophical assumption : interpretivism and 
constructivism 
Reality is objective and singular Reality is subjective and multiple 
No research process effects assumed; researcher is 
independent of that being researched 
Recognition of the impact of the research process 
on the research situation; researcher interacts with 
that being researched 
Presumed to be value-free and unbiased Presumed to be value-laden and biased 
Rule-driven research procedures Flexibility in the research procedures 
Quantification Interpretation 
Generalizations leading to predictions of cause and 
effect 
Patterns, theories developed for understanding 
Context-free  Context bounded 
Accurate and reliable through validity  Accurate and reliable through verification 
(Sources: Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Cassel and Symon, 1994; Creswell, 1994) 
 
Qualitative research genres have become increasingly important modes of inquiry for the 
social science and applied disciplines such as management, education etc. (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999). Still, qualitative research is not a rose garden without thorns and in 
many cases, it has been marginalised as a supplement to core quantitative methodologies 
(Silverman, 1993). In particular, qualitative research has frequently been criticised as not 
being reliable due to the nature of the data it generates. Qualitative data is generally not 
easy to verify and it is difficult to observe and to analyze. Besides, most of the work is 
still done by the researcher (qualitative data analysis software already exists but it is still 
in its infancy compared to statistical analysis software, and its use requires plenty of time 
and efforts) and the quality of the results largely depends on the creativity and capacity of 
the researcher to manage the data. It often raises two problems : reliability (the 
uniqueness of a study within a specific context mitigates against replicating it exactly in 
another context) (Creswell, 1994) and anecdotally (brief conversations, snippets from 
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unstructured interviews are used to provide evidence of a particular contention) 
(Silverman, 1993). In order to limit these problems, objectivity and rigour were both 
crucial elements of attention during data collection and data analysis. Further limitations 
to specific research techniques are also discussed in the next sections. 
 
3.3 Research strategy and methods associated with the first part of 
the research project 
 
3.3.1 Research strategy: a mixed methods research 
 
3.3.1.1 Definition 
 
“A strategy of inquiry comprises a bundle of skills, assumptions and practices that 
researchers employ as they move from their paradigm to the empirical world. Strategies 
of inquiry put paradigms of interpretation into motion” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005:25). 
They lead to the choice of specific methods of collecting and analysing empirical data. 
An important characteristic of research strategies is that they vary depending on the type 
of research. Besides, even within a type there is a variety of possible strategies. For 
example, qualitative research can involve case studies, observations, action methods etc. 
In contrast, quantitative research contains surveys, experiments etc.  
 
The research strategy adopted for the first part of the research project is a mixed methods 
research design. Mixed methods research can be generally defined as the class of 
research which involves “the collection or analysis of both qualitative and quantitative 
data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are 
given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the 
process of research” (Creswell et.al., 2003:212). In particular, it means that we adopt a 
research strategy, using more than one type of research method. It also implies working 
with different types of data.  
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3.3.1.2 Strengths and weaknesses of a mixed methods research 
 
There seems to be a recent surge of interest in mixed methods research strategies4 and 
they are being increasingly used in some disciplines (Brannen, 2005). Different 
arguments are put forward in favour of mixed methods research. First, mixed methods 
research offers creative possibilities for addressing research questions in terms of a range 
of methods (Brannen, 2005). Second, mixed methods research is characterised by 
methodological pluralism or eclecticism, which frequently results in superior research 
(compared to mono-method research) (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Third, mixed 
methods research is useful in some areas because the complexity of phenomena requires 
data from a large number of perspectives (Sale et.al., 2002). Table 7 provides an 
overview of the strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research. 
 
Notwithstanding the many positive arguments, the use of mixed methods research is still 
subject to discussion. In particular, the “purists” in both qualitative and quantitative 
research advocate the incompatibility thesis. The latter posits that qualitative and 
quantitative research paradigms, including their associated methods, can not and should 
not be mixed (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). However, many qualitative and 
quantitative researchers have reached basic agreement on several major points of earlier 
philosophical disagreement (see Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004 for an overview of 
these issues). In essence, because the two approaches share the goal of understanding the 
world in which we live, it is stated that they can be combined in a study (Sale et.al., 
2002). In addition, different scholars have demonstrated the successful use of mixed 
methods in their research which discredits the incompatibility thesis (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2005). Finally, others argue that research should not be preoccupied with the 
quantitative-qualitative debate, because it will not be resolved in the near future, while 
epistemological purity does not get research done (Miles and Huberman, 1984).   
 
                                                 
4 The last years there has been a growing number of international seminars and workshops devoted to the 
discussion of mixed methods research as well as the publication of new handbooks and articles in method 
journals. 
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Table 7: strengths and weaknesses of mixed methods research 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Words, pictures and narratives can be used to add 
meaning to numbers, while numbers can be used to 
add precision to words, pictures and narratives. 
More expensive and time consuming. 
Can answer a broader and more complete range of 
research questions because the researcher is not 
confined to a single method of approach. 
Some of the details of mixed research remain to be 
worked out fully by research methodologists (e.g. 
problems of paradigm missing, how to qualitatively 
analyze quantitative data, how to interpret 
conflicting results). 
A researcher can use the strengths of an additional 
method to overcome the weaknesses in another 
method by using both in a research study. 
Researcher has to learn about multiple methods and 
approaches and understand how to mix them 
appropriately. This can be difficult for a single 
researcher.  
Can provide stronger evidence for a conclusion 
through convergence and corroboration of findings. 
Methodological purists contend that one should 
always work within either a qualitative or a 
quantitative paradigm. 
Can add insights and understanding that might be 
missed when only a single method is used. 
 
Can be used to increase the generalizability of the 
results. 
 
Qualitative and quantitative research -used together- 
produce more complete knowledge, necessary to 
inform theory and practice. 
 
(Source: Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004) 
 
3.3.1.3 Selecting the mixed methods research design 
 
In choosing a mixed methods research design that fits the purpose of the study best, some 
key dimensions must be considered (Creswell et. al., 2003). The first dimension relates to 
the implementation of data collection or the sequence that is used to collect both 
quantitative and qualitative data (concurrently or sequentially). The second dimension 
refers to the priority given to each form of data (equal status or emphasis on qualitative 
and quantitative data respectively). Third, the stage of integration in the research process 
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must be decided upon (e.g. integration can occur at any level, such as within the research 
questions, within data collection, within data analysis or during the interpretation of the 
results).  
 
Using these three dimensions as a guideline in designing the most appropriate mixed 
methods research for the first part of the research project, we decided to opt for a 
sequential exploratory design (Creswell et. al., 2003). A specific feature of this design is 
the two-phase approach whereby the collection and analysis of the qualitative data in an 
initial phase is followed by a phase of quantitative data collection and analysis. In this 
respect, the qualitative phase provides the basis for the subsequent quantitative stage. 
More specifically, it determines the agenda for the successive quantitative research and it 
helps to develop the measurement tools. In our study, we use directors’ open-ended 
responses during initial interviews to construct a rating survey for the second phase (see 
Chapter 4). Moreover, although both qualitative and quantitative data are obtained and 
used during the same research process, they do not receive an equal status. In contrast, we 
place most emphasis on the qualitative phase. The results of both data sets are then 
integrated during the interpretation phase. Figure 9 visualizes our mixed methods 
research design. 
 
Figure 9: sequential exploratory design 
QUAL
QUAL QUAL quan               quan Interpretation
Data Data Data Data  of entire 
Collection      Analysis Collection       Analysis analysis
quan
Notation:”QUAL” stands for qualitative, “quan” stands for quantitative, “ “ stands for sequential, 
capital letters denote priority
Source: Creswell, 1994  
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As the first part of the research project focuses on the identification of criteria that 
potentially contribute to the effectiveness of boards, we believe this sequential 
exploratory design is most suitable. The design allows us to explore the determinants of 
board effectiveness through a qualitative approach while the use of the quantitative data 
helps us in elaborating and interpreting the qualitative findings.  
 
It must be noted that the sequential exploratory design differs from the classical use of the 
technique of triangulation. The term ‘triangulation’ is commonly used for the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to address the same research 
problem (Morse, 2001; Jick, 1979). The archetype of triangulation strategies is 
corroboration or seeking convergence of research results (Creswell, 1994). In this respect, 
different methods are implemented concurrently and independently in order to confirm or 
cross-validate findings within a single study (Greene et. al., 1989). In contrast, our design 
is characterised by a sequential use of qualitative and quantitative methods whereby the 
first serves as an input for the development of the second. Moreover, the primary focus of 
our design is the exploration of a phenomenon by means of qualitative and quantitative 
data rather than concurrent validation. In sum, a mixed methods research design may 
serve many objectives. Besides corroboration, other ways of combining methods have 
been identified for the purpose of expansion, elaboration, initiation, complementarity, 
development and explaining contradictions (see Brannen, 2005 and Greene et. al., 1989 
for a detailed explanation).  
 
3.3.2 Methods 
 
3.3.2.1 Data collection 
 
Methods simply refer to specific research techniques that are used for collecting 
empirical data. There is a broad spectrum of methods available, ranging from direct 
observation and interviews to the analysis of artefacts and documents. Besides, methods 
can be combined. In the first part of this research project, two main techniques are 
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combined in order to gather the required empirical data: interviews (with directors of 
Belgian listed companies) and questionnaires (sent primarily to directors of Belgian non-
listed companies and other actors in the field of corporate governance). Other techniques 
such as conference attendance as well as (roundtable) discussions with directors and 
actors in the field are also used. All the techniques have been selected in order to build a 
fair and solid picture of the variety of factors that potentially contribute to the 
effectiveness of boards. Although each technique has major advantages, there are also 
shortcomings inherent in every technique. Table 8 provides an overview of the strengths 
and weakness of the two main techniques used in this study. Both techniques are 
explained more in-depth in the following paragraphs.  
 
Table 8: strengths and weaknesses of main techniques used in the first part of the study 
Research Technique Strengths Weaknesses 
Interviews Targeted – focuses directly on topic being 
studied 
Bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
 Provide in-depth information Response bias 
 Allow good interpretive validity Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
 Allow probing by the interviewer Reflexivity- interviewee says 
what interviewer wants to hear 
 Useful for exploration  
Questionnaires Good for eliciting content from research 
participants 
Need validation 
 Can be administered to probability samples Must be kept very short 
 Can be administered to groups Response rate possible low for 
mail questionnaires 
  Nonresponse to selective items 
  Possible reactive effects (e.g. 
social desirability) 
(Sources: extracted from Yin, 2003 and Johnson and Turner, 2003) 
  
 Interviews 
 
The first main technique used in the present study is interviewing. Interviews can simply 
be defined as a “conversation with a purpose” (Fowler and Mangione, 1990). It involves 
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asking questions, active listening, interpersonal understanding, a respect for and curiosity 
about what people say (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Interviews commonly target 
unobservable data such as feelings, thoughts, opinions and intentions (this reflects the 
meaning people attach to physical and social artefacts). They are instrumental to learn 
about phenomena or events that happen in the absence of the researcher (Patton, 2002). In 
total, 104 interviews were conducted with members of the boards of directors from 
Belgian listed companies. For more detailed information on this sample we refer to 
Chapter 4. 
 
Type of interview.  Interviews include a wide variety of forms ranging from individual to 
group interviews, from structured to unstructured etc. (Fontana and Frey, 2005). All 
interviews with directors of listed companies were carried out individually in a face-to-
face verbal interchange (in the directors’ mother-tongue) as part of a large scale in-depth 
study on corporate governance in Belgium.  One main standardized open-ended question 
for the purpose of this research project was included in order to explore directors’ own 
views on the most important criteria that constitute a good corporate board. According to 
Yin (2003) open-ended questions are well-suited to ask respondents about the facts of a 
matter as well as their opinions about the topic under discussion. In particular, the 
standardized open ended interview is based on “open-ended questions and results in 
qualitative data; at the same time, neither the wording nor the sequence of the questions 
on the interview protocol is varied, so the presentation is constant across participants” 
(Johnson and Turner, 2003:304). In this study, every director was asked the same 
question, at the same moment in the course of the interview, in order to compare the 
views of interviewees and to eliminate deviations between different investigators. In 
addition, the formulation of the question(s) should be carefully conceived to gather the 
data needed (Patton, 2000). We have opted to phrase the question in rather general terms 
as it allows room to probe for more sensitive aspects as well as to register directors’ 
answers based on their broad experience in multiple boards of directors. The open-ended 
nature of the question involved, should provide us with a deeper understanding of how 
key actors in the field perceive the determinants of board effectiveness.  
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Multiple interview teams. Because the research includes an extensive number of directors 
involved in the interviews, the choice for multiple interview teams is justified to cover all 
respondents (Yin, 2003). The use of multiple interview teams minimalizes the likelihood 
of introducing bias into the study. In particular, the main open-ended question for the 
purpose of this research was asked in exactly the same way by the different teams and the 
answers were cross-verified by the other member(s) of the team(s). 
 
No audiotapes. None of the interviews were formally tape-recorded while each interview 
was held, under the condition of anonymity of individual responses. Although recording 
has the advantage of interpreting answers in a more accurate way, two different actions 
are taken to guarantee a neutral and unbiased interpretation. First, detailed field notes 
were taken during each interview and electronically transcribed in a computer document 
immediately after the interview took place. Second, the majority of the interviews were 
carried out by a team of two interviewers. This allowed for mutual monitoring to make 
sure we were getting the most accurate data possible (Fink and Kosecoff, 1985). 
  
 Questionnaires 
 
Two short questionnaires are used as the second main technique, for collecting data. A 
questionnaire can be described as a self report instrument that is filled out by the research 
participants (Johnson and Turner, 2003). In total 150 respondents filled out the first 
questionnaire and 77 collaborated in the second questionnaire. For more detailed 
information on this sample we refer to Chapter 4. 
 
Construction of the questionnaires. As outlined in paragraph 3.3.1.3 the questionnaires 
are part of the second (quantitative) phase in our sequential exploratory design. This 
implies that the findings of the first (qualitative) phase are used to construct the 
questionnaires. Some additional aspects need to be taken into account when constructing 
a questionnaire.  
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A first decision to be made is the degree of structure imposed on responses. In general, 
there are two kinds of questionnaires, an open-ended (in which the respondents fill out 
the questions in any order, providing the answers in their own words) and a structured 
closed-ended (in which possible responses are provided from which the participants must 
select). Taking into account that we have previously performed a qualitative open-ended 
interview phase, we already gained a better insight into the various (potential) 
determinants of board effectiveness. Our aim now is to further elaborate the importance 
of a selected number of determinants on a more quantitative base as well as to explore 
how they occur in practice. For that purpose, we opted for two structured closed-ended 
questionnaires whereby the response category takes the form of rankings. It must be 
noted that we deliberately opted not to use any form of Likert scales as frequently used in 
quantitative research. Although Likert scales might offer greater opportunities for 
statistical analysis, their success depends to a large extent on the quality of the test items 
or statements (Dillon et.al., 1994). With respect to our research, most of the statements 
used in the questionnaires were derived from the earlier open-ended interviews and by 
consequence not sensitive enough to discriminate and thus create variability. The latter is 
seen as one of the requirements for using Likert scales (Dillon et. al., 1994). 
 
A second aspect relates to the wording of questions. In constructing the questionnaires we 
have  explained or tried to avoid words which have different interpretations. In particular, 
in the beginning of the questionnaires we clearly stated how board effectiveness should 
be interpreted to limit confusion on the definition of this terminology. Moreover, in order 
to enhance clarity, we indicated the purpose of the questionnaires and described how the 
rankings should be interpreted. We have also tried to phrase the questionnaires’ items in a 
neutral, objective and simple way and refrain from using strong adjectives. As a result, 
we presume that the questionnaires are easy to understand and do not pose a major 
problem to be completed by high level people, such as directors.  
 
A third aspect concerns the language. In order to capture the full spectrum of directors in 
Belgium and to avoid misunderstanding of the items included, the questionnaires were 
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drawn up in two languages namely Dutch and French. Translation of the questionnaires 
to French was done by a native speaker and verified by a third person. 
 
Implementation of the questionnaires. The questionnaires were submitted to the 
respondents in two steps. First, the respondents were asked to rank the items included in 
the first questionnaire according to their importance varying from 1 (item is most 
important) to 10 (item is least important). After a period of time, the respondents received 
the second questionnaire, but this time they were asked to assign a ranking to the (same) 
items, indicating to what extent there is room for improvement in practice (ranging from 
1 = item needs most improvement to 10 = item needs least improvement).  
 
 Other methods 
 
Other methods have also contributed to the collection of data and to a better 
understanding of the research topic. During the whole research project national and 
international conferences, focusing on corporate governance and especially boards of 
directors, were frequently attended both as a speaker and a participant. In particular, there 
was an active involvement in the seminars organized by the Belgian Governance 
Institute. Conferences and seminars are important sources of information. They provide 
valuable information on new developments in the field, the issues at stake and actors 
involved. They also offer an important opportunity to meet and discuss with directors in 
an informal way and as such, to get a better feeling of what is happening within the field. 
Finally, they can be used to present or confront directors with the results of empirical 
studies, and consequently, to gather additional comments for further clarification of 
unexpected findings. 
 
3.3.2.2 Data analysis  
 
The choice to opt for a mixed methods research yields two kinds of data. The empirical 
data, obtained from the first phase, is qualitative in nature while in the second phase 
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quantitative data was gathered. Researchers must be aware that the data-analytical 
methods differ according to the nature of the data. Put differently, qualitative data 
requires another approach for analysing and interpreting, compared to quantitative data. 
The analysis of our data set follows the model of Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003). They 
describe several data analysis stages for mixed methods research: data reduction, data 
display, data transformation, data integration. These stages are to some extent sequential. 
In what follows, each stage will be briefly explained and its application to our data sets 
will be described. 
 
 Data reduction 
 
Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying and transforming 
the raw data which is gathered at the data collection stage. Reducing data, helps to 
sharpen, sort and organise data in such a way that final conclusions can be drawn and 
verified (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Both qualitative and quantitative data can be 
reduced and transformed in many ways.  
 
Qualitative data reduction. In order to reduce the qualitative data, generated from the 
interviews, we opted for coding. Codes are “tags or labels for assigning units of meaning 
to the descriptive of inferential information compiled during a study” (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994:56). Codes can be attached to words, phrases, sentences or whole 
paragraphs. An important feature of coding is that the words themselves do not matter, 
but instead, their meaning is important. In a first step, we’ve created a provisional “start 
list” of broadly defined codes. The codes were given names that are close to the concepts 
they describe. The codes were extracted from different sources such as the literature on 
boards of directors, insights into the corporate governance codes etc. However, during the 
coding phase new themes emerged which did not fit into the predefined list, while other 
codes flourished too much. Too many text segments received the same code. Therefore 
our start list needed revision by adding new codes and breaking down certain codes into 
sub codes. The revised list can be found in Appendix 1. Parallel, operational definitions 
of the codes were foreseen to make sure that the codes were applied consistently over 
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time. For the process of coding, we have used the software ATLAS.ti. Reducing our 
qualitative data set by coding, allows for categorizing of the initial data, which permits 
further clustering of text segments.  
 
Quantitative data reduction. The two small questionnaires provide quantitative data on 
the determinants of board effectiveness in the form of rankings. Rankings are ordinal data 
and by consequence not suitable to all kinds of statistical analysis. The numerical data 
was reduced by computing core descriptive statistics using the software SPSS. 
 
 Data display 
 
Qualitative data display.  The main category of displays that have been used with respect 
to the qualitative data are tables. Tabular displays of information are a means to organize 
the data and present the groupings of data in a clear way (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
 
Quantitative data display. Quantitative data is primarily displayed by means of frequency 
tables. 
 
 Data transformation 
 
In some cases it is appropriate to “quantitize” or “qualitize” the data.  Quantitizing simply 
refers to the process of transforming or converting qualitative data into numerical codes 
that can be statistically represented and analysed, while qualitizing refers to the opposite 
process (converting quantitative data into narratives that can be analyzed qualitatively) 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). With respect to our study we decided to use quantitizing 
by introducing a basic form of counting in the analysis of the qualitative data. Counting is 
considered to be a manifestation of the quantitizing process, as described above 
(Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie, 2003). Miles and Huberman (1994) provide two rationales 
for counting which are also applicable to our study. First, counting helps to identify 
patterns more easily. Numbers are by definition more economical and easier to 
manipulate, compared to words. Counting observations enables one to “see” the data and 
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often generates more meaning in addition to their narrative descriptions (Sandelowski, 
2001). It allows us to more fully describe and/or interpret the variety of criteria related to 
board effectiveness, which were cited during the interviews. Second, counting helps to 
maintain analytical integrity. Analysing qualitative data occurs to some extent by insight 
and intuition. Inherent in this approach is the danger of “overweighting”  emerging 
themes, while ignoring data that does not go in the direction of the researcher’s reasoning 
(Sandelowski, 2001; Miles and Huberman, 1994). In this respect, computing frequencies 
during qualitative data analysis is a good way of testing for possible bias and provides a 
way of increasing legitimation and validity (Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie, 2003). It must be 
noted that the use of quantitized data in a qualitative study does not change the initial 
qualitative nature of the study (Morse, 1991). Put differently, when we apply frequency 
data with the objective of enhancing the description of our interview data, we do not 
constitute a quantitative study. The main purpose of introducing the counting is to see 
how robust our insights are.  
 
 Data integration 
 
The final stage in the analysing process is the integration of data. Taken into account the 
features of our sequential exploratory design, we work with qualitative and quantitative 
data within two separate sets of coherent frameworks, which in turn lead to the 
interpretation of the entire data analysis and the formulation of overall conclusions. Table 
9 summarizes the data analysis chain for our study. 
 
Table 9: overview of the data analysis activities 
Stage Qualitative data set Quantitative data set 
Data reduction Coding Descriptive statistics 
Data display Tables Tables 
Data transformation ‘Quantitizing’ through counting No transformation  
Data integration Interpretation of the entire analysis and formulation of overall conclusions 
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3.3.3 Legitimation in mixed methods research 
 
As in any research, attention should be paid to the legitimation and trustworthiness of our 
findings. In quantitative as well as in qualitative research, legitimation has been 
operationalized in a myriad of ways, while the nomenclature applied to assess the quality 
differs between the two types of research (Creswell, 1998). With respect to mixed 
methods research, the issue of legitimation is still in an embryonic stage (Brannen, 2005; 
Teddlie and Tashakorri, 2003). However, agreement seems to exist that two important 
limitations also apply to mixed methods research namely validity (internal and external) 
and reliability. Internal validity with respect to mixed methods research concerns the 
quality of the inferences that emerge from the quantitative and qualitative data.  Inference 
can be defined as “to bring or carry in; cause; induce or to draw a conclusion as by 
reasoning” (Teddlie and Tashakorri, 2003:35). External validity is the extent to which the 
findings of the study can be transferred/generalized to other settings, populations, 
contexts etc. (Teddlie and Tashakorri, 2003). It is argued that the two issues can be 
addressed simultaneously by paying special attention to the sampling design (Collins 
et.al., 2006). In essence, the choice of research samples should correspond with the 
applied mixed methods research design, and as such, with the purpose of the study. Put 
differently, the selected samples should enable us to collect as much robust data as 
possible, in order to fully understand the phenomenon under investigation (these are the 
key factors that potentially contribute to board effectiveness). In this respect, rather then 
selecting a truly random (statistical) sample, it is important to select information rich 
cases from which we can learn most.  
 
In particular, we used the framework of Onwuegbuzie and Collins (in press) to identify a 
sampling design that fits our research objectives and design. A distinguished feature of 
this framework is that it provides a two-dimensional typology of available mixed 
methods sampling models. The first dimension relates to the time orientation of the 
qualitative and quantitative research phases (sequentially or concurrently). The second 
dimension is the relationship of the qualitative and quantitative samples. This relationship 
can be identical, parallel, nested or multilevel. With respect to our study, we have opted 
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for a sequential design using parallel samples for the qualitative and quantitative 
components of the study. A sequential design denotes that we needed the findings 
stemming from the sample of the first phase to drive the selection of the sample for the 
second phase. Parallel samples denote that we use the same underlying population 
(boards of directors of Belgian companies) from which we draw different samples 
(directors from listed companies and directors from non-listed companies) (see also 
Chapter 4). Perhaps more important for assessing the validity threats is the use of 
purposeful sampling (in contrast to probabilistic sampling). In fact, the research samples 
were selected purposefully utilizing (a) a critical cases sampling scheme for the 
qualitative phase and (b) a convenience sampling scheme for the quantitative phase. 
Figure 10 visualizes our sample design.  
 
Figure 10: two-dimensional mixed method sampling design 
 
Parallel
(QUAL)
Critical cases
(QUAN)
Convenience
Time orientation Relationship of 
samples
Sampling schemes
Notation: “qual” stands for qualitative, “quan” stands for quantitative, “ “ stands for sequential, 
QUAL     QUAN
Source : Collins et.al., 2006
 
As indicated above, purposeful sampling or non-probability sampling implies that we 
intentionally selected specific respondents that would provide the most information for 
the first research question. With respect to the sample for the qualitative phase, we have 
chosen individuals based on specific characteristics because their inclusion provides us 
with compelling insights into the determinants of board effectiveness. These are referred 
to as critical cases (Collins et.al., 2006). More specifically, we have selected members of 
the boards of directors of Belgian listed companies including different directors’ roles 
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such as chairmen, independent directors, non-independent (dependent) directors and 
CEOs. With respect to the sample for the quantitative phase, we have chosen individuals 
that are conveniently available and willing to participate in the study (Collins et.al., 
2006). The rationale for this choice is the awareness of the difficulties to obtain access to 
boards of directors and to board members. Accessibility is even more uncommon 
regarding boards of directors of non-listed companies. Therefore, we have made an 
appeal to the member network of the Belgian Governance Institute to distribute the 
questionnaires we are using in the quantitative phase. The Belgian Governance Institute 
represents 715 members5 mainly including directors and, to a more limited extent, other 
actors in the field of corporate governance (advisors, academics, lawyers etc.). 
 
Finally, reliability refers to the extent to which the study can be replicated by different 
researchers, producing the same results (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Regarding the issue 
of reliability, it is important to clarify how the study has been conducted, which data has 
been gathered and how the data has been interpreted. These points have already been 
described in the previous section concerning the methods. 
 
3.4 Research strategy and methods associated with the second part of 
the research project 
 
3.4.1 Research strategy: a case study 
 
3.4.1.1 Definition 
 
The research strategy adopted for the second part of the research project is a case study.  
A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident (Yin, 2003). Unlike an experiment, which isolates the phenomenon 
                                                 
5 This number reflects the size of the member network at the time this study was done. 
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from its context, a case study strategy targets capturing the interconnectedness of the 
phenomenon and its context. The case study is a way of obtaining detailed, 
comprehensive, systematic and in-depth information on real-life events. Conducting a 
case study also means relying on several ways to gather and construct empirical material, 
as well as meeting with several actors (Yin, 1994). In particular when using interviews, 
like we do in this research project, a case study involves letting many voices be heard, i.e. 
to talk to many different actors with different relations to and positions in the case under 
study. 
 
3.4.1.2 Motivation for the case study strategy 
 
Although many possible research strategies might be appropriate to address the second 
research question, several reasons support the choice for a case study approach. A first 
criterion is the nature of the research question. Continuing on the findings of the first part 
of the research, whereby we have explored the variety of factors and their importance for 
board effectiveness, the second part of the research intends to discover the relationships 
between the different factors. In particular, we try to explain how the different factors 
interrelate, influence each other and contribute to the effectiveness of boards of directors. 
As such, the research concerns a ‘how’ type of question. According to Yin (2003), the 
use of case studies is the preferred research strategy when dealing with ‘how’ questions 
which are more explanatory. Second, of importance for choosing a case study research is 
the need to further develop theory. Emory and Cooper (1991) state that “a single, well-
designed case study can provide a major challenge to a theory and provide a source of 
new hypotheses and constructs at the same time” (p.143). The results can not only falsify 
hypotheses or assumed relationships but also provide new insights into the theory. In this 
respect, case study research can be inductive (developing a theory through inductive and 
qualitative study of the phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989) or deductive (starting from a 
theoretical model and testing hypotheses (Emory and Cooper, 1991). We follow the 
deductive research approach. Based on the exploratory field study, we have developed a 
theoretical research framework for board effectiveness and, supported by literature, have 
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identified relationships amongst the selected variables (we refer to Chapter 5 for a 
description of the research framework). A case study strategy will allow us to make these 
relationships stronger. It is argued that such a strategy can be very powerful for 
explaining relationships or causality between variables. As noted by Miles and Huberman 
(1994) a case study can provide a close look, which can identify mechanisms going 
beyond sheer associations. It also offers the possibility to deal with the complex network 
of processes in real life situations. A third characteristic is the focus of the research on 
contemporary rather than historical events, as we analyse the actual working of the board 
of directors. Although boards of directors have been investigated for years, the interest 
for corporate boards has dramatically increased during the corporate governance era, a 
phenomenon that has substantially grown over the past two decades. So its history is very 
recent. This contemporary aspect of the research requires interviewing the persons 
involved in the recent events. In this respect, a case study is well-suited, when examining 
contemporary events (Yin, 2003). Finally, our research also tries to get a better insight 
into the more intangible aspects of board effectiveness. These aspects are rather difficult 
to discover, using quantitative research approaches. Moreover, they have, at this moment, 
rarely been investigated because directors or boardrooms are often not accessible. 
According to Hartley (1994) case studies can be tailor-made to explore behaviour or 
processes which are little understood. The case study offers the opportunity to go into the 
details, which allows the examination of specific issues in considerable depth. It is of 
great value to understand processes at a micro level. Moreover, it provides practical 
insight, which enhances our understanding of intangible aspects or group processes and 
the extent to which they influence board effectiveness.  
 
3.4.1.3 Case study designs 
 
Case study research can have different designs including single or multiple-case studies 
(Yin, 1994). For the purpose of our research we have opted for a single case study 
design. The major rationale for the choice of a single case study is the fact that it 
represents the critical case in validating or testing a clear set of propositions derived from 
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theory (Yin, 2003). The case will be used to determine whether the propositions, as 
defined in our theoretical research framework, are correct or whether some alternative set 
of explanations might be more relevant. In this respect, Stake (2005) uses the term 
instrumental case study indicating that it is not the case itself that is of interest but that a 
particular case is examined mainly to provide insight into an ‘external’ issue of interest. 
The case itself plays a supportive role as it facilitates our understanding of something 
else, which is the base for theorizing of a phenomenon. Moreover, a single case study 
design works effectively to investigate a phenomenon previously inaccessible to 
scientific investigation. Put differently, the opportunity to learn is important when 
conducting a case study (Stake, 2000). As noted previously, boards of directors have 
largely been shielded from view, and accessibility to boardrooms and board members is 
very difficult. As a result, board research has traditionally been conducted from a 
distance, using quantitative research techniques and secondary data sources. We were 
offered the opportunity to study the board of directors of a large Belgian listed company, 
in close interaction with all board members, and as such, to examine the phenomenon of 
board effectiveness in a real-life context.  
 
3.4.1.4 Common prejudices against case study research and the actions taken 
 
Although the advantages of using case studies are numerous, this kind of inquiry is not 
without limitations and problems. Two important limitations are frequently raised with 
respect to case studies: validity and reliability. More specifically, Yin (2003) has 
identified four problems which have been taken into account during the execution of the 
case study: (i) construct validity or the establishment of correct operational measures for 
the concepts being studied; (ii) internal validity or the establishment of causal 
relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as 
distinguished from spurious relationships; (iii) external validity or the establishment of 
the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized and (iv) reliability or the 
demonstration that the operations of a study can be repeated, with the same results.  
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In order to limit the problems associated with construct validity, we applied several 
tactics as suggested by Yin (2003). During the case study, we’ve used multiple sources of 
evidence such as interviews, a written questionnaire and documentation. This way of 
collecting data helps to overcome the limitations of each source but, above all, 
encourages what Yin (2003) calls “convergent lines of inquiry” (p.36). The multiple 
sources of evidence provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon, allow more 
accurate findings and hence increase construct validity. The second tactic is the creation 
of a chain of evidence. According to Yin (2003) this “allows an external observer to 
follow the derivation of any evidence, ranging from initial research questions to ultimate 
case study conclusions” (p.105). The purpose is to trace the steps between the beginning 
and the end of the case study, and backwards. In order to allow the reader to do so, we’ve 
included the circumstances under which the data has been gathered, such as the time and 
place of the interviews. Both the questionnaire and interviews were based on questions 
and constructs, derived from the theoretical framework. In this respect, a clear link exists 
between the empirical data and the theory. The final tactic, that helps to diminish the 
problem of construct validity, is the presentation of (a first version) the case study report 
to the Remuneration and Compensations Committee of the case under study. The other 
board members also received a copy of the written report in order to check the 
truthfulness and accuracy of the information reported. They were asked to send 
comments back to the author(s). Besides, the report of each interview has also been 
reviewed by the other members of the interview team, including the Company Secretary.  
 
The second problem relates to internal validity, because we used the case study for 
explanatory purposes. As we are trying to determine whether input X leads to outcome Y, 
there is a danger to incorrectly conclude that there is a causal relationship while ignoring 
a potential third factor Z which actually might have caused Y. The technique we used to 
deal with the internal validity of our case study is pattern matching and in particular the 
use of rival explanations as a pattern, as suggested by Yin (2003). On top of that, we also 
make use of investigator triangulation (we refer to paragraph 3.4.2.4 for a more detailed 
description of these techniques).  
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The third problem, external validity has been frequently criticised in case study research. 
The critique concerns the limited ability to generalize the case study findings to a larger 
population. Generalizing means taking results and conclusions beyond the particular 
context in which they were generated. Typically, when assessing the generalization of 
findings from a particular research, special attention is paid to the extent to which the 
results can be said to be valid for the whole population from which the sample in a study 
is drawn. This is the conventional notion of statistical generalization. Most often, 
however, qualitative research conducted towards reaching a rich understanding through 
in-depth studies of a small number of cases is considered a poor base for such (statistical) 
generalization. Although this critique is justified, the problem boils down to the notion of 
generalizing. Yin (2003) notes that case studies are a good base for generalizing to 
theoretical propositions, rather than populations or universes. This type of generalization 
is referred to as  analytical or theoretical generalization (in contrast to statistical 
generalization). For that purpose, he advises to use theory when conducting a single case 
study. In essence, before analyzing and carrying out the case study we developed a 
research framework which makes use of existing theories to derive theoretical 
propositions. In addition, we compared conflicting findings with a broad range of 
literature in order to elaborate our theoretical model. Further, we also include literature 
discussing similar findings, either in board research or in different contexts. As such, 
tying emergent findings to existing literature enhances not only the internal validity (see 
previous paragraph) but also the generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
In order to solve the last point, reliability, Yin (2003) proposes to use a case study 
protocol and to develop a case study database. The case study protocol is a written 
document, including a brief explanation of the research purpose, a list of questions for the 
interviews, detailed information on the appointment with the board members, an 
overview of other data sources etc. (see Appendix 2). The case study database is a way to 
store and organize all the materials collected and/or used during the case study. A formal 
case study database has the advantage that raw data can be retrieved at any moment in 
time both by the investigators and by other persons. The majority of the case study 
materials takes the form of computerized data files which are electronically classified. 
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Other documents (e.g. field notes) are stored in a separate library. Furthermore the chain 
of evidence, explained in the previous paragraph, also benefits the reliability of the 
information in the case study. 
 
3.4.2 Methods 
 
3.4.2.1 The single case study 
 
For the second part of the research, the field study consists of a single case study. The 
case under study is a recently listed company and Belgium’s largest telecom operator. At 
the moment of the case study, the Company is controlled by a majority shareholder, 
holding more than 50% of the shares. The shareholder structure - in the meaning of block 
holdings - is very similar to many listed companies in Belgium (see Chapter 2). 
 
In line with the discussion in paragraph 3.4.1.3, this particular company was chosen for 
the case study for two reasons. For the first time in years, we were presented with the 
opportunity to gain access to the full board of directors of one of the largest listed 
companies in Belgium. We were allowed to probe all the directors as part of a board 
evaluation project. As a consequence, we seized the opportunity to combine the project 
with a case study research. Although we were not able to observe the directors inside the 
boardroom, interrogating all directors of the same board enhances the understanding of 
how a board operates and how its effectiveness is perceived by its members. Moreover, it 
enables one to explore the relationships and connections amongst the complex web of 
factors that contribute or hinder the effectiveness of a board. Second, due to several 
forces, the Company and its board of directors have been subject to some major changes. 
For example, the recent IPO triggered a change in the governance structure and the board 
of directors has been adjusted according to the recommendations of the Belgian 
Corporate Governance Code. Moreover, the IPO as well as the high-velocity environment 
the Company is operating in, undeniably have an impact on the role the board is expected 
to perform (see Chapter 6). In this respect, the board of directors is relatively ‘new’ and 
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well-suited (i) to explore the impact of specific board attributes (e.g. independent 
directors) which are assumed to be important corporate governance mechanisms for 
board effectiveness, and (ii) to discover the impact of the context on the effectiveness of 
boards.  
3.4.2.2 Multiple sources of evidence 
 
During the case study, empirical data was collected using three main sources of evidence: 
interviews, a written questionnaire and documentation. Each source has its strengths and 
limitations but used together in a single study, they augment the evidence and make the 
findings more robust. We have already touched upon the strengths and weaknesses of 
interviews and questionnaires in paragraph 3.3.2.1 as these techniques have also been 
used in the first part of the research project. In addition, Table 10 provides an overview of 
the strengths and weaknesses of documents. The three sources of evidence used in the 
case study are presented in the following paragraphs. 
 
Table 10: strengths and weaknesses of documentation as a source of evidence 
Research Technique Strengths Weaknesses 
Documentation  Stable – can be reviewed repeatedly Retrievability – can be low 
 Unobtrusive – not created as a result of 
the case study 
May be incomplete because of 
selective reporting  
 Exact – contains exact names, references, 
and details of an event 
Reporting bias -  reflects 
(unknown) bias of author 
 Broad coverage – long time span, many 
events and many settings 
Access – may be deliberately 
blocked 
(Sources: Yin, 2003; Johnson and Turner, 2003) 
 
 Questionnaire 
 
The first main technique used in the case study is a written questionnaire. As described in 
paragraph 3.3.2.1 a questionnaire is a self report instrument that research participants are 
expected to fill out (Johnson and Turner, 2003). All 17 members of the board of directors 
filled out the questionnaire before the start of the interviews. 
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Construction of the questionnaire. The written questionnaire is the result of a continuous 
interaction between the researcher and the Company. This interaction was necessary for 
the sake of completeness. After all, the instrument must meet the requirements of the case 
study as well as serving the particular objectives of the board evaluation project. 
Consequently, the questionnaire covers a broad range of  issues that are of relevance to 
both parties. As previously explained (see paragraph 3.3.2.1), some additional aspects 
need to be considered in constructing a questionnaire. 
 
The first decision to be made is the degree of structure imposed on responses. For the 
purpose of the case study we used a quantitative questionnaire which is based on 
completely structured and close-ended questions (Johnson and Turner, 2003). This means 
that possible responses are provided and the respondents are ‘forced’ to select from the 
pre-selected alternatives. The advantages of this kind of questionnaire are its efficiency 
and reliability (Fink and Kosecoff, 1985). It is efficient because it is simple for the 
respondent to use while easy for the researcher to code for computer analysis. The 
increased reliability stems from the uniformity of the data this kind of questionnaire 
provides, because each respondent answers the same questions with the same options 
(e.g. agree or disagree). Close-ended questions are also preferable in larger 
questionnaires. Moreover, we used 5-point Likert scales for all the questions. A Likert 
scale is a bipolar scaling method, measuring either a positive or negative response to a 
statement. In particular, the directors were asked to specify their level of agreement to 
each item on a list of statements. The latter was ordered amongst eight themes and after 
each theme some open space was foreseen with the objective to allow the directors to 
write down any comment or suggestion. 
 
Another aspect concerns the language. In order to minimize potential biases in the 
responses -due to the different national languages-, the questionnaire is written in 
English.  
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We did not formally pre-test the questionnaire due to three reasons. First, the case study 
questionnaire is to a large extent based on existing questionnaires that have been used in 
prior research on corporate governance, and as such, have per definition been pre-tested 
before. Second, the questionnaire has been screened and obscurities slightly adapted. 
Third, regarding specific constructs related to our theoretical framework, commonly used 
scales were extracted from the literature and included in our questionnaire. Finally, the 
questionnaire was formally approved by the Remuneration and Nomination Committee of 
the Company, before sending it out to the other board members.  
 
Implementation of the questionnaire. The questionnaire was sent to the board members 
by mail. The cover letter was personalized, introducing the purpose of the questionnaire 
and informing the directors about the next steps in the process. In particular, the directors 
were asked to fill out the questionnaire before the interview took place. In sum, the mail-
out package consisted of a cover letter, the questionnaire and a self-addressed, stamped 
return envelope. 
 
 Interviews 
 
The second main technique that is used for data collection is interviewing. According to 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005) the interview is “a conversation – the art of asking questions 
and listening” (p.643) (see also paragraph 3.3.2.1 for more information on the technique 
of interviewing). The members of the board of directors were individually interviewed in 
a face-to-face verbal interchange (in the directors’ mother-tongue). The two foreign 
directors were individually interviewed by telephone. The interview typically lasted for 
one to one and a half hours, but occasionally took as long as three hours. 
 
Type of interview. As described in paragraph 3.3.2.1 there are many different types of 
interviews, depending on the purpose of the interview. For the case study, we agreed to 
use focused interviews. Focused interviews are - to some extent - of an open-ended nature 
and assume a conversational manner, but in fact the investigators follow a certain set of 
questions derived from the case study protocol (Yin, 2003). These questions are linked to 
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our theoretical framework, reflect our actual line of inquiry and are developed following 
the guidelines of Yin (2003). Regarding data collection, he distinguishes two levels at 
which the questions can occur. Level 1 relates to the questions asked to the board 
members and reflects the verbal line of inquiry. Level 2 relates to the questions asked in 
relation to the individual case and these questions are posed to the investigator. They 
reflect the mental line of inquiry6. Relying on this format, we were able to put forward 
the same questions in the same way to all the board members although the sequence 
could vary. Next to the predefined questions, additional questions were posed in order to 
get some clarification of specific answers or comments in the written questionnaire. 
 
Interview team. A critical issue in doing interviews is the possible impact the interviewer 
has on the interviewee and by consequence on the quality of the collected data. It is 
important that the interviewer(s) generate(s) trust and respect to convince the interviewee 
that the interview is being done for a good cause and the assurance of confidentiality is 
legitimate (Fontana and Frey, 2005). Besides, the interviewer(s) should appear familiar 
with the topic under investigation, expose professionalism and/or occupy a role of 
authority in the field (Fowler and Mangione, 1990). To address these two crucial aspects, 
special care was taken of the composition of the interview team and it was decided to 
compose the interview team of both an outsider (the researcher) and an insider (the 
Company Secretary).  
 
No audiotapes. It was decided not to tape-record the interviews for three reasons. First, 
we believed that the presence of a tape-recorder could influence the behaviour of both the 
interviewee (because he/she does not like to be tape-recorded) and the interviewers 
(because they are unfamiliar with the technique). Second, during the interview some 
sensitive topics were tackled and tape- recording could be inconvenient to freely speak up 
and utter one’s opinion on the topic. Third, the absence of a tape-recorder could reinforce 
our guarantee of anonymity of individual responses. The disadvantage of not using 
audiotapes is the increased chance of bias and inaccuracy in interpreting the answers. In 
                                                 
6 The comparison with a detective can clarify the difference between the two levels. The detective has in 
mind what the course of events in a crime might have been (Level 2) but the actual questions posed to any 
witness or suspect (Level 1) do not necessarily betray the detective’s thinking. 
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paragraph 3.3.2.1 we already touched upon the different actions that can be taken to 
reduce this problem. First, we respected the "24 hour" rule which requires that detailed 
interview notes and impressions be completed within one day of the interview 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). During the interviews detailed field notes were taken 
and electronically transcribed in a computer document immediately after the interview 
took place. If there was any doubt on the interpretation or meaning of specific responses, 
the latter was discussed more in-depth with the other team members. Individual records 
were then sent to the other member(s) of the interview team in order to check the 
information. Second, the field notes included all data, regardless of their apparent 
importance at the interview, completed with our ongoing impressions (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). Third, each member of the interview team received a written script of 
the main interview questions in order to standardize to some extent the interview 
procedures. Finally, there was a mutual monitoring of the interviewers to get the most 
accurate data possible (Fink and Kosecoff, 1985). 
  
3.4.2.3 Documentation 
 
For case studies, documentation is very relevant, but Yin (2003) noted that it must be 
used with care and should not be accepted as a literal recording of events that have taken 
place. In other words, most documents are made for purposes other than the case study 
and might be deliberately edited or biased by the author. Still, they can offer a rich source 
of insights into the participants’ interpretations of organisational life. The main purpose 
of using documents in this case study was to corroborate and augment evidence from 
other sources and to supplement other sources of information. Documentation comes in 
many forms, but in general, two types of documents can be distinguished: primary and 
secondary documents. Primary sources are materials that are gathered first hand and 
which have a direct relationship with the people, situations or events under study. 
Secondary sources are materials that are published. Both types of documents have been 
collected and used for the purpose of our research (Table 11 presents an overview). 
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Table 11: documents used in the case study 
Source Type of documents 
Organizational documents  
     Primary documents Summary of the chairman’s introductory 
discussions with the individual directors 
 Briefing notes 
    Secondary documents The company’s Articles of Association 
 The company’s annual reports 
 Corporate governance charters 
 Press releases 
Other secondary documents Law 21 March 1991 and the Company Law 
 The company’s website 
 Summary of an analysis on the company’s 
Corporate Governance Structure by a legal advisor 
in February 2005 
 Newspaper cuttings 
 
3.4.2.4 Data analysis 
 
The empirical data collected during the interviews is qualitative in nature. In order to 
capture the essence of this data, validation and verification methods are necessary. To 
analyze the qualitative data we follow the approach put forward by Miles and Huberman 
(1994). They substantiate that analysis consists of three concurrent flows of activity: data 
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. These three activities can be 
interwoven before, during and after the data collection. In what follows, we briefly 
describe each activity and explain how they are applied in our study. 
 
 Data reduction 
 
As explained in paragraph 3.3.2.2, data reduction refers to the process of selecting, 
focusing, simplifying and transforming the raw data of the field notes. Data reduction 
already starts at the stage of data collection. By deciding which case to study, which 
approaches to use for the collection of the data, there is already some kind of data 
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reduction. Reducing the large amount of available data helps to focus on the most 
relevant issues in such a way that final conclusions can be drawn and verified. Data 
reduction does not mean, per definition, quantification. In fact, qualitative data can be 
reduced and transformed in many ways. 
 
In order to reduce the data, we relied on the theoretical research framework which we 
have developed in Chapter 5. This framework offers an analytical tool that allowed us to 
develop a chain of questions, from the theoretical to the operational level. It has been 
used to operationalise the theoretical questions, in order to enable their investigation, and 
to refer to when analyzing the data. In essence, the various constructs and potential 
relationships amongst these constructs, derived from the theoretical research framework, 
were used as a guideline to order and summarize the available data. We used pattern 
coding as a way of grouping summaries into a smaller number of sets, themes and 
constructs. (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Pattern codes are defined as “explanatory or 
inferential codes, ones that identify an emergent theme, configuration or explanation. 
They pull together a lot of material into more meaningful and parsimonious units of 
analysis” (Miles and Huberman, 1994:69). This technique helps to channel the data in 
order to discover common themes amongst the respondents, to reveal causes/explanations 
and to allow new elements to surface. 
 
 Data display 
 
Data display refers to the techniques that are used to organize and/or to visualize the 
information in an accessible and compact form. The main technique that is used 
regarding the analysis of the case study is matrices. Matrices involve the crossing of two 
or more main dimensions or variables to see how they interact (Miles and Huberman, 
1984). Matrices come in many forms and there are no fixed rules for constructing a 
matrix. In essence, matrix construction depends on one’s understanding of the substance 
and meaning of the database. The issue is not to construct ‘right’ matrices but whether the 
matrices are helpful to provide answers to the questions at stake. In this respect, we 
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developed matrices which enable us to compare the data of all respondents for a certain 
theme. 
 
 Conclusion drawing 
 
Drawing conclusions refers to the way meaning is given to the collected information. It 
implies noting regularities, patterns, explanations etc. As explained in paragraph 3.4.1.3, 
the case study is used for explanatory reasons. The purpose is to examine to what extent 
our theoretical research framework is valid by verifying the propositions derived from 
theoretical assumptions. Essentially, we draw conclusions based on two analytical 
techniques (i) triangulation and (ii) pattern matching.  
 
In general, the term triangulation refers to the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods to address the same research problem (Jick, 1979). The rationale is 
that multiple and independent measures, if they reach the same conclusions, provide a 
more certain portrayal of the phenomenon under study. As such, the technique of 
triangulation can be used to cross-validate or confirm findings within a single study 
(Greene et. al., 1989). In our case study we used two types of triangulation. First, we used 
data triangulation or multiple sources of evidence. These are qualitative interviews, a 
written questionnaire and company documents. These data sources are expected to 
complement each other and they provided us with qualitative and quantitative evidence 
which we combined to draw conclusions. Both data types are highly synergistic, as 
qualitative data is useful to understand the evidence emerging form the quantitative 
sources. Conversely, the quantitative data is useful to corroborate those findings from 
qualitative evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, we respected the technique of 
investigator triangulation or the use of multiple investigators. In our research, the case 
study respondents (interviewees) were interviewed by a team (of 2 or 3 interviewers), 
which is a common strategy recognized for employing multiple investigators (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Moreover, we used a tactic of giving the team members a unique role, where one 
or two researchers handled the interview questions while the other records notes and 
observations (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). The technique of investigator 
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triangulation allows the data to be observed from different perspectives. These 
complementary insights enhance the creative potential of the data as well as the 
likelihood of capitalizing on any new insight that emerges from the data. Moreover, the 
convergence of observations and perceptions from multiple investigators increases the 
confidence in the findings. 
 
Pattern matching is a logic which compares an empirical base pattern with a predicted 
one and it is considered to be one of the most desirable techniques for case study analysis 
(Yin, 2003). In our case study we applied the technique of rival explanations to account 
for findings with respect to the independent variables. While the theoretical research 
framework provides predefined propositions in terms of inputs (independent variables) 
and outcomes (dependent variables), there is still the possibility that the empirical 
findings do not match with the predicted relationship. Successful matching of the 
empirical pattern to a rival explanation provides the base for concluding that this 
explanation is the correct one (and that the initial predicted one was incorrect) (Yin. 
2003). Besides, the technique of rival explanations is also of added value for theory 
building as we consider it as a tool for identifying shortcomings in our theoretical 
framework. In particular, we compared emerging unexpected relationships with literature 
in order to understand to what extent it contradicts and why. Examining literature to 
explain conflicts with the predefined propositions, is considered to be an essential feature 
of theory building for two reasons. First, the confidence in the findings may be reduced 
when conflicting findings are ignored. Second, the juxtaposition of conflicting results 
forces one to consult a broad range of literature which offers an opportunity to exhibit a 
creative, frame breaking mode of thinking (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The chapter on methodological considerations has presented the choices involved in 
carrying out the present study. Although our research project can be divided into different 
parts with implications for the research strategy and methods used, we have documented 
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in detail that a coordinated qualitative methodology is selected because it is assumed to 
be the most appropriate way to investigate the phenomenon of board effectiveness. In 
essence, we believe this methodology enables a better understanding of ‘what’ 
determines the effectiveness of boards as well as ‘how’ effectiveness is shaped by a 
complex web of interrelated factors. Moreover, we are convinced that qualitative research 
provides a valuable counterbalance for the large amount of quantitative studies 
commonly found in board research. 
 
As with any research methodology, the qualitative approach has some limitations, in 
particular concerning the subjectivity issue. Although the latter can not be completely 
avoided, a number of measures have been taken in order to limit this problem as much as 
possible. Special attention was paid to selecting the most appropriate research strategy 
and methods that fit with the issues under investigation. In this respect, we opted for a 
mixed methods research for the first part of our study and a case study for the second 
part. In both cases, we combined multiple data techniques, such as interviews and 
questionnaires, which yielded qualitative and quantitative evidence in order to elaborate 
or corroborate the findings. 
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4 Identifying key determinants of effective boards of directors 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, boards of directors are of interest to academics, the 
investment community, the business world and society at large. According to Cadbury 
(1999) this attention is understandable, given the fact that boards of directors serve as a 
bridge between the shareholders, who provide capital, and management in charge of 
running the company. At the heart of the corporate governance debate is the view that the 
board of directors is the guardian of shareholders’ interest (Dalton et.al., 1998). Yet, 
boards are being criticized for failing to meet their governance responsibilities. Major 
institutional investors put pressure on (incompetent) directors and have long advocated 
changes in the board structure (Monks and Minow, 2001). Their call has been 
strengthened by many corporate governance reforms resulting from major corporate 
failures. The reforms put great emphasis on formal issues such as board independence, 
board leadership structure, board size and committees (Weil, Gotshal and Manges, 2002; 
Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999). These structural measures are assumed to be 
important means to enhance the power of the board, protect shareholders’ interest, and 
hence, increase shareholder wealth (Becht et.al., 2002; Westphal, 1998). 
 
The interest of the investment and business community in the effectiveness of corporate 
boards undeniable stimulated academic research. Empirical studies on boards of directors 
are to a large extent triggered by a common question, i.e. whether boards of directors 
have an impact on corporate performance. Early research on US boards showed a sad 
picture as it concluded that boards of directors are rather passive, dominated by 
management and their impact is in fact minimal (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Drucker, 
1974; Mace, 1971). From a different angle, an extensive body of research has examined 
the direct impact of board attributes on firm performance. By using a firm’s financial 
performance as a proxy, scholars have been able to empirically test a board’s 
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effectiveness in protecting shareholders’ interests. Most of these studies have, however, 
shown inconclusive results (see the reviews by Coles et.al., 2001 and Dalton et.al., 1998). 
Another stream of research has investigated the influence of board attributes on the 
performance of board roles, suggesting an indirect causal relationship between boards of 
directors and company performance (see the reviews by Deutch, 2005 and Johnson et.al., 
1996). A common feature of all these studies is the focus on a limited number of 
characteristics related to board composition namely insider/outsider representation, board 
size and CEO duality. This comes as no surprise as (i) their importance is recognized by 
the various theoretical perspectives on board research (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), (ii) they 
are common targets of those who seek to reform the corporate governance processes 
(Dalton et.al., 1998), and (iii) a vast majority of these studies relies on archival data 
gathering techniques and structural board measures provide the relative ease of data 
collection (Daily et.al., 2003) (see also Chapter 3).  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that market parties (investors, corporate governance activists 
etc.) and scholars attach great importance to the same board issues, there are few 
definitive and striking findings to link these structural board characteristics to 
performance outcomes (Daily et.al., 2003). Due to the lack of clear and solid academic 
evidence, the appropriateness of these board measures as adequate proxies for 
understanding board effectiveness can be questioned. Almost two decades ago, Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) already argued that there is “a growing awareness of the need to 
understand better how boards can improve their effectiveness as instruments of corporate 
governance (…). The starting point for future research involves conducting extensive 
field work to understand better, document and operationalize board variables. More 
descriptive work is necessary before normative board models or theories can be 
advanced” (p.327). Some scholars have tried to overcome the limitations in mainstream 
board research by examining the explanatory value of individual director characteristics 
(van der Walt and Ingley, 2003; Kesner, 1988; Vance, 1978), board working style 
(Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000) and board processes (Cornforth, 2001) for the 
effectiveness of boards. In addition, recent qualitative research into boards of directors 
(Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Roberts et.al., 2005; Huse et.al., 2005) as well as more 
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practitioner literature (e.g. Charan, 2005; Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Sonnenfeld, 2002) 
have brought the importance of studying boardroom dynamics to researchers’ attention. 
Unfortunately the conduct of extensive field work (as called upon by Zahra and Pearce 
(1989)) remains limited, not in the least because of difficulties of gaining access to 
boardrooms and directors. Hence, a sufficient insight into the complex web of criteria 
which enables (or hampers) boards of directors to be effective in conducting their roles 
and ultimately creating shareholder wealth is - to a large extent - still lacking (Leblanc 
and Gillies, 2005). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to try to fill this void as much as possible, by identifying 
and exploring the broad variety of criteria that may influence board effectiveness. In 
particular, this chapter addresses the following research question: What are the key 
factors that contribute to the effectiveness of boards of directors? (see Chapter 1). We 
will investigate this question by means of a mixed methods research design, involving 
boards of directors of both listed and non-listed Belgian companies as well as other actors 
in the field. Particularly, we will explore a set of qualitative and quantitative data 
generated from a sample of directors, who express their views on the criteria of board 
effectiveness, based on their own (board) experience.  
 
The chapter is organized in four sections. First, we outline the theoretical background. 
The second section contains an explanation of the research methodology, focusing on the 
mixed methods research design. The third section presents the results of our study. We 
end this chapter by discussing our findings and drawing conclusions.  
 
4.2 Theoretical background 
 
In studying boards of directors, academic research has been concerned with mainly three 
board characteristics: composition, leadership structure and size. They are commonly 
identified by the basic theoretical perspectives on boards of directors and by consequence 
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assumed to be important proxies for understanding board effectiveness (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989).  
 
 Board composition as key determinant 
 
The bulk of academic research on boards of directors examines the role and the 
proportion of inside, outside and independent directors. In essence, two theories prevail to 
explain the reliance either on insider or outsider-dominated boards (see also Chapter 2). 
As previously pointed out, agency theory is concerned with conflicts of interest that may 
occur between the shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents). Separation of 
ownership and control provides the potential for managers to pursue actions which 
maximise their self-interest at the expense of the shareholders. The board of directors 
serves as an internal control mechanism in order to monitor management and to ensure 
shareholders’ welfare (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In an 
agency perspective, effectiveness is presumed to be a function of board independence 
from management. Applied to the composition of the board of directors, agency theory 
prescribes a preponderance of independent outside directors. The opposite perspective is 
grounded in stewardship theory, which perceives managers as good stewards of the 
company assets. Managers have a range of non-financial motives, such as the intrinsic 
satisfaction of successful performance, the need for achievement and recognition etc., 
which restrains them from misappropriating corporate resources at all costs. Reallocation 
of control from shareholders to management leads to maximization of corporate profits 
and hence shareholder returns (Muth and Donaldson 1998). Based on these assumptions, 
stewardship theory suggests a board of directors dominated by insiders. The empirical 
findings of academic research on board composition, however, do not reveal a consistent 
picture.  
 
First, a rich body of literature has investigated the direct impact of board composition on 
corporate financial performance, but yielded mixed results. Several researchers have 
studied the effects of outsider-dominated boards on shareholder wealth and have found 
positive results. For example, Baysinger and Butler (1985) reported that firms with higher 
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proportions of independent directors ended up with superior performance records (as 
measured by return on equity). Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) found that a clearly 
identifiable announcement of the appointment of an outside director leads to positive 
effects on the firm’s share price. In contrast, there is also a series of studies that do not 
support the postulated positive relationship. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) as well as 
Coles et.al. (2001) reported a negative impact of greater representation of outside 
directors on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q respectively Market Value 
Added. In addition, Kesner’s findings (1987) indicate a positive association between the 
proportion of inside directors and two indicators of firm financial performance, profit 
margin and return on assets. Still others are more reserved on the effects of board 
composition on corporate performance. Wagner et. al. (1998) conclude that both greater 
insider and outsider representation can have a positive impact on performance, while a 
meta-analyses by Dalton et.al. (1998) demonstrates that there is virtually no substantive 
relationship between board composition and financial performance.  
 
Another stream of empirical research suggests that board composition is related to the 
board’s undertaking of its roles, but again the results are mixed. A fair amount of 
evidence supports the assumption that outside directors have been effective in monitoring 
management and protecting shareholder interests. Outsider-dominated boards are 
significantly more likely to replace an underperforming CEO (Weisbach, 1988), to 
prevent management from paying greenmail (Kosnik, 1987), are more involved in 
restructuring decisions (Johnson et. al., 1993), and are better able to distinguish between 
good and bad acquisitions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). In contrast, some researchers do 
not support the notion that independent directors are effective guardians of shareholders’ 
interest. For instance, no significant relationship was found between the proportion of 
independent directors and the adoption of a poison pill provision (Mallette and Fowler, 
1992) or the number of illegal acts committed by management (Kesner et.al., 1986). 
Moreover, some results are rather in favour of insider-dominated boards. Research shows 
that the proportion of inside directors has a positive impact on R&D spending (Baysinger 
et.al., 1991), innovation and diversification strategies (Hill and Snell, 1988) and is 
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negatively associated with the incidence of golden parachute agreements (Cochran et. al., 
1985).  
 
 Board leadership structure as key determinant 
 
Board leadership structure refers to whether or not there are separate persons who serve 
in the roles of CEO and chairman of the board. Agency theory, as well as stewardship 
theory, are also relevant to explain the leadership structure of boards. In an agency 
perspective, the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board is prescribed as 
a measure for more independent oversight. Splitting these roles dilutes the power of the 
CEO, avoids CEO entrenchment and reduces the potential for management to dominate 
the board. A separate board leadership structure provides the required check and 
balances, and hence, may positively influence company performance (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). This view runs counter to other thinking about CEO duality. In fact, proponents of 
stewardship theory suggest that if the CEO also serves as the chairman, this duality 
provides unified firm leadership, builds trust and stimulates the motivation to perform. In 
this perspective, joint leadership structure facilitates better firm performance (see e.g. 
Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Finkelstein and D’Avanti, 1994). Empirical research on 
board leadership structure is rather limited and provides inconclusive results supporting, 
both perspectives. 
 
Only a limited number of studies has empirically examined the effects of CEO duality on 
firm performance. Donaldson and Davis (1991) as well as Coles et al. (2001) reported a 
positive relationship between a combined leadership structure and shareholder returns, as 
measured by return on equity, and economic value added respectively. In contrast, 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that firms with separate board leadership structures 
outperformed - over a six-year time period - those relying upon a joint structure. 
However, a small amount of studies show no relationship between board leadership 
structure and firm performance (e.g. Dalton et.al., 1998, Baliga et al., 1996; Chaganti 
et.al., 1985).  
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Another way of approaching this issue is by studying the joint effect of board leadership 
structure and board composition. In this respect a robust interaction effect is suggested 
between firm bankruptcy and board structure. Firms that combine the CEO and chairman 
roles and that have lower representation of independent directors are associated with 
bankruptcy (Daily and Dalton, 1994a; Daily and Dalton, 1994b). 
 
 Board size as key determinant 
 
Board size is a well-studied board characteristic for two different reasons. First, the size 
of the board is believed to have an impact on firm performance. In particular, in 
accordance with agency theory, the number of directors frequently serves as an indicator 
of CEO domination of the board. Increasing the number of directors makes it more 
difficult for the CEO to dominate the board and hence enables the board to better monitor 
management and corporate performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In addition, the 
importance of board size is also recognized by resource dependency theory (see also 
Chapter 2). The central postulate of this theory is that external parties hold resources 
which a business organization perceives as crucial for the realization of its internal 
objectives (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In order to acquire and maintain these resources, 
a company seeks to establish links with its environment and the board of directors is a 
vehicle to do so. According to this perspective, a larger board of directors is presumed to 
be more capable of co-opting external influences, thus obtaining valuable resources that 
are inevitable for corporate success (Johnson et.al., 1996). Based on these assumptions, a 
positive association between board size and corporate performance became conventional 
wisdom, however the evidence of empirical research on this issue is rather inconsistent. 
Some early studies provide positive evidence for varying industries. According to Provan 
(1980), board size is one of the strongest predictors of organizational effectiveness in the 
human service sector. Chaganti et. al. (1985) compared the board size of failed and non-
failed firms in the retailing industry and found that larger boards were associated with a 
higher rate of corporate survival. Pearce and Zahra (1992) found a significant positive 
relationship between board size and different measures of financial performance, using 
data from Fortune 500 industrial companies. In contrast, more recent studies reported 
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opposite results. Yermack (1996) found a negative relationship between board size and 
firm market value, using a sample of large US public companies. Similar results were 
reported using European data. Eisenberg et. al. (1998) studied small non-listed Finnish 
firms and found a negative correlation between a firm’s profitability and the size of its 
board, while the study of Conyon and Peck (1998) shows an inverse relationship between 
return on shareholders’ equity and board size for five European countries.  
 
Second, from a completely different angle, boards of directors are approached as 
decision-making groups. In this respect, board size serves as a proxy measure of 
directors’ expertise. Larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and skill at their 
disposal and the ability of boards to draw on a variety of perspectives likely contributes to 
the quality of the decision-making (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). However, expanding the 
number of directors might significantly inhibit the working of a board, due to the 
potential group dynamic problems associated with larger groups (Jensen, 1993). 
Consequently, larger boards may be hampered in reaching a consensus on important 
decisions (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). A limited number of studies has empirically 
examined the influence of board size with respect to strategic decision-making. Judge and 
Zeithalm (1992) found that board size was negatively associated with board involvement 
in strategic decisions, concluding that when boards get too large, effective debate and 
discussion are limited and the interaction between individual members is lower. 
Goodstein et.al. (1994) have explored the effects of board size on strategic changes 
initiated by organizations. Their results indicate that large boards have limited 
effectiveness in directing strategic change during periods of environmental turbulence. 
Also, Golden and Zajac (2001) found that strategic change is significantly affected by 
board size. In particular, their findings indicate that an increase in board size is negatively 
related to strategic change for larger boards. 
 
To summarize, the above mentioned studies show that there is no robust evidence on the 
relationship between structural characteristics of boards of directors and board or 
company performance. Although these studies revealed interesting and useful insights, 
the absence of clear empirical support of substantive relationships casts doubt on both the 
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efficacy of agency theory as the dominant governance theory and the appropriateness of 
structural board measures as adequate proxies for understanding board effectiveness. In 
particular, the vast majority of empirical studies are being criticized for using a too 
narrow focus in assessing the effectiveness of boards in performing their governance role 
and its contribution to firm financial performance (Daily et al., 2003). It seems that our 
knowledge on the effectiveness of boards is hampered not only by the applied data 
gathering techniques, but also by inadequate attention to the potentially large number of 
intervening variables between board characteristics and performance outcomes (Roberts 
et al., 2005; Pettigrew, 1992).  
 
4.3 Methods 
 
As indicated in Chapter 3, the vast majority of studies on boards of directors have relied 
upon quantitative data gathering techniques (Daily et.al., 2003). These techniques include 
mainly large scale archival data, while a subset of board studies has also used 
questionnaires. Although these techniques offer the advantage to analyse the data in a 
consistent way, their access to process-oriented data is restricted (Daily et.al., 2003). 
Some scholars have overcome this limitation by using in-depth interviews (Roberts et al., 
2005; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989) and direct observation techniques (Huse and Schoning, 2004; Leblanc and Gillies, 
2003). Their research provides an important qualitative counter-balance to the traditional 
surveys on boards of directors.  
 
In our study, we build upon the strengths of both approaches by opting for a mixed 
methods research design (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). More specifically, we opted for 
a sequential exploratory design (Creswell et. al., 2003). A specific feature of this design 
is its two-phase approach whereby the collection and analysis of the qualitative data in an 
initial phase is followed by a phase of quantitative data collection and analysis. More 
specifically, in the first (qualitative) research phase we try to identify - by means of 
interviews - the full set of criteria that potentially contributes to the effectiveness of 
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boards. The results are then used to construct a rating survey for the second (quantitative) 
research phase which helps us to elaborate and interpret the qualitative findings. 
Furthermore, the research design implies completely different samples and data collection 
techniques for the two phases. We refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation of 
this research design.  
 
4.3.1 Sample and data collection for the qualitative phase 
 
4.3.1.1 Sample 
 
For the first qualitative research phase, we selected purposefully utilizing a critical cases 
sampling scheme (Collins et.al., 2006) (see Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation). This 
means we intentionally limited the sample to members of the boards of directors of 
Belgian listed companies because we believed that they are well-placed to provide us 
with compelling insights into the determinants of board effectiveness. A sample of 147 
directors of Belgian companies listed on Euronext Brussels was contacted and asked to 
participate in a large scale in-depth study on corporate governance in Belgium. Our 
sample included different directors’ roles such as chairmen, non-executive directors 
(including independent directors) and executive directors (including CEOs). Information 
on the companies listed on Euronext Brussels was found on the Euronext website 
(www.euronext.com). Information on the boards of directors was retrieved from multiple 
sources such as the company’s annual report, its website and the Belfirst database. Of the 
initial 147 directors that were contacted, a total of 104 (response rate = 71 %) agreed to 
participate. Table 12 presents our sample in terms of directors’ roles.  
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Table 12: (qualitative) sample per directors’ role 
Directors’ role Number 
Chairmen 41 
Chairman = CEO 18 
Chairman = independent director 11 
Chairman = non-executive director 12 
Executive directors 35 
CEOs 30 
Other executives    5 
Non-executive directors 25 
Independent directors 21 
Non-executive shareholders’ representatives   4 
Secretary-generals   3 
Total 104 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Data collection 
 
Data was collected during interviews with directors of Belgian listed companies. For the 
purpose of this study, a standardized open-ended question was used (Johnson and Turner, 
2003) (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation). In particular, the directors were 
asked to sum up what they perceived as the most important ingredients of a good board of 
directors. In this respect, multiple answers could be given. We deliberately opted not to 
use the term ‘effective’ to avoid misunderstanding because the concept of effectiveness 
may yield different interpretations. By consequence, we used the word ‘good’. By 
phrasing the question in a more neutral way, we believed that each respondent had the 
same understanding of the question, which diminishes bias in the answers. In addition, by 
using an open-ended question we were able to fully capture a broad spectrum of criteria.  
 
 
 
 
 
 92
4.3.2 Sample and data collection for the quantitative phase 
 
4.3.2.1 Sample  
 
For the second quantitative research phase, we selected purposefully utilizing a 
convenience sampling scheme (Collins et.al., 2006) (see Chapter 3 for a detailed 
explanation). This means that we have chosen individuals that are conveniently available 
and willing to participate in the study. A sample of 715 members of the Belgian 
Governance Institute were contacted and asked to participate in our study. Members 
include (i) directors with different roles (such as chairmen, independent-, non-executive- 
or executive directors) representing boards of directors of listed as well as non-listed 
companies, and (ii) actors in the field of corporate governance (advisors, lawyers, 
academics etc.). Of the initial 715 directors that were contacted, a total of 166 (response 
rate = 23%) respondents were engaged in the quantitative research phase. Next, in order 
to avoid overlap between the samples, we excluded the respondents who previously 
participated in the interviews. Incomplete responses were also rejected from the sample 
resulting in a total of 150 (response rate = 21%). The sample can be divided in two 
groups of respondents. We labelled a group “directors”, representing those persons who 
sit on boards of directors of Belgian companies and another group received the label 
“experts”, representing actors in the field of corporate governance (see Table 13). 
 
 
Table 13: (quantitative) sample per group of respondents 
Respondent Number 
Directors 119 
 Representing listed companies   12 
 Representing non-listed companies  107 
Experts 31 
Total 150 
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4.3.2.2 Data collection 
 
Two small written questionnaires were used to collect the quantitative data (see Appendix 
3). The aim of the questionnaires was to reveal further gradation between various criteria 
which are assumed to contribute to the effectiveness of boards. For that purpose, we 
opted for structured closed-ended questionnaires whereby the response category took the 
form of rankings (see Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation). The 10 questionnaire items 
were based on the themes (representing groupings of similar criteria) derived from the 
open-ended question in the qualitative phase. To avoid misunderstanding, we clearly 
defined what was meant by board effectiveness. In particular, board effectiveness was 
defined as “the degree to which the board is able to carry out its strategic and monitoring 
tasks”. Furthermore, we also indicated how the rankings should be interpreted. To 
minimize response bias, the respondents received the questionnaires in two steps. As 
previously explained, the first questionnaire was submitted to the respondents who were 
asked to rank the items according to their importance (1 most important - 10 least 
important). After a period of time, the respondents received the second form and were 
asked to indicate to what extent there is room for improvement in practice (1 needs most 
improvement - 10 needs least improvement).  
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Qualitative analysis 
 
The interviews yielded a broad set of responses regarding criteria that constitute a good 
corporate board, as perceived by the directors. The qualitative data was analysed by 
coding using the ATLAS.ti software (see also Chapter 3). As recommended in literature 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984), we developed a coding list, based upon the literature on 
boards of directors and insights into the corporate governance codes, and complemented 
the list with topics that emerged during data analysis. This resulted in a total of 31 
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qualitative codes. The codes resemble as close as possible the directors’ responses. In the 
next step, we grouped codes that related to similar themes and entered these groupings as 
“families” in ATLAS.ti. (see Appendix 1). The creation of families is a way to form 
clusters and allow easier handling of coded material (ATLAS.ti, 2004). In addition, we 
used a basic form of counting during the analysis process because it allowed us to more 
fully describe the variety of criteria that were cited during the interviews and it helped to 
maintain analytical integrity (Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie, 2003). Table 14 provides a 
summary of the results. A detailed overview of the frequencies of each individual code 
within a “family” can be found in Appendix 4.  
 
Table 14: ingredients of a good corporate board - directors' perspectives 
Families Number of 
respondents 
who referred 
to this theme  
 
% of 
respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this 
theme was 
reported 
Theme 1: board composition 99 95% N=101 
Theme 2: board culture 53 51% N=55 
Theme 3: operation of the board 49 47% N=54 
Theme 4: board tasks 34 33% N=37 
Theme 5: debate/decision-making 28 27% N=29 
Theme 6: individual norms 25 24% N=28 
Theme 7: relationships between the board members 23 22% N=23 
Theme 8: board-management relationship 6 6% N=7 
 
The findings presented in Table 14 show that aspects related to the composition of the 
board are - by far - most frequently reported by a large number of directors. Board 
culture, which expresses more intangible aspects of the board of directors, resides in the 
second place, closely followed by the operation of the board. The least frequently 
mentioned theme refers to the relationship of the board with management. In what 
follows, each of the themes will be described in more detail. 
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 Board composition7 
 
In directors’ perceptions, in order to be effective, the board of directors should have the 
appropriate structure. This involves several related dimensions. The most frequently cited 
dimension refers to diversity. The board should comprise a mix of people having different 
personalities, educational, occupational and functional backgrounds. As some directors 
pointed out: “A board of directors composed of ‘clones’ does not work”. However, 
although diversity seems to be top of mind, it is closely followed by the dimension of 
complementarity. Having different skills at the disposal of boards is a minimum 
requirement, but they should be complementary. One director summarized this, using the 
following metaphor: “It is the mayonnaise that counts within a board, thanks to the 
different oils present”. The third dimension relates to the competence of individual 
directors. Beyond diversity and complementarity, this dimension was cited separately as 
one of the key criteria. It was pointed out that individual directors should have a 
minimum degree of knowledge and experience. It boils down to the capacity and quality 
of the people sitting on the board. Within the cluster relating to board composition, the 
proportion of independent directors as well as the size of the board were amongst the 
least frequently reported criteria. In the cases where these criteria came across, it was 
noted that the board of directors should pursue a balance between executive directors, 
shareholders’ representatives and independent directors. Moreover, the board of directors 
should not be too large. 
 
 Board culture8 
 
Directors also directed much attention to the more intangible side of board conduct. We 
labelled this theme ‘board culture’ - referring to a set of informal unwritten rules which 
regulates board and directors’ behaviour. The frequencies of the reported issues, within 
this theme, are very close. Most important there should be openness and transparency. 
Directors should have the ability to express their views and a culture of open debate 
should reign. This implies that matters should be treated inside the boardroom and not 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 4, Table A 
8 See Appendix 4, Table B 
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‘behind the scene’. One director formulated it as follows : “There should be no taboo. All 
subjects ought to be touched upon. Directors should utter their opposition against a 
principle. Freedom of thought is very important.” Second, involvement is also perceived 
as an important criterion. In contrast to a ceremonial, passive board, a good board of 
directors is active, interested and of added value to a company. Third, the general 
atmosphere or climate determines to some extent the way board members are expected to 
behave. This refers to a sense of humour, positive and constructive attitude, degree of 
professionalism etc.. Other dimensions with respect to board culture, less often reported, 
are the facts that the board members need to pursue a common vision or interest and be 
vigilant and critical. 
 
 Operation of the board9 
 
It seems that directors attach much importance to the operation of the board of directors. 
In particular, the preparation of a board meeting was often cited as a key issue. This 
relates to the make-up of a board agenda and, even more vital, to the documents the 
directors receive in advance. A director commented: “A good board must be 
conscientiously prepared; sufficient information must be provided for each point on the 
agenda in such a manner that it allows directors to decide with full knowledge during 
board meetings”. Next, the role of the chairman was acknowledged. One director put it as 
follows: “The chairman is the driving force…. he is responsible for an efficient course of  
board meeting, he is the one who takes the plunge in case of conflict, who dares to stick 
his neck out… in addition, he is the hinge between shareholders, management and the 
board.” Finally some aspects which were less frequently reported, related to the conduct 
of board meetings such as the length of board meetings (not too long), the quality of 
(management) presentations, time management etc. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Appendix 4, Table C 
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 Board tasks10  
 
From a different perspective, a good board of directors was viewed in relation to the tasks 
it performs. Particularly, directors place emphasis on the strategic role of the board. As 
pointed out by the directors, the board should be involved in determining the long term 
strategic direction of the company. In doing so, two additional comments are of interest. 
First, the board must have some insight into the evolution of the business environment. 
One director explained “A good board of directors is able to see the present, whilst 
keeping an eye on the future”. Second, the board must be able to translate the 
shareholder’s strategic ambitions to management. One director expressed this as follows: 
“See the company through the eyes of the shareholder”. In second order, the support role 
was mentioned. This role refers to the support the board of directors provides to 
management by means of challenging, advising and stimulating management. Some 
directors summarized this as follows: “A good board brings out the best in its 
management”. Less attention is paid to the monitoring role of the board and the context 
which enables a board to fulfil it tasks. The latter refers to the degree of delegation of 
power within the corporate governance tripod. 
 
 Debate/decision-making11 
 
This theme approaches the board of directors as a decision-making group. In particular, 
the occurrence and quality of the debate(s) are perceived as key criteria. The board is not 
a rubber-stamping body. Real, in-depth discussion should take place but the deliberations 
should be characterised by neutrality and objectivity. Or as one director stated: “One 
should play the ball, not the man”. To a less extent, references were also made to the facts 
that directors should make a contribution in the discussions by sharing information or 
knowledge, and that the board should come to a decision. 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 4, Table D 
11 See Appendix 4, Table E 
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 Individual norms12 
 
We have already touched upon the capacity and quality of the individual directors when 
discussing the composition of the board. In addition, more behavioural characteristics 
were highlighted during the interviews which we labelled as ‘individual norms’. First, the 
personality of individual directors seems to matter. In particular, aspects such as integrity, 
ethics, attitude, ego etc. were mentioned. Second, it also includes the commitment of 
individual directors - referring to the personal enthusiasm, interest and availability of 
people sitting on a board. The independence of and preparation by individual directors 
were perceived as less important characteristics. 
 
 Relationship between the board members13  
 
Directors also paid some attention to the interpersonal relationships between board 
members. Although the frequencies are quite low, some related dimensions could be 
singled out. First, boards need the right chemistry to foster cohesiveness. Second, 
informal contacts and interaction between the directors must be stimulated. Third, the 
board of directors should function as a team. Finally, trust and respect between the 
members are also valued. 
 
 Board-management relationship14 
 
The last theme refers to dimensions regarding the relationship between the board and 
management, which could not be grouped within the support role of the board. More 
specifically, this theme relates to the contact, symbioses with and trust in management, as 
well as to the quality of management. In fact, only a few directors mentioned the reliance 
on a strong and honest management as a key criterion for a good board of directors. 
 
                                                 
12 See Appendix 4, Table F 
13 See Appendix 4, Table G 
14 See Appendix 4, Table H 
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4.4.2 Quantitative analysis  
 
The previous section has provided a descriptive analysis of the variety of criteria that 
potentially contribute to the effectiveness of boards. By means of two written 
questionnaires, the qualitative findings are further elaborated.  More specifically, the 
questionnaires offered respondents a set of 10 determinants of board effectiveness. These 
determinants are retrieved from the qualitative results, and as such, are not mutually 
exclusive, as some are closely related. The first questionnaire was aimed at getting a 
more profound insight into the importance rate of a select number of suggested 
determinants on a more quantitative base. Descriptive statistics for the full sample are 
given in Table 15 while Appendix 5 provides the detailed frequency table.  
 
Table 15: descriptive statistics of importance rate for the full sample (N=150) 
* denotes the frequency the item received a ranking score ≤3 
 
The results show that a relationship of trust between the board and CEO/management is 
perceived to be the most important determinant of board effectiveness. The next-best 
determinants are the composition of the board in terms of complementary expertise, and a 
constructive critical attitude of board members. In contrast, a chairman who seeks 
Determinants of board effectiveness in top 3* Rank 
 # %  
Trust between the board of directors and CEO/management  76 50,6 1 
Complementarity with respect to background, expertise and experience 68 45,3 2 
Board members show a constructive critical attitude  68 45,3 2 
The board of directors includes a mix of executives, independent 
directors and non-executives representing the shareholders 
61 40,6 4 
The board members are well-prepared 60 40,0 5 
The information is sufficient and on time 49 32,6 6 
All directors actively participate in the discussions  29 19,3 7 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 22 14,6 8 
The chairman seeks consensus  11 7,3 9 
Board members get along very well 6 4,0 10 
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consensus as well as board members who get along very well appear to be of little 
importance for the effectiveness of boards. 
 
In order to reveal a more fine-grained view on the importance rate, we have divided our 
sample into two groups. A first group represents the “directors” while a second group 
represents the “experts”. In fact, we are interested to see if directors’ perceptions on the 
determinants of board effectiveness differ from those of experts in the field of corporate 
governance. Table 16 presents the descriptive statistics for both groups. 
 
Table 16: descriptive statistics of importance rate for sub-samples 
 * denotes the frequency the item received a ranking score ≤3 
 
The descriptive results indicate some differences between the perceptions of directors and 
experts with respect to the importance rate, as only 3 of the 10 suggested determinants 
rank the same (trust between the board and CEO/management, sufficient and timely 
information, consensus-seeking by the chairman). The views of directors and experts 
 DIRECTORS (N=119) EXPERTS (N=31) 
 in top 3*  in top 3*  
Determinants of board effectiveness # % Rank # % Rank 
Trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management  
59 49,6 1 17 54,8 1 
Board members show a constructive critical attitude 58 48,7 2 13 32,3 5 
Complementarity with respect to background, 
expertise and experience 
51 42,9 3 17 54,8 1 
The board of directors includes a mix of executives, 
independent directors and non-executives 
representing the shareholders 
47 39,5 4 14 45,2 3 
The board members are well-prepared 46 38,7 5 14 45,2 3 
The information is sufficient and on time 37 31,1 6 12 38,7 6 
All directors actively participate in the discussions  27 22,7 7 2 6,5 8 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 17 14,3 8 5 16,1 7 
The chairman seeks consensus  10 8,4 9 1 3,2 9 
Board members get along very well 5 4,2 10 1 3,2 9 
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diverge, in particular, regarding the importance of board members’ constructive critical 
attitude. The deviation in the ranking score is the greatest for this determinant (ranked 2nd 
for directors while 5th for experts). Although our data set can be claimed for statistical 
ordinal testing, it does not fulfil the requirements for the computation of a Pearson Chi-
Square correlation coefficient mainly because of low frequencies per cell (with respect to 
the responses of the expert group). 
 
The second questionnaire was used to explore how the suggested determinants occur in 
practice. In particular, it yielded quantitative data reflecting respondents’ perceptions on 
the (same) listed items in terms of their need for improvement. Descriptives of the 
corrigible rate for the full sample are given in Table 17 while Appendix 5 provides the 
detailed frequency table.  
 
Table 17: descriptive statistics of corrigible rate for the full sample (N=75) 
Determinants of board effectiveness in top 3* rank 
 # %  
The board members are well-prepared 48 64,0 1 
The information is sufficient and on time 43 57,3 2 
All directors actively participate in the discussions  32 42,7 3 
Complementarity with respect to background, expertise and experience 31 41,3 4 
Board members show a constructive critical attitude  21 28,0 5 
The board of directors includes a mix of executives, independent directors 
and non-executives representing the shareholders 
21 28,0 6 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 11 14,7 7 
Trust between the board of directors and CEO/management  8 10,7 8 
The chairman seeks consensus  6 8,0 9 
Board members get along very well 4 5,3 10 
* denotes the frequency the item received a ranking score ≤3 
 
The results indicate that the preparation of board members, a sufficient and timely 
information flow and the active participation in discussions by all directors are most in 
need of improvement. In contrast, consensus-driven deliberations, guided by the 
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chairman and a good relationship amongst the board members are perceived to be least in 
need of improvement. 
 
Similar to the analysis of the importance scores, it is possible to reveal a more fine-
grained view on the corrigible rate, by dividing our sample into two groups. A first group 
represents the “directors”, while a second group represents the “experts”. In fact, we are 
interested to see if directors and experts view the need for improvement of the suggested 
determinants differently. Table 18 presents the descriptive statistics for both groups. 
 
Table 18: descriptive statistics of corrigible rate for sub-samples 
 DIRECTORS (N=56) EXPERTS (N=19) 
 in top 3*  in top 3*  
Determinants of board effectiveness # % rank # % rank 
The board members are well-prepared 37 66,1 1 11 57,9 1 
The information is sufficient and on time 33 58,9 2 10 52,6 2 
All directors actively participate in the discussions  25 44,6 3 7 36,8 3 
Complementarity with respect to background, 
expertise and experience 
25 44,6 4 6 31,6 4 
Board members show a constructive critical attitude  16 28,6 5 5 26,3 5 
The board of directors includes a mix of executives, 
independent directors and non-executives 
representing the shareholders 
16 28,6 5 5 26,3 5 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 6 10,7 7 5 26,3 5 
Trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management  
6 10,7 8 2 10,5 9 
The chairman seeks consensus  2 3,6 9 4 21,1 8 
Board members get along very well 2 3,6 9 2 10,5 9 
 
The descriptive results indicate great similarities between the perceptions of directors and 
experts with respect to the corrigible rate, as 7 of the 10 suggested determinants rank the 
same. The views of directors and experts seem only to diverge regarding the need for 
improvement of tolerating divergent opinions, trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management and consensus-seeking by the chairman. Although our data set can be 
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claimed for statistical ordinal testing, it does not fulfil the requirements for the 
computation of a Pearson Chi-Square correlation coefficient mainly because of low 
frequencies per cell. 
 
Finally, matching the importance rate of the determinants of board effectiveness to their 
corrigible rate reveals the gaps that exist, and at the same time points out the criteria that 
limit the board’s potential to fulfil its strategic and monitoring role. Figure 11: linking 
importance and corrigible scores of determinants of board effectiveness illustrates the 
link between the importance of the 10 suggested determinants of board effectiveness and 
their need for improvement.  
 
Figure 11: linking importance and corrigible scores of determinants of board effectiveness 
 
 
Quadrant 1 denotes determinants of board effectiveness representing ‘type 1’ which we 
term flashing lights. In particular, this quadrant groups criteria which are perceived to be 
very important for the effectiveness of boards and at the same time require most 
improvement in practice. Put differently, the findings suggest that too little 
complementarity in the expertise present, the absence of a critical attitude in discussions, 
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insufficient diversity regarding directors’ roles or unprepared board members may 
hamper the board in carrying out its duties. 
 
Quadrant 2 denotes determinants of board effectiveness representing ‘type 2’ which we 
term challengers. In particular, this quadrant groups criteria which are perceived to be 
very important for the effectiveness of boards while at the same time require only little or 
no improvement in practice. It appears that only one criterion fits into this quadrant, that 
is the relationship between the board and management. Although this relationship seems 
not to pose many problems in practice, the challenge to maintain a balance of trust 
between the board of directors and CEO/management is inherent in the governance of 
every company. A relationship of trust can easily be broken at any point in time and 
therefore requires continuous effort of both governing bodies. 
 
Quadrant 3 denotes determinants of board effectiveness representing ‘type 3’ which we 
term subordinates. In particular, this quadrant groups criteria which are perceived to be of 
less importance for the effectiveness of boards and at the same time require only little or 
no improvement in practice. These criteria are perceived to be inferior compared to the 
other groups. Our findings suggest that a tolerance of divergent opinions in board 
meetings, a chairman who seeks consensus or directors who are getting along do not 
significantly add value to the ability of a board in performing its roles (compared to type 
1 and type 2). 
 
Quadrant 4 denotes determinants of board effectiveness representing ‘type 4’ which we 
term seducers. In particular, this quadrant groups criteria which are perceived to be of 
less importance for the effectiveness of boards while at the same time being most 
corrigible in practice. The findings suggest that appropriate information beforehand and 
an active participation of all directors in discussions are two criteria which should be 
addressed as practice shows major shortcomings on these issues. Still, the danger exists 
that these criteria might mislead attention and effort from the more critical aspects of 
board effectiveness (type 1 and type 2). 
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4.5 Discussion  
 
Three major points emerge from this study. First, there appears to be a gap between a 
limited number of structural board measures consistently found in literature and the 
broad set of criteria that are emphasized in directors’ perceptions, in particular the 
systematic occurrence of a set of behavioural criteria of board effectiveness. Mainstream 
board research has been heavily influenced by a research tradition from financial 
economics and theories treating the board of directors as a “black box”. Although boards 
of directors are frequently studied in academic research, scholars have traditionally 
focused on a limited number of characteristics such as board size, board composition and 
board leadership. These structural measures are commonly viewed as appropriate and 
adequate proxies for understanding board effectiveness, while the working processes of 
boards or individual directors’ behaviour are rarely investigated. A such, the various 
research streams suggest that if the structure of a board is appropriate, the board should 
be able to fulfil its duties, and ultimately enhance corporate performance. However, little 
convincing evidence exists that these structural measures, which are presumed to 
contribute to the effectiveness of boards as guardians of shareholders’ welfare, have had 
considerable impact on the financial performance of companies. Moreover, the data 
collected in this study reveals a huge discrepancy between the criteria found in academic 
literature and the perceptions of the directors themselves. Our qualitative findings have 
revealed an enlarged set of board attributes and suggest a more prominent role for 
intangible or ‘soft’ factors as determinants of board effectiveness. More than half of the 
directors interviewed put great emphasis on the informal rules which regulate board and 
directors’ behaviour (‘board culture’), while more than a fourth stressed the importance 
of debate as a criteria for a good corporate board. The quantitative results retrieved from 
the questionnaires elaborate on this qualitative evidence. They highlight the importance 
of trust between the board and CEO/management as well as the behaviour of board 
members with respect to their preparation, participation and critical attitude in boardroom 
deliberations. Our findings suggest that boards of directors and board effectiveness in 
particular, should also be understood through attributes reflecting the board’s inner 
workings and not solely through attributes of board structure and composition. 
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Furthermore, our findings are to a large extent consistent and supported with evidence 
from other qualitative board studies. The latter has also drawn attention to the importance 
of the human element in board effectiveness. A climate of trust and candour, a culture of 
open dissent, collective wisdom, collective strength and behavioural expectations are 
some of the elements put forward to increase board performance (Leblanc and Gillies, 
2005; Charan, 2005; Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Sonnenfeld, 2002).  
 
A second major point is that the value of independence may be overemphasized at the 
cost of the broader issue of diversity. Stimulated by the dominance of the agency 
perspective in corporate governance, board effectiveness has commonly been approached 
as the ability of boards to act independently from management. Board independence has 
been the cornerstone of the corporate governance debate, although considerable divergent 
views exist both on the right proportion of independent directors and their definition (Van 
den Berghe and Baelden, 2005; Daily et.al. 1999). It is assumed that independent 
directors add real value to a company and arguments in favour of their appointment are 
well-documented (Felton et.al., 1995). Corporate governance reforms tend to support the 
plea for board independence by advocating that a critical mass of independent directors is 
essential for a board to be able to provide critical oversight. Although our findings also 
highlight the importance of having a sufficient mix of directors’ roles in terms of 
executives, non-executives and independent directors, they suggest that competencies, 
diversity and complementarity are more pivotal attributes for board effectiveness. These 
criteria were amongst the most cited in the interviews and the dimension of 
complementarity systematically received high rankings in the questionnaires. Still, the 
issue of diversity is to a large extent neglected in board research in spite of the fact that a 
small number of studies already presented interesting findings. For example, Golden and 
Zajac (2001) found that specific types of directors’ expertise or experience are influential 
in shaping the orientation of a board toward strategic change. In addition, corporate 
governance and shareholder activists are increasingly becoming convinced by the added 
value of diversity in terms of improved decision-making. Boards have commonly been 
viewed as homogenous groups of executive and non-executive directors who are cut from 
the same cloth and it is argued that this uniformity undermines the quality and variety of 
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boardroom debate (Grady, 1999). Consequently, institutional investors have begun to 
pressure companies to diversify their board composition with respect to gender, race and 
type of expertise. TIAA-CREF, for example, puts major focus on qualified directors who 
reflect a diversity of background and experience (TIAA-CREF, 2006). 
 
A third major issue is that mainstream board research ignores to a large extent two 
additional conditions under which a board of directors can make an effective contribution 
to the strategic direction and control of a company. First, our findings suggest that board 
members should become sufficiently knowledgeable about the particular company 
context. During the interviews, the aspect of preparation of board meetings in terms of 
agenda and information provided to directors was frequently cited. The quantitative 
evidence endorsed this finding as both timely and sufficient information and the 
preparation of board members received relatively high ranking scores as important 
determinants of board effectiveness. Besides, this issue was listed on top in the corrigible 
ranking. The need to adequately inform board members is also recognized by other 
scholars involved in qualitative board research. It is generally accepted that non-
executive and independent directors face a disadvantageous position with regard to 
information gathering. Non-executive and independent directors, who spend only a 
limited amount of time with the company, can never know as much as the executive 
directors. They depend to a large extent on the goodwill of management to obtain 
relevant and timely information. Consequently, it is assumed that in order to be able to 
perform their duties, directors need to be well informed at all times (Charan, 1998). The 
corporate scandals are only some examples of boards that knew too little too late. In 
addition, it is noted that a dysfunctional information flow may hinder the performance of 
boards. Some boards receive bundles of documents, but only a small part may be useful 
in gaining an understanding of the real issues the board should be addressing (Monk and 
Minow, 1996). Also Lorsch and MacIver (1989), in studying American boards, reported 
that information is often provided in such a complex way that directors have a problem in 
interpreting and using it. A study by Lawler et. al. (2001) points out that those boards 
whose directors have a greater amount of relevant information appear to perform their 
roles more effectively than boards that are less well-informed.  
 108
Second, our findings suggest a pivotal role of the chairman in the effectiveness of boards. 
In particular, the qualitative data suggests that the leadership style of the chairman plays a 
important role in the way the board is able to carry out its duties. However, the academic 
governance literature traditionally looks at the issue of board leadership in quite narrow 
terms by focusing the discussion on the relationship of the chairman and the CEO. 
Especially, the question whether the two functions should be separated or not has 
received considerable attention and continues to be subject to much debate. Still, the 
effects of a separation of roles have not been consistently substantiated by empirical 
evidence. Besides, only a handful of studies exist which have examined the role of the 
chairman and his impact on the effectiveness of boards. For example, Roberts (2002) 
documents how the unskilful management of board relationships and processes can easily 
disable a board in its decision-making and performance. Based on the nature of 
chairman/chief executive relationships, he distinguishes three dysfunctional board 
dynamics – a competitive, personal and captured board - with negative consequences for 
board effectiveness. Also the earlier study of Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) already 
pointed to the key role a chairman plays in shaping board dynamics and transforming a 
‘minimalist’ board to a ‘maximalist’ board, having a strong impact on the direction of a 
company. However, an unexpected finding in our study relates to the role of the chairman 
in the board’s decision-making process. The results from the written questionnaire 
suggest that in order for the board to be effective, it is not important that a chairman seeks 
consensus. As such, this finding does not support the study of Hill (1995) who found that 
maintaining boardroom consensus was a fundamental value amongst all directors he 
surveyed and that it was definitely the norm within the executive grouping. A possible 
explanation relates to the interpretation of the notion of consensus. Additional comments 
by directors revealed that consensus might be (wrongly) interpreted as ‘unanimity’ and 
consequently bias responses. They noted that a good board of directors reaches a decision 
that is supported by all board members even though personal disagreement exists. 
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4.6 Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this study was to obtain a better understanding of the various criteria that 
(potentially) contribute to the effectiveness of boards. In order to do so, we conducted an 
in-depth review of the literature and complemented the insights with the findings of an 
extensive field study. The analysis is primarily intended to be exploratory and descriptive 
while using both qualitative and quantitative data. The first research phase is based on a 
large number of interviews and yielded a broad spectrum of criteria that constitutes a 
good board of directors, as perceived by the directors. By coding the criteria and 
clustering them into separate groups we were able to grasp the variety of criteria. 
Moreover, the technique of counting (the frequency a criterion was mentioned) provided 
a first indication of which criteria mattered more. The importance rate of a limited 
number of suggested determinants of board effectiveness was further examined in the 
quantitative research phase by means of a written questionnaire. In addition, a second 
questionnaire was used to further elaborate the findings by exploring how the suggested 
determinants occur in practice. The overall results raised three major issues which were 
then discussed more in-depth. What becomes clear through our research is that many 
aspects of board effectiveness are invisible to ‘outsiders’ and as a result poorly 
understood. Most researchers have remained at a considerable distance from actual board 
practice, partly because of difficulties of gaining access. As a consequence, their attention 
has focused on a small number of structural board characteristics leading to inconclusive 
findings. Our findings suggest that this ambiguity in current research evidence can to 
some extent be attributed to the ignorance of a wide range of interconnected structural 
(such as diversity and competence) and more behavioural factors (such as trust, attitude, 
norms and conduct) which actually shape the effectiveness of boards in performing their 
roles. 
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5  Developing a process-oriented model  
for board effectiveness 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, it was documented that the governance of companies and 
especially the board of directors is subject to considerable debate. Corporate governance 
has recently been put high on the agenda of policy makers and investors, mainly because 
of major corporate failures which alarmed the public at large. Besides, academic research 
has quite a long-standing history of studying boards of directors. The board of directors is 
a topic that has been extensively investigated in diverse disciplines such as finance, 
economics, management and - to a lesser extent - sociology. Particularly, in Chapter 4, 
we have noted that one of the most widely discussed issues concerns how to 
appropriately structure the board of directors and to what extent changes in the make up 
of the board influence company performance. In this respect, an impressive amount of 
empirical research has examined the consequences of different board characteristics on 
firm performance. What became clear is that the large majority of the academic 
governance literature treats structural board measures (such as board size, outsider/insider 
proportion and CEO duality) as appropriate and adequate proxies for understanding board 
effectiveness. Simultaneously, however, empirical research has failed to reveal a 
consistent relationship between board structure and corporate performance.  
 
There seems to be a point of agreement in literature that progress will largely depend on a 
better understanding of the inner workings of a board of directors (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2000; Pettigrew, 1992). Already a small number of empirical studies offer a 
worthy attempt to open-up the “black box” of actual board conduct by exploring the 
dynamics of power and influence as well as the behaviour of board members and their 
relationship with management (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005; Huse and 
Schoning, 2004; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Simultaneously, some scholars have 
attempted to model the dynamics of boards theoretically (Huse, 2005; Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2004a; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Our study 
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links up with this research stream in that it is also aimed at obtaining a more profound 
insight into the concept of board effectiveness by omitting a direct relationship between 
board characteristics and performance outcomes. Although the accents slightly differ, we 
share a common belief, mainly. that board effectiveness is determined by a large and 
interrelated set of variables which have been - to a large extent - ignored in mainstream 
board research. In particular, the findings of our extensive field study (see Chapter 4 for 
the detailed analysis of this field study) have revealed two important issues. First, the 
concept of diversity seems to be an additional structural board characteristic of high 
importance for the effectiveness of boards. Although diversity research has a long history 
in other settings, up to date it has been under-exposed in the context of boards. Second, 
we ascertain a systematic occurrence of a broad range of criteria with respect to board 
culture, board deliberations and directors’ behaviour which can rarely be found in 
academic corporate governance literature.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate these empirical findings by examining the 
interrelationship amongst the different criteria while paying special attention to the more 
intangible aspects of board conduct as well as to the issue of diversity. Guided by existing 
board models, complemented with additional literature from other disciplines, significant 
variables will be extracted and integrated into a theoretical framework of board 
effectiveness. This chapter unfolds along the following lines. We begin by explaining, 
more in-depth, the inconclusive results found in board-performance links. Second, we 
briefly explain how boards of directors differ from other teams15 in an organization. 
Understanding the uniqueness of boards is useful because it limits the extrapolation of 
constructs found in other literature, in particular regarding group dynamics. Third, we 
develop the research framework, and based on theoretical assumptions we derive a 
number of propositions indicating relationships between the identified variables. We go 
on to discuss the limitations and the boundary conditions of the model. The chapter ends 
with our conclusions. 
                                                 
15 It must be noted that the management literature has tended to use the term “team” while academic 
literature has tended to use the word “group”. 
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5.2 Explaining the inconclusive findings in board research 
 
Many explanations can be given for the lack of consistent findings in empirical research 
on the relationship between the board of directors and company performance. In essence, 
they all boil down to two issues. These are (i) a lack of clear construct definition, and (ii) 
the reliance on incomplete research models. 
 
First, the diverging findings have been attributed to the varying definitions and 
operationalizations of the constructs used in empirical research. Daily et.al. (1999), for 
example, identified over twenty separate ways of defining board composition. The 
earliest studies distinguished inside from outside directors and board composition was 
measured using three different approaches: (absolute) number of outsiders, industry 
inside-outside norm and outsider/insider proportion or dominance16 (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). Later on, researchers increasingly wanting to capture the independence of the 
outside directors have been separating independent directors from interdependent or 
affiliated directors. The latter is considered to be characterized by a lack of independence. 
In such an approach, board composition has been operationalized by the 
independent/interdependent distinction or by the proportion of affiliated directors (Dalton 
et.al., 1998). In addition to the complexity of uniformly defining board composition, the 
measurement of performance is also subject to considerable discussions (Hawawini et.al., 
2003; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). Although some scholars rely on market-
based measures, research on boards of directors has been dominated by accounting 
measures (Coles et.al., 2001; Dalton et.al., 1998). Performance measures rooted in 
financial accounting are being criticized because they (i) are subject to managerial 
manipulation, (ii) undervalue assets, (iii) are influenced by accounting standards such as 
depreciation policies, inventory valuation and treatment of certain revenue and 
expenditure items and (iv) are affected by differences in methods for consolidation of 
accounts (Chakravarthy, 1986). Furthermore, a review by Johnson et al. (1996) has 
revealed a list of distinct financial performance measures on which empirical research has 
                                                 
16 Proportion was calculated by dividing the number of outside or inside directors to board size. In contrast, 
“dominance” denoted the existence of a large majority of outside or inside directors on the boards, and was treated as a 
dichotomous variable (outsider versus insider-controlled) 
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relied, emphasizing the fact that certain measures have additionally been adjusted to 
account for industry effects or risk in a different manner. Consequently, the variety in 
definitions and measures applied in empirical research makes comparison of studies 
difficult and may be the cause of inconsistent findings. 
 
Second, it can be argued that the models used to study the relationship between the board 
of directors and firm performance are incomplete. As previously pointed out in Chapter 1 
and 4, the literature on boards of directors is characterized by a near universal focus on 
studying the direct effects of board characteristics on performance outcomes while 
ignoring the influence of potential intervening variables. In particular, Pettigrew (1992) 
observed that in mainstream board research: “great inferential leaps are made from input 
variables such as board composition to output variables such as board performance with 
no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms which presumably link the inputs to 
the outputs” (p.171). More and more, researchers hold this point of view and are 
convinced that it is necessary to go beyond the traditional direct approach to fully 
understand what boards of directors actually do, how they work, and derivatively, to what 
extent they affect performance (Huse, 2005; Huse and Schoning 2004; Finkelstein and 
Mooney 2003; Daily et.al., 2003; Leblanc and Gillies 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999).  
This criticism is, however, by no means limited to board research as it is also expressed 
in studies on demography-performance links in other contexts. In particular, in “upper 
echelons” research (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), scholars came to understand that the 
relationships between Top Management Team (TMT) demography and organisational 
outcomes are mediated and/or moderated by various intervening variables, such as team 
processes. In their recent review, Carpenter et.al. (2004) propose and challenge 
organizational researchers to “carefully explore the practical and theoretical meaning of 
TMT demographic characteristics vis-à-vis the deeper constructs they are presumed to 
proxy” (p.749). This actually reinforces the call of earlier authors to omit the use of direct 
input-output models. Priem et.al. (1999), for example, already pointed out that upper 
echelon theories frequently suggest mediating variables (such as group interaction 
processes etc.) to explain the influence of TMT heterogeneity on firm performance, but 
that these mediators typically remain unmeasured. “Most research undertaken from a 
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demographics perspective implicitly views TMT processes as a “black box” that must be 
inferred because they are impractical to measure or cannot be directly observed” (p.947). 
The “black box” of organizational demography has also been described by Lawrence 
(1997) in terms of the phenomenon of ‘congruence assumption’. Based on Pfeffer’s 
(1983) original discussion, she noted that researchers assume demographic predictors to 
be congruent with subjective concepts, which therefore are irrelevant and unnecessary to 
include. She makes a strong case to eliminate the congruence assumption to study the 
actual mechanisms underlying the demography-outcome relationships. At the same time, 
the need for inquiry into intervening processes is strengthened by studies that have 
demonstrated superior explanatory power by including process variables in TMT research 
(Petterson et al., 2003; Papadakis and Barwise, 2002; Amazon and Sapienza, 1997; 
Amazon, 1996; Smith et. al., 1994).  
 
In this respect, TMT research and research on group effectiveness in general, offer an 
interesting starting point to explore the added-value of including process variables in 
board research. Still, it can be argued that the board of directors differs from other teams 
active within an organization .  
 
5.3 Differentiating boards of directors from other organizational 
teams 
 
The board of directors can be considered as a multi-member governing body, standing at 
the apex of the organization (Bainbridge, 2002). However, being a collection of 
individuals, boards of directors show some distinctive features which make them, to some 
extent, unique amongst organizational teams (see Table 19 for a summary). 
 
A first feature is partial affiliation. Board of directors usually include outside directors 
who are not employees of the company and do not assume management tasks (see 
descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 2). In most cases, outside directors sit on 
several boards and these mandates come on top of their regular ‘day job’. In this respect, 
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outside board members are only partial affiliated to the company on whose board they 
serve (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Nadler et.al., 2006). Second, boards of directors are 
characterised by episodic interactions. Most board of directors only meet a few times a 
year (see descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 2). Although (some) board 
committees meet more frequently, the meetings involve only a small subset of the whole 
board. By consequence, board members spend only a limited time together in the 
boardroom so that it is quite difficult to experience intense personal contact.  Besides, 
with little or no contact between formal board meetings, there is little opportunity to build 
strong working relationships (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Nadler et.al., 2006). A third 
feature is limited time and information. Outside board members devote only limited 
amount of their time to board-related work (Lorsh and MacIver, 1989). Moreover, as 
noted in Chapter 4, they heavily depend on the goodwill of the management to obtain 
relevant and timely information. In this respect, it is obvious, that outside directors - 
compared to executive directors - are restricted in their ability to become deeply familiar 
with the company, its people and its business issues (Nadler et.al., 2006). Fourth, boards 
of directors are commonly composed of a preponderance of leaders.  Regarding the 
background of outside directors, most of them can present a track-record as former or 
present CEO (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). It is often because of their outstanding 
professional achievements that they have been appointed to the board of directors. At the 
same time, these individuals are used to sitting at the head of the table and have their own 
psychological needs for power, recognition, and influence. For many of these directors, 
the setting of a board of directors is (or might be) sensed as an unusual and 
uncomfortable situation (Nadler et.al., 2006). Fifth, complex authority relationships 
exist within a board of directors. In contrast to management teams, the role and position 
of outside directors do not reflect their status in the company’s hierarchy (Nadler et.al., 
2006). Still, some outside directors may have more authority than others, due to their 
status in the corporate world or business community at large. Moreover, when the 
positions of chairman of the board and CEO are combined, as it is still the case in many 
companies, a perplexing power relationship might exist (see Chapter 2 for descriptive 
statistics on the occurrence of CEO-duality). A sixth feature relates to the changing 
expectations for work.  Compared to other teams, the role of the board is often not well-
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defined and may substantially differ amongst companies. In addition, boards of directors 
are increasingly confronted with unprecedented scrutiny and (public) pressure (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004). As a result, many boards are struggling to agree on what their 
tasks are, also vis-à-vis management. Seventh, boards of directors expose an aura of 
formality.  The format, physical setting, social rituals and conduct of a board meeting 
create a sense of formality and status which is uncommon amongst other teams (Nadler 
et.al., 2006). Finally, boards of directors encompass a larger number of members.  On 
average, the number of board members exceeds the size of other organizational teams 
frequently studied in the literature (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) (see Chapter 2 for 
descriptive statistics on board size). 
Table 19: characteristics differentiating boards as teams 
 Boards as teams 
 
Typical teams 
Affiliation Outside directors may be 
members of more than one board; 
this is not their “day job.” 
 
Members work for the same 
organization. 
Interaction Directors spend little time 
together, making it difficult for 
them to build working 
relationships. 
Members spend considerable 
time together, experience intense 
personal interaction. 
Time and information Limited time and information 
available to master issues of a 
complex company. 
 
Constantly immersed in 
company’s business. 
Leaders as members Majority of members may be 
CEOs, who are used to leading, 
not following. 
 
Most members are not 
accustomed to sitting at the head 
of the table. 
Authority relationships Lines of authority complex and 
unclear; chairmen/CEOs both 
lead and report to boards. 
 
Members’ roles on the team often 
reflect their status in the 
company. 
Changing expectations Difficult to achieve consensus in 
a climate of unprecedented 
scrutiny and pressure. 
 
Usually created with a reasonably 
clear charter –such as completing 
a project- in mind. 
Formality Physical setting and social rituals 
reinforce aura of power and 
privilege. 
 
High degree of formality is rare, 
generally reflects the culture of 
the company. 
Team size Average number of members is 
rather high 
 
Average number of member is 
rather low 
(source: adapted from Nadler et.al., 2006) 
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5.4 Presenting a theoretical research framework of board 
effectiveness 
 
Taking into account these distinctive features, we develop a model of board effectiveness 
that bridges some of the gaps in the research on boards of directors (see Figure 12). 
Drawing on a broad variety of sources (e.g. corporate governance literature, literature on 
TMT and group effectiveness, field studies etc.), we distinguish multiple intervening 
constructs that we believe mediate the direct impact of board characteristics on firm 
performance. The proposed model strongly relies on the input-process-output approach 
used in research frameworks for studying organizational teams (e.g. Gladstein, 1984; 
Cohen and Baily, 1997). Apart from that, this approach also inspired existing board 
models (e.g. Huse, 2005; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
 
Figure 12: overview of the research framework 
 
Board characteristics Board processes                Board effectiveness
Board Size
Board Independence
Board Diversity
Board Task 
Performance
Cohesiveness
Debate
Conflict norms
Control
role
Strategic
role
P 6
P 1b,2b,3b
Firm 
performance
P4
P 5 
P 1a,2a, 3a
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5.4.1 Defining board effectiveness 
 
Literature reveals that multiple approaches exist to determine the concept of effectiveness 
due to the scholars’ different background and their heterogeneous research purposes (Van 
den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Kuo 2004). In their seminal article Hackman and Morris 
(1975) set out three criteria of group effectiveness: group performance, the ability of the 
group to work together over time and the satisfaction of the personal needs of group 
members. This definition includes the classic “task” (group-produced) and “maintenance” 
(attitudinal) criteria and has been commonly used in research on work groups (Lemieux-
Charles et. al., 2002; Cohen and Bailey 1997; Jehn 1995; Gladstein, 1984). Applied to the 
context of boards of directors, board effectiveness is mainly concerned with “task” 
outcomes and occurs by fulfilling a role set (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004b). The latter is, 
however, still subject to considerable debate in literature. The role set is often not defined 
as an integrated set of activities but is rather conceptionalized in a multiple, and in some 
cases, contradictory way as a function of the underlying theory (Hung, 1998; Johnson 
et.al., 1996). Commonly accepted is the classification into three board roles: control, 
service and strategic role (Maassen,1999; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Table 20 provides a 
detailed overview of a board of directors’ role set. 
 
Table 20: a board of directors’ role set 
 Control role Service role Strategic role 
Board Responsibilities  Maximizing 
shareholder’s wealth 
 Primarily the board 
has to monitor actions 
of agents (executives) 
to ensure their 
efficiency and to 
protect principals’ 
(owners) interests 
 Boards are a 
cooptative 
mechanism to extract 
resources vital to 
company 
performance 
 Boards serve a 
boundary spanning 
role 
 Boards enhance 
organizational 
legitimacy 
 Boards serve as 
‘sounding board’ for 
management 
 
 
 Boards are rubber 
stamps (‘passive’ 
school of thought) 
 Boards are an 
important strategic 
device contributing to 
the overall 
stewardship of the 
company (‘active’ 
school of thought) 
Board Tasks  Selecting, rewarding 
and replacing CEO  
 Scanning the 
environment 
 Satisfying the 
requirements of 
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 Monitoring/evaluating 
company performance 
 Articulating 
shareholders’ 
objectives and 
focusing the attention 
of key executives on 
company performance 
 Reducing agency 
costs 
 Ratifying and 
monitoring important 
decisions 
 
 Representing the 
firm in the 
community 
 Securing valuable 
resources  
 Providing advice to 
the organization and 
CEO 
 Involvement in 
strategy formulation 
and implementation 
 
 
company law 
(‘passive view’) 
 
‘Active’ view : 
 Guiding management 
to achieve corporate 
mission and 
objectives 
 Involvement in the 
strategic decision 
making  process 
 
Theoretical 
perspectives 
Legalistic 
Agency Theory 
Resource Dependence 
Theory 
Stewardship theory 
A broad range of 
theories e.g. managerial 
hegemony theory and  
stewardship theory 
 
Theoretical origins Law 
Economics & Finance 
Organizational Theory 
Sociology 
Psychology 
 
Organizational Theory 
Sociology 
(Source: adapted from Zahra and Pearce. 1989) 
 
Regarding the control role, the board of directors has a legal duty to provide oversight 
and is expected to carry out this duty with sufficient loyalty and care. Particularly, in 
Anglo-American countries it is emphasised that the board has a fiduciary duty to oversee 
the company’s operations and monitor top management performance in order to protect 
shareholders’ interests (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). The board’s duty to monitor 
management and corporate performance has also been addressed in other disciplines than 
law. In particular, the dominant theory underlying the control role of the board is agency 
theory, initially the prevailing school of thought in finance and economic research 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) (see also Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion on 
agency theory). In an agency perspective, the board of directors has the obligation to 
ensure that management acts in the interest of the shareholders. The board meets this 
obligation by scrutiny and evaluation of the actions of top management. In particular, a 
board of directors fulfils the critical tasks of hiring, firing and compensating the CEO (top 
management) as well as ratifying and monitoring important decisions (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  
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The service role of the board of directors primarily stems from a resource dependence 
view and secondly from stewardship theory (see also Chapter 2 for a more in-depth 
discussion on resource dependency and stewardship theory). A careful reading of the 
literature however reveals that the service role of the board is not uniformly approached. 
From a resource dependence perspective, which is mainly grounded in sociology and 
organizational theory, the board of directors is seen “as a vehicle for co-opting important 
external organizations with which the company is interdependent” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Within this context, Mintzberg (1983) distinguishes at least four service roles of 
the board of directors: (1) co-opting external influencers, (2) establishing contacts (and 
raising funds) for the organization, (3) enhancing the organization’s reputation and (4) 
giving advice and counsel to the organization. In particular, the latter refers to the board’s 
potential to provide high-level advice to the CEO (Dalton et.al., 1998; Jensen, 1993). An 
alternative approach of the service role, mainly based on stewardship theory, excludes 
legitimacy and resource dependence functions in favour of strategic engagement. This 
point of view suggests that the board of directors can serve the CEO and management 
with their expertise through their active involvement in the strategic decision-making 
process, particularly by advising top management on the initiation, formulation and 
implementation of strategy (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; see also the review by 
Johnson et.al., 1996). As a consequence, this approach blurs a clear distinction between 
the service and the strategic role of a board of directors. 
 
Finally, the strategic role of the board of directors has historically been subject to much 
dispute, especially in the management literature (see e.g. the discussions in various issues 
of Harvard Business Review from the beginning of the 1980, edited by Kenneth 
Andrews). The strategic role of the board taps insights from different theoretical 
perspectives. In essence, two broad schools of thought on the involvement of boards in 
strategy can be detected, referred to in the literature as “active” and “passive” (Golden 
and Zajac, 2001). The passive school views the board of directors as a rubber stamp or a 
tool of management with little or no impact on a company’s strategy process (see e.g. the 
discussion on the managerial hegemony perspective in Chapter 2). In contrast, the active 
school views the board of directors as an ‘independent’ body that actually contributes in 
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shaping the strategic course of a company and in guiding the management to achieve the 
corporate mission and objectives (Maassen, 1999; Hung, 1998). The board’s contribution 
can occur in a myriad of ways such as through advice and counsel to the CEO, through 
careful refinements of strategic plans, by initiating own analyses or suggesting 
alternatives, by probing managerial assumptions about the firm and its environment, or 
by ensuring that agreement exists amongst executives on the strategic direction of the 
firm (Zahra, 1990; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). According to Goodstein et.al. (1990) the 
strategic role is of particular importance in critical cases such as periods of environmental 
turbulence or declines in company performance, because such events provide the 
opportunity to a board to initiate strategic change. As pointed out by different scholars, 
the active school of thought is receiving growing attention and is graining ground 
(Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
 
Although the literature recognizes three board roles, the importance attached to each role 
is not equal. As agency theory dominates corporate governance research, it is obvious 
that the board’s control role is emphasized as the most important one and this role is well-
documented by a rich body of empirical literature. At the same time, the importance of 
the board’s strategic role is supported by a limited but increasing amount of empirical 
research. Several scholars have attempted to understand actual board involvement in the 
strategic decision-making process mainly relying on qualitative research techniques (Van 
den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Short et. al., 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Goodstein et.al., 1994; Johnson et.al., 1993; Judge and Zeithalm, 1992; Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Applied to our study, we value the view of 
a two-fold role set which comprises the control and the strategic role. Different 
arguments underpin our choice. First, previous studies on boards of directors have relied 
on a single theoretical perspective favouring one board role at the expense of the other, 
resulting in an incomplete picture (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In order to get a more 
holistic and richer understanding of what boards do, we contend that a multiple lens 
approach is important (see also Chapter 2).  Second, as argued above, the service and 
strategy role are not mutually exclusive as some overlap exist with respect to the 
prescribed tasks performed by the board, particularly with respect to the strategic 
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decision-making process. Finally, the strategy role received the most attention (compared 
to other roles) in the directors’ perceptions during our field study (see chapter 4). 
Therefore, we have opted to integrate the service and the strategy role. As a consequence, 
in our model board task performance refers to the degree boards are successful in 
carrying out their strategic and monitoring tasks. Because of the rather confidential 
nature of board activities, it is not easy to measure board performance in ways that are 
both reliable and comprehensive. A suggestion of Forbes and Milliken (1999) is to use 
certain publicly announced board actions, for example CEO replacement, as proxies for 
performance of the control functions. Still, this approach appears to be less suitable for 
the assessment of board task performance on the strategic dimension. In particular, it can 
be argued that is difficult to isolate the real impact of the board of directors (from the 
impact of management) when assessing publicly announced strategic decisions, such as a 
take-over. Alternatively, we suggest researchers to measure board task performance by 
identifying various board functions related to the strategic and monitoring role and then 
asking respondents to assess how well these functions are being performed. In spite of 
their limitations, these self-evaluation approaches have been commonly used in previous 
empirical studies on board effectiveness in the non-profit sector (e.g. Cornforth, 2001; 
Green and Griesinger, 1996; Bradshaw et.al., 1992; Slesinger, 1991).  
 
So far, we have argued that the impact of boards of directors on company performance 
indirectly occurs through the effectiveness of boards in performing their dual key roles. 
In the next sections, we elaborate the indirect route by proposing three process variables 
that we believe will significantly influence the task performance of boards: cohesiveness, 
debate and conflict norms. Moreover, we capture them in a set of propositions. 
 
5.4.2 Cohesiveness and debate as intervening variables 
 
Despite certain distinctive characteristics, boards of directors are, like top management 
teams, confronted with complex ambiguous tasks. Much of the work that boards of 
directors must do in order to produce effective outcomes involves cooperative decision-
making and joint efforts. Board members are required to work together by mutual 
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interaction, sharing information, resources and decisions.  In this respect, the board of 
directors is considered to be a collegial body and only if board members coalesce into a 
group, can collective judgment emerge (Charan, 1998). However, it is only in the last 
decade that scholars began suggesting that the board should transform itself from a loose 
aggregation of individuals into an effective team (for example, Nadler, 2006 and 2004; 
Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Conger et.al., 2001). For boards of directors to become a team, 
that operates collegially, we argue that a minimum degree of cohesion amongst the board 
members is required. Our view that cohesion aids collaboration and communication 
amongst board members, and as such influences performance outcomes, has also been 
suggested and reinforced by research on other teams. Organizational demography 
literature has emphasised cohesiveness (or social integration) as a potential intervening 
construct and it is one of the most extensively studied variables in group settings 
(Williams and O’Reilly, 1998; Bettenhausen, 1991). Group cohesiveness is defined as 
“the degree to which the members of the group are attracted to each other and are 
motivated to stay in the group” (Shaw 1976:197). The concept is affective in nature and 
is characterised by a sense of connectedness. In particular, cohesiveness is considered to 
play a vital role in any exchange relationship (Austin, 1997) and it can be argued that it 
also has relevance in the context of boards of directors. To the extent board members like 
each other and like the group, they can be expected to interact and integrate more easily. 
Moreover, qualitative research by Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) as well as our own 
research (see Chapter 4 and Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004) has revealed that 
directors value the chemistry of the board and the team spirit of their colleagues as 
important elements of board effectiveness. Ideas such as “team spirit” and “teamwork” 
have been linked to the concepts of social integration and cohesiveness (Seashore, 1977). 
Lastly, the board model put forward by Forbes and Milliken (1999) has also suggested 
that cohesiveness may exert an influence on the task performance of boards of directors. 
Researchers can operationalize cohesiveness by using the four-item cohesiveness index 
from O’Reilly et.al. (1989). In addition, directors can be asked to evaluate statements 
such as “members of this board respect and trust each other”, “board members also 
socialize with each other outside board meetings” etc. 
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Considering the board of directors as a decision-making group, we propose a second 
intervening construct, namely debate. Debate is defined - consistent with Simons et. al. 
(1999) - as an open discussion of task-related differences and the advocacy, by different 
board members, of differing approaches to the decision-making tasks. The expression of 
cognitive conflict during discussions is considered to be a critical component of decision-
making groups: “debate is critical in liberating relevant information and shaping effective 
courses of action” (Eisenhardt et.al., 1997:43). Since the complexity of board’s tasks 
overwhelms the knowledge of one person, board members are supposed to share their 
own, unique experiences or perspectives via discussions or other forms of interaction 
(Schweiger et.al., 1989). In particular, board members must find ways to let their views 
be aired, to challenge one another’s viewpoint without breaking the code of congeniality. 
Debate facilitates the generation of ideas and provides the opportunity to critically assess 
multiple alternatives and to question false assumptions (Eisenhardt et.al., 1997). Debate 
has some overlap - but is not identical to - the concepts of task conflict, which can also be 
found in studies on top management teams and cognitive conflict, which is also proposed 
by Forbes and Millikens’ board model. Task or cognitive conflict exists when there are 
disagreements amongst group members about task issues, including differences in ideas 
and opinion on how best to perform the content of the task (Jehn, 1995). The difference 
with debate boils down to the fact that the concept of task conflict is essentially based on 
a perception of difference or disagreement which does not necessarily need to be 
expressed verbally (Simons et. al., 1999). Next to the recognition in literature of 
including debate as an intervening process variable, when studying decision-making 
groups, the issue has also been emphasised by the directors themselves. Our field study 
revealed that directors perceived the occurrence of objective debate as one of the key 
criteria for board effectiveness (see Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis). Our findings are 
consistent with the evidence of a qualitative study by Finkelstein and Mooney (2003). 
They noted that during their interviews, all directors mentioned the importance of 
constructive conflict in discussing diverse views amongst themselves and with the CEO. 
Debate, as a construct, can be measured by extending the scale from Simons et. al. 
(1999). In particular, board members can be asked to rate statements such as “discussions 
during the meetings are constructive”, “when discussing an issue directors state clear 
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disagreement with each other”, “different directors propose different approaches to the 
issue”, “directors openly challenge each other’s opinion” and “discussions of the issue 
become heated”. 
 
5.4.3 The effects of board characteristics on board processes 
 
Board size refers to the number of board members. It simply represents a board’s 
structural and compositional context. Hambrick and D’aveni (1992) state: “at a basic 
level, the resources available on a team result from how many people are on it” (p.1449). 
Board size is a well-researched characteristic as it is considered to have an important 
impact on the functioning of a board (see also Chapter 4). Still, the effects produced by 
board size are not unambiguous as they can be both positive and negative. In many 
studies, board size is recognized as a proxy for directors’ expertise, and in this respect, 
board size is synonymous with cognitive capability (Amason and Sapienza, 1997). Larger 
boards have the potential to provide an increased pool of expertise because their members 
likely have a broader variety of backgrounds and may represent more specialized 
knowledge and skills (Smith et.al., 1994). For this reason, larger boards are better 
equipped (compared to small boards) to process large amounts of information (Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1990). The possibility for boards to draw on a larger pool of expertise 
likely contributes to the quality of the discussions in board meetings.  
Jensen (1993) however contends that board size is not unlimited. There exists a turning 
point where the benefits of an enlarged board will be outweighed by the costs in terms of 
productivity losses. As size increases, boards may be confronted with some traditional 
group dynamic problems associated with large groups. In fact, larger boards of directors 
become more difficult to co-ordinate and may experience problems with communication 
and organization - a proposition borrowed from organizational behaviourists (see for 
instance Hackman, 1990; Eisenberg et.al., 1998). Consequently, boards that are too large 
may be inhibited to have fruitful debates. Besides, having a high number of board 
members around the table may hamper the board’s ability to identify, extract and use its 
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members’ potential contribution. Given the limited time available during board meetings, 
there might be too many members to hear from and to persuade (Patton and Baker, 1987).  
Finally, larger boards - as with any large group - may find it difficult to establish the 
interpersonal relationships which further cohesiveness (Shaw, 1976). The problem of not 
developing intense personal contact in larger boards will also be strengthened by the 
episodic interactions amongst the board members. As a consequence, they are prone to 
develop factions and coalitions which can increase group conflict and hence inhibit 
cooperation amongst the directors (Goodstein et. al., 1994). Thus, we offer the following 
propositions : 
 
 Proposition 1 a : the effect of board size on debate will be positive but when the  
    size becomes too large, the impact on debate will be negative 
 Proposition 1 b : the larger the size of the board, the less cohesiveness the board 
   members will  experience 
 
Board independence refers to the degree of independent outside representation on the 
board of directors (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999). An increase in the number of 
independent directors relative to executive directors is one of the commonly prescribed 
remedies to improve corporate governance (Walsh and Seward, 1990). The ratio of 
outside independent directors is frequently used as a measure of the extent to which a 
board is able to act independently, especially from management (see Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4). Particularly, the agency perspective presumes that independent directors - 
irrespective of the way they are defined17 -, engage in a critical assessment of 
management proposals and that they take a dispassionate stand vis-à-vis management 
interests and values (Kosnik, 1987). Because of their non-employment status independent 
directors are supposed to identify with the interests of the shareholders and to operate in 
the best interest of the company in an unbiased and object way (Van den Berghe and 
                                                 
17 As indicated in Chapter 2, in countries where the Anglo-American system prevails and thus where the 
manager de facto calls the shots, independence is defined with respect to the management.  In contrast, in 
many Continental European countries with concentrated share-ownership, independence is seen primarily 
in relation to the dominant shareholder. 
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Baelden, 2005). In other words, due to the absence of close ties with the company, 
independent directors are able and better placed to approach issues from a distance and to 
speak up more freely. In addition, the literature on director interlocks suggests that 
independent directors bring along important information about business practices and 
policies, due to their experiences on other boards. This information may further enable 
problem-solving and facilitates discussions (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Rindova, 
1999). In contrast, the contribution of executives sitting on the board is believed to be less 
straightforward. Although executive directors may bring along firm-specific information, 
which is presumed to lead to a more effective decision-making process (Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990; Fama and Jensen 1983), their willingness to be actively involved in candid 
discussions has been questioned. It is argued that their objectivity will be impaired by 
their dual role as full-time manager and executive director (Kosnik, 1987). Especially 
their ties and loyalty to the CEO, in addition to the fear of retaliation which could harm 
future working relationships or career perspectives, may prevent executive directors from 
openly voicing disagreement during board discussions (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; 
Patton and Baker, 1987).   
At the same time, increasing board independence, by attracting more independent 
directors may hamper the integration of board members. By definition, independent 
directors are not employees of the company and do not assume management tasks. As 
most boards of directors only meet a few times a year, outside independent directors 
interact less frequently with each other and with the executives. Moreover, they are less 
close-knit due to their affiliations with different firms (see section 5.3). Thus, we offer the 
following propositions :  
  
 Proposition 2 a : an increase in board independence will increase debate 
 Proposition 2 b : an increase in board independence is negatively related 
    to cohesiveness 
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Board diversity refers to the degree to which a board is heterogeneous with respect to 
informational demographic attributes (Jehn et.al., 1997). In particular, board diversity 
reflects differences in knowledge, experience and skills (due to educational, functional or 
occupational backgrounds, industry experience etc.). In the case of boards of directors, 
the issue of diversity is introduced by the resource dependence perspective (see also 
Chapter 2). By recruiting outside directors with different backgrounds or who represent 
specific organizations, boards of directors help to link the company to its external 
environment and as such secure critical resources (Pfeffer, 1972). In addition, the interest 
in board diversity is growing, under the pressure of major institutional investors (see for 
example, TIAA-CREF’s policy statement dating from 1997) and other shareholder 
activists. Directors themselves also stressed the importance of having a diversified mix of 
people on the board of directors in order to be effective (see detailed analysis of our field 
study in Chapter 4). However, up to date the concept of diversity is a rather unexplored 
domain in empirical board research (Carter et. al., 2002). In contrast, research on 
diversity in other settings has a long-standing history. Although the issue of diversity has 
not been approached in a uniform way, two streams have been identified that influence 
the way diversity is conceptionalized. One stream of research approaches diversity from a 
moral-ethical perspective and focuses on the social inequity in order to identify 
discriminatory practices in the workplace. A second research stream studies diversity 
from an organizational and economical perspective in order to examine the effects of 
diversity on work-related outcomes (Janssens and Steyaert, 2003). Especially the latter 
points out robust relationships which can to some extent be extrapolated to the context of 
boards of directors. 
Diversity amongst board members is assumed to improve debate due to the obvious 
reason that diversity is commonly associated with different life experiences and hence 
diverse perspectives (Eisenhardt et.al., 1997). In fact, research on group heterogeneity 
suggests that creativity is positively related to skill-based heterogeneity because diverse 
perspectives can produce and consider a broad array of solutions and decision criteria 
(Schweiger et.al., 1986). This is of particular relevance when groups are confronted with 
complex, non-routine tasks, as it is the case with boards of directors. From a different 
point of view, research has also shown that board members who are in a minority position 
 135
have the potential to provide unique perspectives and challenge the conventional wisdom 
amongst the majority in the board (Westphal and Milton, 2000). For example, when the 
majority of board members represent a particular functional background (e.g. finance), 
the opinion expressed by a board member with a different background (e.g. marketing) 
may shed another light on the topic, and hence, change the discussions. 
Although the results of empirical research on the cognitive capacity of groups are 
consistently positive (see the reviews by Milliken and Martins, 1996 and Williams and 
O’Reilly, 1998), if boards become too diverse, debate may be hampered by difficulties in 
understanding of alternatives, attributable to differences in language or background 
(Pelled, 1996). Board members with the same background share a language which 
reflects similarities in interpreting, understanding and responding to information. 
Directors who are not familiar with this shared language may find it difficult to 
communicate (Zenger and Lawrence, 1989). In addition, heterogeneous boards have a 
greater potential for disputes (Goodstein et.al. 1994), are less able to agree on means and 
objectives (Golden and Zajac, 2001) and as a consequence, may find it difficult to reach 
consensus.  
At the same time, based on socio-psychological research, greater heterogeneity on boards 
is likely to have a negative impact on cohesiveness. An explanation can be found in the 
social categorization and similarity/attraction theory. The first refers to the process of 
self-categorization. The basic assumption of the social categorization theory is that 
individuals seek a positive self-identity. Therefore, on the base of demographic attributes, 
individuals classify themselves and others into social categories. This process permits the 
individual to define himself in terms of a social identity and to compare himself to others 
(Tajfel, 1982). Individuals are perceived as in-group members if they have similar 
features and out-group members otherwise. There is a tendency then to evaluate the 
members of other categories more negatively which results in stereotyping, polarization 
and anxiety (Tsui et. al., 1992). According to this theory, individuals tend to prefer 
homogeneous groups of similar persons. Diversity, in contrast will trigger the process of 
social categorization. The more diverse a board is composed, the greater the chance 
directors will be confronted with individuals of other social categories, resulting in 
increased hostility which may have detrimental effects on the cohesiveness within the 
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board. A similar prediction is grounded in the similarity/attraction paradigm. According 
to this perspective, individuals who perceive themselves as similar to others tend to 
empathize with and feel attracted to these other persons (Byrne, 1971). Similarity can 
appear on all kinds of attributes ranging from demographic variables to attitudes and 
values. Being similar reinforces a person’s attitude and beliefs while dissimilarity is 
considered negatively (Tsui and O’Reilly, 1989). Empirical research on groups already 
supports these predictions. In particular, diversity on attributes like gender, race and 
functional background have been found to negatively influence affective outcomes such 
as commitment, cohesiveness (or social integration), satisfaction etc. at both the 
individual and group level (see Williams and O’Reilly, 1998 and Milliken and Martins, 
1996 for a review). Applied to a board context, diversity, irrespective of the way it is 
uttered/expressed, yields dissimilarity amongst the members which lowers interpersonal 
attraction and liking. Thus, we advance the following propositions :  
  
 Proposition 3 a : the effect of board diversity on debate will be positive but when 
   the board becomes too diverse, the impact on debate will be  
   negative 
 Proposition 3b : the greater the diversity in the board of directors, the less  
   cohesiveness the board members will  experience 
  
5.4.4 The moderating role of conflict norms 
 
In addition, we expect that the strength of the relationship between board characteristics 
and debate, may depend on current norms regarding conflict. Norms are a set of informal, 
unwritten rules derived from shared beliefs which regulate board members’ behaviour 
(Nadler, 2004;; Wageman, 1995; Shaw, 1976). Although individuals behave differently, 
they care about how they are perceived by other group members and strive to comport 
themselves in accordance with group norms (Bainbridge, 2002). Bettenhausen and 
Murnighan (1985) consider norms as “standards against which the person can evaluate 
the appropriateness of behaviour,… providing order and meaning to what otherwise 
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might be seen as an ambiguous, uncertain, or perhaps threatening situation” (p.350). In 
particular, conflict norms refer to standards that “encourage an openness and acceptance 
of disagreement” (Jehn, 1995). Conflict norms are suggested as a necessary condition for 
the emergence of debate (Faulk, 1982). Without these norms, the board of directors is 
unable to take advantage of its diversity and available expertise. Only if there is an 
atmosphere in which board members can freely express their opinions, will open 
discussion emerge. It is likely that directors will hesitate to be a “devil’s advocate” if 
board norms do not allow critical questions to be asked. Conversely, when a board of 
directors is characterized by a willingness to challenge and the utterance of viewpoints is 
expected, board members may feel encouraged to become actively involved in board 
discussions. This view has been reinforced by our qualitative field study. Many directors 
emphasized the importance of an open board culture where it is considered appropriate to 
engage in a vigorous debate (see Chapter 4). In addition, Amason and Sapienza (1997), 
found in their study on top management teams a positive impact of ‘openness’ on task 
conflict. Also Huse (2005) includes board culture in his research framework and has 
found in a recent study of Norwegian firms that ‘openness and generosity’ (one of the 
measures of board culture) was positively related to specific board roles. In essence, 
while board size, independence and diversity provide the potential for debate, conflict 
norms represent the catalyst that unlocks this potential. Relying on Jehn’s (1995) 
example, researchers could operationalize conflict norms by asking board members to 
rate statements such as “differences of opinions are accepted in the board”, “disagreement 
is detrimental to getting the work done by the board”, “critical questions are tolerated in 
the board”, “disagreement is dealt with openly in the board” and “directors try to avoid 
disagreement at all costs”. Based on the above mentioned argumentation, we offer the 
fourth proposition :  
 
 Proposition 4 : the greater the conflict norms, the stronger the   
   relationships between board size, independence, diversity  
   and debate 
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5.4.5 Indirect effects of board characteristics : the board processes-task performance 
link 
 
The strategic as well as the control role of the board include complex and interactive 
tasks which require a minimum level of interpersonal attraction, or cohesiveness, 
amongst the board members in order to perform these tasks effectively. In particular, the 
performance of these tasks depends on mutual trust and professional respect and this is 
more difficult to sustain when boards are more fragmented (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
Genuine collegiality in the boardroom is required to foster confidence that board 
members are respectful listening to each others points of view and are committed to 
working through the board tasks in a collective way. Empirical research on other groups 
has already found a positive relationship between cohesiveness or social integration and 
performance outcomes (Cohen and Baily, 1997). Higher cohesive or integrated groups 
experience higher levels of member satisfaction (Bettenhausen, 1991), a higher 
productivity (Shaw, 1976) and a lower turnover rate (O’Reilly et.al., 1989).  
Still, it can be argued that the impact of cohesiveness on board task performance is not 
simply linear. In fact, group studies have demonstrated that a high level of cohesiveness 
may lead to a pressure to conform with group standards and a striving for unanimity at 
the expense of critical thinking and questioning of assumptions, a phenomenon known as 
“groupthink” (Janis, 1983). Also boards of directors may be vulnerable to the danger of 
groupthink to the extent politeness and courtesy is emphasized over critical oversight and 
quality strategic decision-making (Jensen, 1993). In this respect, board members are 
failing to examine alternatives, to be critical - either to themselves or to others, and be 
selective in gathering information (Bainbridge, 2002). Based on these assumptions, we 
advance the following propositions: 
  
 Proposition 5 : the effect of cohesiveness on board task performance will be positive  
   but when cohesiveness is too high, the impact on board task   
   performance may be negative 
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As noted before, in most boards, directors are faced with complex strategic and 
monitoring issues. By relying on their specific expertise and backgrounds they may have 
different viewpoints on how to accomplish these issues and especially on what trade-offs 
need to be made. In view of reaching a consensus, board members are presumed to 
challenge and critically oppose each other’s ideas. Research by Schweiger et.al (1986) 
suggests that the presence of debate improves group performance by formalizing and 
legitimizing conflict and by encouraging critical evaluation. According to Eisenhardt 
et.al. (1997) debate “provides a more inclusive range of information, a deeper 
understanding of the issues, and a richer set of possible solutions” (p.43). Simons et.al. 
(1999) argued that when team members are confronted with other opinions they are 
forced to reconsider their viewpoints with information they have not thought of before. 
Furthermore, team members might see the benefit of evaluating alternatives and of taking 
a broader approach to decision-making. Hayashi (2004), for instance, found that teams 
whose members share and exchange knowledge tend to perform better. Furthermore, 
results of empirical research regarding the effect of task conflict on performance 
outcomes have proven that this type of conflict is generally beneficial. Task conflict is 
productive in groups performing non-routine tasks (Jehn 1995) and it enhances the 
quality of decisions (Amason 1996, Pelled et.al., 1999). Based on this evidence, we 
advance the following proposition: 
  
 Proposition 6 :  debate will be positively related to board task performance   
 
 
5.5 Limitations and boundary conditions of the model 
 
The model we have developed is characteristized by several limitations and boundary 
conditions. Caution is also required in empirical testing. First, the model that we propose 
is primarily developed for one-tier or unitary boards. Although the unitary board of 
directors is internationally the most prevalent, it must be noted that some European 
countries have a two-tier board structure, for example Germany, the Netherlands, 
Denmark etc. As both systems are grounded in varying legal and historical contexts, it is 
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clear that a unitary and a two-tier board differ substantially in their composition, 
operations and responsibilities (see Chapter 2). We contend that these differences should 
be taken into account when exploring board processes and consequently determining the 
effectiveness of boards. 
 
Second, the theoretical model has been developed in the wake of our extensive field 
study. The qualitative empirical findings were compared and complemented with 
additional sources in order to extract process variables that we believe were the most 
relevant for the effectiveness of boards of directors. In particular, we have distinguished 
three intervening variables, namely cohesiveness, debate and conflict norms.  However, a 
variety of other process variables exist that have been identified in (group) literature but 
that are not included in our board model. Examples are internal task process (Ancona and 
Caldwell, 1992), use of knowledge and skills (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), decision-
making attention (Golden and Zajac, 2001) and decision comprehensiveness (Simons 
et.al., 1999). Nevertheless, they also offer interesting avenues for further research, 
particularly from the angle of the decision-making process. It might be worthwhile to 
explore to what extent these variables contribute to our model of board effectiveness next 
to the ones that we have selected.  
 
Third, although we have supported the proposed relationships with evidence from both 
the corporate governance literature and literature on group effectiveness, they are not 
exclusive. In spite of the fact that the identified intervening variables are separate 
constructs, we acknowledge the possibility that they can influence each other. For 
example, when board members air their ideas in open discussions, the danger of 
groupthink diminishes. Conversely, boards that are more fragmented, may be hampered 
in conveying debate, and directors feel less motivated to make an effort to contribute. In 
addition, it can be stated that not all of the relationships may be one-directional and for 
instance, board outcomes reciprocally impact board structure. When the strategic or 
monitoring tasks are not carried out in a sufficient manner, the board will likely decide to 
change the composition of the board. Still, it is more difficult to predict the exact nature 
and strength of these relationships amongst the variables. 
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Fourth, it must be noted that the static nature of input-process-output models of group 
effectiveness has raised critical questions, and there is a plea to pay more attention to the 
dynamic nature of group systems (Ruigrok and Tacheva, 2004). Demb and Neubauer 
(1992) already touched upon this issue by introducing the “reinforcing loop” in order to 
conceptionalize the findings of their directors’ poll. Although we value their approach, 
mapping board models that way, it is not evident to detect the determining variable that 
reinforces either positive or negative cycles of board behaviour. Perhaps longitudinal 
research methods may shed more light on this interdependence nature of dynamic board 
systems. 
 
Fifth, in our model, board effectiveness has been defined as a dual role set, supported by 
the underlying theories. However, as the theoretical foundations simultaneously provide 
complementary and conflicting propositions on the role and responsibilities of the board 
of directors, a question arises as to their varying usefulness. Lynall et.al. (2003), for 
example, stated that “it is not a matter of choosing one theoretical perspective over 
another but, rather, of identifying under which conditions each is more applicable” (419). 
A first attempt to identify the conditions which determine the extent the board prefers one 
role to another is covered by Zald (1969). In his paper he points to four factors (i) 
structure of external groups (e.g. concentrated ownership), (ii) dependence of the 
company on its directors, especially the need for financial support, (iii) the directors’ 
knowledge of the company’s operations, and (iv) the general health and conditions of the 
company (e.g. crises and transitions). Building on the work of Zald, Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) identify additional internal and external contingencies such as company size and 
life cycle, type of business, CEO style, industry type etc. 
 
Finally, some researchers strongly plea to incorporate such a contingency perspective in 
board research in a more substantial way (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004b; Heracleous, 2000). 
In fact, these researchers advocate the idea that a company should tailor its governance 
structures and processes to its environment. Previous research on high-tech, venture-
backed companies for instance, has already revealed how governance structures and 
processes differ from more traditional companies (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2002). As 
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a consequence, it can be stated that specific board attributes that are beneficial for one 
company may turn out to be detrimental to another. The contingency perspective might 
be of particular relevance when testing our model for board effectiveness on different 
types of firms.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have pointed out that research on boards of directors has traditionally 
been focusing on a direct link between board characteristics and firm performance, while 
ignoring potential intervening variables. Recently, a handful of scholars have tried to fill 
this void by proposing process-oriented board models as an indirect route. We rely on this 
stream of research by presenting a new theoretical research framework for evaluating the 
effectiveness of boards. In fact, our model develops a rationale to explain how specific 
board processes may influence board outcomes which in turn may affect corporate 
performance. In developing our model we have integrated the corporate governance 
literature with literature on group effectiveness. While there is an extensive amount of 
research on boards and a large body of work on group effectiveness, very few integrative 
studies can be found. Supported by the qualitative findings of our preparatory field study, 
we extract the significant variables from the separated literature and integrate them into a 
theoretical model of board effectiveness. Relying on the input-process-output approach, 
we have explored variables that we believe are critical in determining the effectiveness of 
boards. We go beyond the structural characteristics of boards of directors to also include 
behavioural or attitudinal measures of board effectiveness. We have argued that 
cohesiveness, debate and conflict norms may be intervening variables which mediate the 
relationships between board input and board outcomes. In doing this, we have tried to 
clarify the inconsistent results found in empirical research on boards. Furthermore, 
specific relationships have been proposed. Empirical research is required to confirm the 
model and to validate the proposed relationships. We believe this kind of research may 
help to explain the differences between successful boards and board failures. 
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6 Board effectiveness in practice: a case study 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 provides the theoretical framework for the second part of our empirical 
research. In particular, we have developed a process-oriented model for board 
effectiveness that pays attention to potential intervening variables between board 
characteristics (input) and board performance (output). Moreover, we have presented 
several propositions which express relationships between the variables. At the heart of the 
model is the belief that the interactions and relationships amongst board members 
determine to a large extent the collective outcomes of the board of directors. In fact, the 
model suggests that behavioural or attitudinal aspects of boards represent the catalyst that 
unlocks (or locks) the potential - provided by structural aspects - for boards to be 
effective in fulfilling their roles. 
 
In this chapter, we present the case of a major Belgian listed company (the Company) 
that we studied at the end of 2005. The case study is used to evaluate and validate the 
theoretical research model. The Company’s board of directors constitutes an interesting 
example to examine the intangible aspects that contribute to the effectiveness of boards. 
It does not only provide the unique opportunity of studying a high elite class whose 
accessibility is uncommon but it also leads to a better understanding of how board 
effectiveness is shaped by a complex web of factors.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we explain the outlines of the theoretical 
research framework. The latter provides the background for the case study. Next, we 
discuss the research methods that were followed during the field study. Section 3 of this 
chapter includes a brief description of the Company’s sector, mission, activities and 
governance structure. This description allows a better understanding of the context in 
terms of the strategic and governance challenges the Company faces. In section 4, we 
evaluate the robustness of our board model which we have developed in the previous 
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chapter. In particular, by combining both qualitative and quantitative data, we assess the 
nature of the relationships between the predefined variables. Finally, the findings are used 
to reconsider our research model and to draw conclusions. 
 
6.2 Background 
 
The board of directors, as the ultimate decision-making body, is assumed to add value to 
an organization. However, despite the intense interest in boards of directors, our 
understanding of how boards contribute to organizational performance is still relatively 
undeveloped (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004(a)). In Chapter 4, we have documented that a 
great deal of literature on boards of directors has traditionally been centred around direct 
board-performance links using organisational performance (e.g. Dalton et.al., 1998) or 
critical decisions (such as greenmail (Kosnik, 1990) or CEO turnover and remuneration 
(Core et.al. 1999; Weisbach, 1988)) as dependent variables. It was noted that decades of 
research have enhanced our insights on boards of directors, but at the same time no solid 
evidence is provided on how and to what extent boards of directors add value to their 
companies. Moreover, it was argued that mainstream board research has relied on 
incomplete models which largely ignore the influence of various intervening variables 
between board inputs and performance outputs.  In fact, Tricker’s (1978) observation that 
the work of directors, in and out of the boardroom, is rated as the most under researched 
management topic, is still much alive. In this respect, Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) 
have contended to establish a new research direction which should unfold along three 
lines: (i) modelling of the inner workings of the boards; (ii) tests of the implication of 
particular models and (iii) studying boards of organizations other than the largest-publicly 
traded corporations. Although recent work has followed one or two approaches 
(behavioural board model by e.g. Huse, 2005; empirical study of board effectiveness in 
non-profit organisations by e.g. Cornforth, 2005 and 2001)), we believe that subsequent 
work in these three main directions will continue to add much to our knowledge on 
boards. 
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Understanding how boards actually work is not an easy task and requires a range of tools 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2004(b)). Modelling or developing a conceptional framework is 
considered to be a key tool, because it indicates how factors are related to each other 
and/or how factors can cause changes to others. Notwithstanding the abstract nature of 
frameworks and models, it is important that reality is adequately reflected (Sutton and 
Staw, 1995). Based on the empirical findings of our exploratory field study (see Chapter 
4), we have developed a conceptional model for analyzing board effectiveness (we refer 
to Chapter 5 for a more detailed description). Our model, which basically follows an 
input-process-output approach, has three main characteristics. First, board effectiveness 
(the output variable) is defined in relation to the tasks the board of directors is expected 
to perform. In particular, we have approached an effective board as one that can 
successfully execute a dual role set, namely its strategic and monitoring role. Literature, 
in contrast, has traditionally focused on the board’s execution of a single role rather than 
on an integrated role set (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004(a); Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In 
addition, due to the dominant reliance on agency theory in corporate governance and 
board research, literature has (over)emphasized the monitoring and control functions of 
the board at the expense of other functions, such as strategic or resource dependence roles 
(e.g. Johnson et.al., 1996). Both tendencies have resulted in an incomplete understanding 
of what boards actually do.  
Second, emphasis is placed on board processes in addition to the size and composition of 
the board as factors influencing board effectiveness. In particular, we have identified 
three intervening variables (cohesiveness, debate and conflict norms) which we believe 
mediate the effects of board structural characteristics on board task performance. The 
bulk of research on boards has focused too much on structural factors and only recently 
has a more behavioural perspective (in terms of a focus on the working relationships 
amongst board members) in board research started receiving increased attention (e.g. 
Nadler et.al, 2006; Huse, 2005; Roberts et.al., 2005, Toshi et.al., 2003; Sonnenfeld, 
2002). In particular, this research makes a strong case for the fact that board composition 
(as a proxy) can not replace the behaviours of board members in determining the 
effectiveness of the board in pursuing company success. From this perspective, it is 
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crucial to get a better picture of the inner workings of a board of directors as well as to 
enhance the knowledge on the relationships between board members. 
Third, the concept of board diversity is introduced as an additional input variable. Despite 
the huge interest in other research settings, the issue of diversity has been - to a large 
extent - unexplored in the contexts of boards (Carter et.al., 2002). In fact, the 
overwhelming emphasis on agency theory in board research has led to the dominant 
assumption that board effectiveness is a function of a board’s independence from 
management. As a consequence, much attention in literature is paid to the ratio and role 
of outside, independent directors (Walsh and Seward, 1990). From an agency perspective, 
the concept of diversity has not been of a concern. In contrast, the value of board 
diversity is recognised by resource dependency theorists (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
who touch upon diversity as a means for providing critical resources (legitimacy, advice 
and counsel, channels of communication and tangible resources). However, the issue only 
received moderate support in empirical board research. 
 
In line with the view of Hermalin and Weisbach (2000), a next step to enhance our 
understanding of boards is the validation of our model. In order to do so, we have opted 
for a case study of a Belgian listed company, active in a high velocity environment.  
 
6.3 Research design 
 
The main research question that is addressed in the second empirical field study is “how 
do board processes influence the task performance of boards of directors”. By developing 
a process-oriented board model, we have approached this research question from a 
theoretical point of view. In particular, we have documented how different structural and 
‘intangible’ variables are interconnected to form an integrated set of criteria which 
influence board effectiveness. Moreover we have expressed our expectations of 
relationships amongst the identified variables. By means of an empirical field study, we 
will evaluate and validate the robustness of our theoretical research framework. 
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6.3.1 Case study method 
 
We chose to study board effectiveness in a natural setting by investigating the board of 
directors of a Belgian listed company. The choice of a single case is supported by Yen 
(2003, 1994) when (i) an investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyze a 
phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation or (ii) when the case 
represents the critical case in validating a clear set of propositions derived from theory. 
Both arguments are applicable to our study. We refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed 
explanation on case study as a research strategy.  
 
Quality measures. A major challenge in case study research is to ensure that data 
collection and data analysis meet tests of reliability, construct validity, external and 
internal validity (Yin, 2003). We promoted reliability (1) by using a case study protocol 
in which all informants were subjected to the same interview questions, and (2) by 
creating a data base to organize the interview notes and other documents. Construct 
validity was enhanced (1) by using multiple sources of evidence (data triangulation), (2) 
by establishing a clear link between empirical data and theory and (3) by a verification of 
the case study report by the board members who checked the truthfulness and accuracy of 
the information reported. External validity is limited to generalizibility of the findings to 
theoretical proposition rather than populations. Finally, we addressed internal validity (1) 
by investor triangulation and (2) by the "pattern matching” analysis method described by 
Yin (2003). We refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed description on the limitations of 
case study research. 
 
6.3.2 Sources of information 
 
We obtained our empirical data by relying on three data resources : (1) semi-structured 
interviews with all board members, (2) a written questionnaire, and (3) documentation. 
 
Interviews with all board members. We conducted face-to-face focused interviews 
which typically lasted for one to one and a half hours, but occasionally took as long as 
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three hours. Each interview consisted of three major parts. In a first part, we gained a 
general impression on how directors perceived the effectiveness of the Company’s board 
of directors. In a second part, we probed for the different factors which influence board 
effectiveness, using a standard set of questions. A third part included questions for 
clarification and verification of responses in the written questionnaire. Each interview 
was conducted by an interview team and additional rules were followed for within-case 
analysis. We refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation. 
Questionnaire. We also obtained quantitative data from written questionnaires, which 
board members filled out before the start of the interview. The questionnaire covered a 
broad range of board issues and included measures for the variables within our theoretical 
research framework. We refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the 
questionnaire and to Chapter 5 for an explanation of how we measure the constructs in 
our board model. 
Documentation. Additional information was gathered by means of primary and 
secondary documents, such as the Company’s annual report, charters, relevant laws and 
regulations etc. We refer to Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation regarding the use 
of documentation as a source of evidence. 
 
6.4 Presentation of the case study 
 
6.4.1 The Company’s environment  
 
The Company in our study operates within the telecom sector. This sector can be 
characterized as a high velocity industry. The latter is characterised by a rapid and 
discontinuous change in regulation, technology, competitors and demand (Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt, 1988). In essence, we can identify four forces at work which have had a 
major impact on the telecom sector over the past two decades, and which are expected to 
influence the industry over the next years. First, the European Commission pushed for a 
broad liberalisation of the telecom sector in order to generate more competition, better 
prices and services for the consumer. In this respect, different regulations have been 
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revised and have changed the competitive landscape, also in Belgium. Second, the sector 
faces a strong technological evolution. This evolution materialises itself in terms of new 
applications, changes in transport media and in infrastructure. Companies have started to 
bundle different communication and entertainment services such as telephony, internet 
and television (defined as “triple play”). Third, there seems to be consolidation amongst 
existing players and emergence of new and diverse players. In Europe and in Belgium 
too, the telecom incumbents have preserved a leadership position, but new competitors 
have entered the market. In contrast, North America is confronted with many mergers and 
acquisitions leading to the emergence of a few large players. Fourth, customer demand 
and behaviour is rapidly changing. In general, customers are becoming more technology 
savvy and more demanding, in particular regarding integrated solutions.  
 
6.4.2 The Company’s mission, strategy and activities 
 
In a few years time, the Company has evolved from a classic telephone company to a full 
telecommunications company. The technological revolution, especially, is creating new 
opportunities which force the Company to keep up with recent developments in the field 
of communication . This is reflected in its vision and resulting mission. 
Vision : The Company believes in a world where unlimited 
communication possibilities will create new unexpected services of 
uplifting benefit for all.
Mission : By opening up the amazing universe of communication 
possibilities, the Company enables and inspires people and 
organizations to achieve their dreams and goals in their ever 
changing world.
(annual report, 2005)               Box 1: The Company’s vision and mission 
 
 
At the Company, strategy is defined in a long-term context and revolves around three 
pillars: operational excellence, maintaining market leadership for the core activities, and 
the pursuit of new development opportunities. The strategic goals are referred to as 
BELG (annual report, 2005):  
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B for “Become Best-in-Class”: this reflects the Company’s overall purpose and its desire 
to maintain its number one position in Belgium and ranking amongst the most efficient 
operators in Europe. To achieve this objective, three principles must be followed: 
E for “Excellence”: meaning that the Company wants to make excellence a priority with 
respect to (i) managing costs, human resources, and technical know-how, (ii) synergizing 
activities within the Group and (iii) customer interactions. 
L for “Lead”: meaning that the Company continuously strives to (i) maintain its 
leadership position in Belgium in the area of voice telephony, by launching new products 
and services, (ii) play a pivotal role in the triple-play market by promoting its network, 
ADSL and digital TV and (iii) to build customer intimacy by offering a range of 
innovative products. 
G for “Grow”: meaning the Company must (i) expand in the data and e-services markets, 
(ii) pursue international growth through its carrier subsidiary and (iii) extend its activities 
beyond Belgium, in both fixed-line and mobile telephony markets. 
 
The core activities of the Company are split up in three business unites: Fixed Line 
Service (FLS), Mobile Communications Services (MCS) and International Carrier 
Services (ICS). 
 
Fixed Line Services. The Company offers a comprehensive range of voice, data 
transmission and internet services over the fixed telephone line for both professional and 
residential customers. At the end of 2005, the Company counted approximately 5,2 
million access channels to its fixed-line network (PSTN lines, ISDN lines and ADSL 
retail). Besides, being Belgium’s main Internet Service Provider (ISP), the Company 
provides narrow- and broadband Internet access to over one million subscribers. The 
Company is also the leading provider of data connectivity services in Belgium where it 
offers a range of enterprise data site-to-site and user-to-site services which can be tailored 
to business customers' requirements. During 2005, the Company branched out into the 
digital television sector, launching digital TV in June. At the end of 2006 more than 
100.000 Belgians subscribed to digital TV.  
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Mobile Communications Services.  The Company is the main provider of mobile 
communication in Belgium. The major brand has 4,25 million active customers and 
offers a broad range of mobile communications services, including traditional voice, data 
(SMS, MMS), a large range of mobile solutions for companies and roaming services, as 
well as wholesale data services to third-parties 
International Carrier Services. These activities are carried out by the company’s 
subsidiary ‘International Carrier Services’. In 2005, the latter combined forces with a 
foreign Carrier Services in a joint venture. The subsidiary ‘International Carrier Services’ 
is the preferred supplier of international connectivity services to the two partners 
involved and provides voice and data capacity and connectivity services to other 
telecommunications operators around the globe. 
 
In Belgium, the Company (including its subsidiaries) is a market leader in many fields, 
particularly in wholesale and retail fixed line services, mobile communications, Internet 
and broadband data transmission services.   
 
6.4.3 The Company’s financial position  
 
The Company has a strong and sound financial position as illustrated by Table 21.  
 
Table 21: key financial figures of the Company 
 Before 
IPO 
After IPO 
 2003 2004 2005 
Income Statement (in EUR million)    
Total revenue before non-recurring items 5,454  5,540  5,458 
EBITDA* before non-recurring items 2,250  2,394  2,214 
Net income (Group share) 172  922  959 
Cash Flow Capital Expenditures (in EUR million)    
Cash flow from operating activities 296  1,899  1,883 
Capital expenditures (502) (556) (696) 
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Balance sheet (in EUR million)    
Balance sheet total 6,009  5,368  5,831 
Net financial position 157  110  534 
Data per share    
*Earnings Before Interests, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization. 
 
 (Source: the Company’s website, investors’ corner) 
 
Since the IPO in March 2004 the Company’s shares have been  listed on the Euronext 
Brussels Stock Exchange and have been included in a total of 53 indexes, amongst which 
are the BEL20 (main Belgian caps) and the major European/telecom indexes. Table 22 
below shows the main indicators on the Company share performance. 
  
Table 22: key figures on share performance 
 2004 2005 
Market capitalization 31 Dec. (in EUR billion) 11.15  9.38 
Data per share   
Basic earnings per share (in EUR) 2.57  2.78 
Dividend per share, gross (in EUR) 1.38  1.52 
Price/Earnings ratio 31 December 12.36  2.36 
  (Source: annual report 2005) 
 
In 2005, the company share price was under considerable pressure in the first half of the 
year but managed to remain fairly stable over the second half. The share, however, 
underperformed the Telecom sector-index and the BEL20-index (see Figure 13).  
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  Figure 13: the Company share compared to BEL20 and Euro STOKX 
 
 
6.4.4 The company’s governance structure 
 
The Company’s corporate governance model is to a large extent influenced by its specific 
legal status as well as by the recommendations of the Belgian Corporate Governance 
Code (Lippens Code). As a limited liability company under public law, the Company is 
in line with the law of 21 March 1991 reforming certain public economic enterprises. For 
matters not explicitly regulated by the 1991 Law, the Company is governed by the 
Belgian Company Code. Being just listed on the Euronext Stock Exchange, the Company 
fully complies with the requirements of the Lippens Code. This regulatory framework 
shapes the context of the relationships between the different actors in the corporate 
governance tripod (see Appendix 6). 
 
6.4.4.1 Shareholder structure 
 
In general terms, the shareholder structure has not substantially changed since the IPO in 
2004 (see Table 23). Before the IPO, the shares were mainly distributed between a 
Belgian majority shareholder and an international private consortium. After the IPO, the 
major shareholder kept its stake in the Company while the private consortium sold its 
shares to the public.  
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Table 23: the Company's shareholder structure 
Situation on  
31/12/2003 
% in 
total 
Situation on 
31/12/2005  
Shares % in 
total  
% voting 
rights 
Majority shareholder 50,0% Majority shareholder 180.887.569 50,00% 53,14% 
Private consortium 46,9% Free-float* 157.525.777 43,54% 46,28% 
The Company (own shares)   3,1% The Company (own 
shares)  
21.380.565 5,91% 0,00% 
  Personnel 1.981.224 0,55% 0,58% 
  Total 361.775.135 100,00% 100,00% 
(Sources: annual reports 2003, 2005) 
* In accordance with the Belgian Transparency Law, holdings of 5% (or a multiple of 5%) of the total share 
capital must be declared to both the BFIC (Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission) and the company 
itself. The Company’s articles of association have reduced this threshold to 3%. In this context, an 
institutional investor (Belgian investment fund) reported that it had acquired a shareholding of more than 
3%.  
 
Frm this point of view, the Company can be considered to be a closely held listed 
company, controlled by a major shareholder, holding a large part of the shares. 
Chapter 2 provides some descriptive statistics on ownership concentration in Belgium. In 
particular, it is indicated that 80% of Belgian listed companies have a major shareholder 
who controls the company either directly (participation > 50%) or indirectly 
(participation between 25% and 50%, and in control through formation of coalitions 
through voting pacts or similar arrangements). In this respect, the Company’s shareholder 
structure resembles that of an average Belgian listed company. 
 
6.4.4.2 Board of directors 
 
6.4.4.2.1 The composition of the board of directors 
 
The board of directors of the Company is composed of maximum 18 members, including 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). There are two distinctive features with respect to the 
composition of the Company’s board of directors: appointment of directors and language 
parity (the Company’s Articles of Association, 16 and 18). 
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First, the board of directors consists, besides the CEO, of two broad categories of non-
executive directors:  
(i) Board members who are appointed directly by the majority shareholder, in 
proportion to the number of votes held. They are considered as the non-
executive directors representing the dominant shareholder. 
(ii) Board members who are appointed in the General Meeting of Shareholders, 
and by a separate vote amongst the other shareholders for the remaining seats. 
These board members are appointed solely from a list of candidates proposed 
by the board of directors. In accordance with the Belgian Companies Code, at 
least three board members must be independent in line with the legal 
definition. However, the Company is striving for a proportion of 50% 
independent directors. 
 
Second, in constituting a board of directors, the Company must take language parity into 
account. The latter means that the same number of French-speaking members and Dutch-
speaking members must sit on the board of directors, with the possible exception of the 
chairman of that board. Board members who are neither French-speaking nor Dutch-
speaking are not taken into account in determining the linguistic parity. 
 
Both requirements also have implications regarding the positions of chairman and CEO 
(the Company’s Articles of Association, 19 and 20). The Company has separated the 
roles of chairman and CEO. Both the chairman of the board of directors and the CEO are 
appointed by the major shareholder and must belong to different language groups.  
TableTable 24 presents the composition of the Company’s board of directors at the end of 
2005.  
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Table 24: composition of the Company's board of directors 
Name Category Directors 
since 
Term 
expires 
Language Gender Age 
Director A executive 2003 01/03/2009 F Male 50 
Director B NED-MS* 2004 01/03/2009 N Male 52 
Director C NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 N Male 54 
Director D NED-MS 1996 23/12/2006 N Male 39 
Director E NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 F Female 55 
Director F NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 F Male 57 
Director G NED-MS 2003 30/09/2009 F Male 59 
Director H NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 N Male 59 
Director I NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 N Male 52 
Director J independent 2004 AGM 2010 F Male 61 
Director K independent 2004 31/12/2006 F Female 45 
Director L independent 2004 AGM 2010 E Male 51 
Director M independent 2004 31/12/2006 F Male 65 
Director N independent 2004 31/12/2006 N Male 62 
Director O independent 2004 31/12/2006 E Male 63 
Director P independent 2004 31/12/2006 N Male 52 
Director Q independent 2004 AGM 2010 N Female 53 
One vacancy** independent      
            (Source: annual report 2005) 
 * NED-MS denotes non-executive directors representing the major shareholder 
 ** the vacancy for one independent director has not been filled after the departure of director  
 
Some observations can be drawn from this table. First, it is clear that the current board of 
directors is recently appointed. In fact, the IPO resulted in a renewed composition of the 
board of directors. Fully in line with the corporate governance recommendations, new 
independent board members were appointed by proposal of the board. They replaced the 
members who had represented the private shareholder consortium and who ceased to be 
shareholders when the Company became listed on the stock exchange. In fact, with the 
exception of the CEO, the board of directors is composed of 50% independent directors. 
 
Second, the size of the board is quite large. In fact, the maximum number of directors, as 
laid down by law and the company’s Articles of Association, has not changed since the 
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IPO. The actual board size is the result of a respect for equilibriums, as the Company is 
required to keep certain balances (language parity, shareholder representation versus 
independency etc.). In addition, board size is intended to be large enough in order to 
include sufficient members who are expected to contribute experience and knowledge 
from different fields. 
 
Third, the composition of the board reflects the desired diversity in terms of age, gender 
and nationality.  
 
6.4.4.2.2 Board committees 
 
As recommended by many corporate governance codes, the board of directors has set up 
special committees. These include an Audit and Compliance Committee, a Nomination 
and Remuneration Committee and a Strategic and Business Development Committee:  
 The Audit and Compliance Committee must include a majority of independent board 
members. The chairman must also be an independent board member. The Audit and 
Compliance Committee is currently made up of three independent directors 
(including the Committee’s chairman) and two shareholder representatives. 
 The Nomination and Remuneration Committee must be comprised of at least four 
board members and is currently made up of two independent directors and two 
shareholder representatives. The chairman of the board chairs this Committee.  
 The Strategic and Business Development Committee must consist of a majority of 
board members representing the major shareholder. The Committee is chaired by the 
Chairman of the board of directors, with the CEO participating as an ex officio 
member. The Committee is currently made up of four members. 
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6.4.4.2.3 Comparison with an average board of directors of Belgian 
listed companies 
 
The descriptives reveal some similarities between the Company’s board of directors and 
an average board of directors of a Belgian listed company (as described in Chapter 2).  
First, a separated board leadership structure is a common practice amongst listed 
companies in Belgium. Second, most boards of directors of Belgian listed companies 
include a mix of executive, non-executive and independent directors. Third, the 
installation of board committees is commonly found amongst listed companies in 
Belgium. It is noted that these governance practices are to a large extent influenced by the 
recommendation of the Lippens Code and a willingness of Belgian listed companies to 
comply with the required standards of corporate governance. 
 
In contrast, there are some particularities with respect to the Company’s board of 
directors in terms of (i) exclusive rights of the major shareholder to appoint a certain 
number of board members, including the Chairman and the CEO, (ii) recent nomination 
of 50% independent directors, (iii) the large board size, and (iv) the installation of a 
strategic committee. Although these governance practices are not unique, they are less 
commonly found amongst Belgian listed companies. 
 
6.4.4.3 Management 
 
A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
Company. To assist the CEO in the performance of his duties a Management 
Committee has been installed. The CEO chairs the Management Committee. At the time 
of the study, the Management Committee was made up of seven members. Besides the 
CEO, the Chief Financial Officer, Chief Strategy Officer, Chief Human Resources 
Officer and the 3 Officers leading the three business units, sat on the Management 
Committee. 
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6.4.4.4 Supervision and control 
 
As with any other Belgian listed company, the Company is subject to external audit. The 
financial supervision which encompasses the auditing of the financial situation, the 
annual accounts and the regularity of the transactions recorded in the annual accounts is 
entrusted to a four-member panel of auditors. Two commissioners are appointed by the 
Court of Auditors. The others are appointed at the General Meeting from the members of 
the Institute of Company Auditors. 
 
Particular for the Company is an additional administrative oversight exercised by a 
Government Commissioner, appointed and dismissed by the Crown. The role of the 
Government Commissioner is to ensure compliance with the law, the Articles of 
Association and the Management Contract. He must ensure that the Company’s policy 
does not prejudice the performance of the company’s public service obligations. In order 
to do so, the Government Commissioner is invited to all meetings of the board of 
directors and the Management Committee, where he participates in an advisory capacity.  
 
6.4.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Since the beginning of the nineties, the Company has faced important challenges with 
respect to both its strategic positioning and its governance structure. The environment in 
which the Company operates has been subject to a relatively high rate of change. The 
technological (r)evolution and the liberalisation/deregulation push at the EU level have 
enabled new possibilities for the traditional telecom operators while at the same time 
confronting them with increased competitive pressures. All of this has had important 
implications for the Company and in order to face this evolution the Company has 
restructured several times. These restructuring operations have drastically changed the 
Company’s corporate structure, strategy, culture and image. Besides, in order to adjust to 
the changing environment, the Company’s governance structure has evolved as well. In 
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particular, the board of directors has been adjusted to fit the new challenges and to be in 
line with the highest corporate governance standards.  
From a governance point of view, the Company shows important similarities with the 
majority of other Belgian companies quoted on the stock exchange. In addition, the 
Company faces some distinctive governance features which may impose additional 
challenges on the effectiveness of its governance model in general, and of its board of 
directors in particular. 
 
6.5 Analysis of the relationships between the determinants of board 
effectiveness 
 
The research framework, briefly outlined above and presented in detail in Chapter 5, will 
be analyzed in terms of each of the identified determinants of board effectiveness and the 
expected relationships between the determinants. Observations induced from the 
Company’s board of directors are also used to introduce elements of a more elaborated 
and integrated perspective on the effectiveness of boards of directors. 
 
6.5.1 Board task performance as output  
 
Based on the underlying theoretical perspectives, we have extensively described the roles 
a board of directors is assumed to fulfil (see Chapter 5). In particular, supported by the 
findings of our first empirical field study (see Chapter 4) we have contended that the 
board of directors needs to perform a two-fold role. On the one hand, boards are expected 
to control and monitor the company and on the other hand they need to be involved in 
strategy. This dual role set is also supported by the Company’s directors.  
Example R3: The board has two essential functions; these are the strategic sounding board and the 
supervision of management. The strategic sounding role implies a long term vision and a global 
approach of business issues, customers etc. The monitoring role does not equal ‘control’ in the strict 
meaning of the word because thereby the board can rely on audit bodies and other regulatory 
bodies; monitoring implies challenging management on a regular basis….  
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Yet, it is acknowledged that the predominance of one role over the other can vary 
according to companies of different types (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). For example, for 
companies operating in turbulent environments, the strategic role of the board is predicted 
to be of particular importance. The rapidly changing environment provides significant 
opportunities for boards of directors to take important decisions on strategic issues that 
help the organization adapt to the new circumstances (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Boulton, 
1978). Taking into account the particularities of the Company’s environment (high rate of 
change and strong external controls, see paragraph 6.4.1), we expect a predominance of 
the strategic role of the Company’s board of directors over its monitoring tasks. Our view 
is supported by the Company’s role definition of its board of directors. As expressed in 
law and the Articles of Association, the Company’s board of directors has the (legal) 
power to perform all acts necessary or useful to achieve the Company’s corporate objects, 
with the exception of those reserved to other bodies within the company. Responsibilities 
that are the exclusive power of the board and which can not be delegated are (i) the 
approval of the Management contract, (ii) establishing the business plan as well as the 
general policy and strategy and (iii) supervision of the CEO, particularly with regard to 
the execution of the Management contract. Within this legal framework, the Company 
has opted for a board of directors which, conceptually, strongly associates with the notion 
of a “working” board - notably a board that is strongly involved in the strategy of the 
company (briefing note, July 2005). By use of the written questionnaire, we have tried to 
get insight into the extent to which the board of directors actually performs its strategic 
tasks. We identified seven strategic functions and asked the directors how involved the 
board of directors was in each of the functions using a 5-point Likert type scale (ranging 
from 1 ‘no involvement’ to 5 ‘strong involvement’). The results are presented in Table 
25. The relatively high average scores indicate a strong involvement of the board of 
directors in strategy.  
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Table 25: role of the Company's board in strategy 
 Mean 
score 
Std 
dev. 
Min. 
Score 
Max. 
score 
Definition of the company’s mission, objectives and values 4,20 (1,21) 2 5 
Decision on the delegation of powers and responsibilities 3,53 (1,41) 1 5 
Decision on the allocation of resources (financial, HRM, etc.) 3,53 (0,99) 1 5 
Approval of plans and budgets 4,60 (0,63) 3 5 
Discussion on strategic options related to Mergers & Acquisitions 4,47 (1,12) 1 5 
Approval of Mergers & Acquisitions 4,67 (0,82) 2 5 
Decision on the strategic direction the company should take 4,53 (0,91) 2 5 
 
In addition to this quantitative investigation, we used interview comments to verify the 
findings. The qualitative data retrieved during the interviews revealed a more nuanced 
picture. Although all board members recognize the important role the board of directors 
has to play in strategy, it is observed that the board’s impact on major strategic decisions 
is rather relative. Especially in important files, the involvement of the full board of 
directors does not meet directors’ expectations. Several directors noted: 
R5: The impact of the board on strategy is relative, even when there exists the will to do well.  This 
is because certain files are presented to the board too late while clearly specific engagements are 
already taken by management… we have then the impression that ‘the stakes are done’.  
R9: Certain important strategic files are settled on too short notice by the board. 
R10: With respect to the timing, sometimes strategic files are submitted to the board too late 
compared to the facts or decisions. 
R17: It appears to me that when the management train has departed, the board needs to run after 
(…) files are presented to the board in ‘slices’. 
 
An important observation that clearly explains the gap between board (strategic) role 
expectations and actual board (strategic) task performance is the existence of the 
Strategic and Business Development Committee. The Strategic and Business 
Development Committee’s role is to assist and advise the board of directors on matters 
concerning the Company’s general policy and strategy, as well as on major issues 
regarding its strategic development (annual report, 2005). In general, the establishment of 
board committees is one of the structural measures put forward by corporate governance 
reforms in order to enhance the effectiveness of boards (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 
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1999). The rationale behind this recommendation is that committees allow board 
members to delve more deeply into specific issues, and develop a specialized 
understanding so that the board can accomplish more in a limited time (Carter and 
Lorsch, 2004). Still, board committees can involve risks or lead to unintended side-effects 
that seriously limit a board’s capacity to do its job (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 
1999). We found that these benefits and risks are particularly applicable to the 
Company’s Strategic and Business Development Committee (see Table 26). Several 
directors explained how this committee supports the board of directors in the execution of 
its strategic tasks. The most important explanations relate to (i) more efficient use of time 
due to the (large) size of the board; (ii) the need to prepare, elaborate and discuss files 
beforehand and (iii) the role of sounding board for management in developing the 
strategy. In contrast, the existence of this committee clearly affects the way the full board 
of directors is able to carry out its strategic tasks due to the perception of (i) information 
asymmetry and (ii) pre-cooking of files and hence the dilution of the role of the board. 
While responsibility for providing strategic direction is borne by the board of directors as 
a whole, the Strategic and Business Development Committee plays a prominent role in 
developing and selecting the Company’s strategy (especially regarding mergers and 
acquisitions). The strong involvement of only a subgroup of the board in major strategic 
files implies that the majority of the directors are left out of important discussions which 
causes discrepancy between the expected engagement of the full board of directors and 
the actual performance. This finding is consistent with evidence of previous qualitative 
research on boards. Carter and Lorsch (2004), for instance noted that the creation of a 
strategic committee disconnects the committee from board members who do not serve on 
it and as such prohibits all directors from focusing on major issues.  
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Table 26: benefits and risks of the Strategic and Business Development Committee 
Benefits Risks and side-effects 
Efficient use of time of small 
number of directors 
Preparatory in-depth-
discussions  
Sounding board for 
management 
Information asymmetry Dilution of the board’s 
strategic role 
Examples Examples Examples Examples Examples 
 
Having a board of 18 members, it 
is important to have a strategic 
committee… one does not get 
involved in strategy with 18 
people (R1). 
 
The objective of the strategic 
committee is to simplify the files 
in order to prepare board 
decisions. This is of utmost 
importance in a company which 
faces a high level of complexity 
(R10). 
 
 
The CEO looks into the strategy 
with support of the board. As a 
consequence, it is evident that 
some members are seriously 
engaged in strategy (R16). 
 
The SBDC may cause a problem, 
because board members are not on 
the footing of equality (….) 
members who are not part of the 
committee do not have the same 
information (R8). 
 
 
If the strategic committee 
presents an opinion or decision, 
it is my impression that the 
board can not oppose it. As 
such, the committee erodes the 
power of the board (R12). 
 
Discussing some strategic issues 
in a brainstorming way with 18 
members seems unlikely to be 
efficient (R14). 
There is a definite role to be 
played by this committee in 
preparing the strategy and 
specific M&A dossiers (R2). 
With a small number of directors, 
when properly used, it is of added 
value for management. It offers a 
greater interaction with 
management (R1). 
 
We sometimes have the 
impression that there is an 
asymmetry of information 
between the members of this 
committee and the board. 
Committee members have a lead 
over the others (R5). 
 
SBDC dilutes the role of the 
board (R7). 
Because of the size, one cannot 
have real strategic discussions in 
the board, there can be strategic 
presentations but that is not the 
same (R12). 
The strategic committee has an 
important role to play. It enables 
discussions and the ability to 
work on files more in-depth ‘en 
petit comité’ … after all, 
discussing strategy requires time 
(R3). 
 
 Some directors feel second-rate 
and the committee’s existence 
creates some distrust (R14). 
There is no pre-cooking in this 
committee and there are no 
decisions being taken, 
unfortunately the perception in 
the board is different (R14). 
Discussing strategy can not be 
done in a board with 18 members 
(R3). 
The strategic committee fulfils a 
preparatory role, it assembles a 
small number of directors to 
discuss certain issues ‘en petit 
comité’ (R14). 
 
 SBDC generates a board within 
which two groups of directors 
work at different speeds. It gives 
different responsibilities to 
different members.. it is definitely 
not at the strategic level that 
differentiation of board members 
must exist… strategy is one of the 
most important roles of the board 
(R13). 
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The written questionnaire also included questions regarding the monitoring role of the 
board. In order to get insight into the extent to which the board of directors actually 
performs its control functions, we identified five monitoring tasks. We asked the directors 
how involved the board of directors was in each of these tasks using a 5-point Likert type 
scale (ranging from 1 ‘no involvement’ to 5 ‘strong involvement’). The results are 
presented in Table 27. At first glance, the mean scores point to a rather moderate level of 
board involvement in monitoring. 
 
Table 27: role of the Company's board in monitoring 
 Mean 
score 
Std. 
dev. 
Min. 
score 
Max. 
score 
Monitoring of the results and implementation of the strategy 4,40 (0,99) 2 5 
Monitoring of the company assets and their allocation 3,53 (1,19) 1 5 
Monitoring of management 3,60 (1,35) 1 5 
Monitoring of the presence and effectiveness of internal monitoring 
systems 
3,47 (1,36) 1 5 
Evaluation of risk management 3,33 (1,34) 1 5 
 
Qualitative data gathered during the interviews helped to interpret these scores. In 
particular, the minimum scores need to be interpreted with care due to potential response 
bias. From the interviews, it became clear that some directors make a distinction between 
the tasks of the (full) board and the responsibilities of the audit committee. By 
consequence, the scores may underestimate the real involvement of the ‘board level’ in 
control tasks. The Company’s directors explained that the board can rely, in fulfilling its 
control duties, on (a) a well-functioning and competent Audit and Compliance 
Committee and (b) the well-developed internal and external control systems the Company 
has in place. These two conditions are perceived as fundamental for the board of directors 
in order to perform its monitoring role. According to the Company’s directors, the 
board’s monitoring role is in line with expectations and no real concerns are expressed.  
Example R17: With respect to monitoring, the board is doing well; we have great trust in the 
competencies of the Audit and Compliance Committee and its chairman; in general very strong and 
structured control appliances exist within the Company. 
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The Audit and Compliance Committee plays an important role in ensuring the integrity of 
the Company’s financial reports, the compliance with legal and regulatory requirements 
as well as in evaluating the risk framework and the methodology of risk assessment. In 
general, audit committees are considered one of the more powerful board committees as 
their main objective is to ensure the financial health of the company (Firstenbergh and 
Malkiel, 1994). Our findings highlight the importance of an audit committee for carrying 
out a board’s monitoring role and are fully in line with the limited research on audit 
committees (Kesner, 1988; Daily, 1996).  
Furthermore, the Company’s board of directors as well as the Audit and Compliance 
Committee are supported by the Company’s Compliance Office. The latter was set up in 
order to ensure that the activities of the Company - and of all its staff members - are 
carried out in line with the increasingly complex set of rules and legislations applicable to 
the Company’s activities (annual report, 2005). In addition, the Company is subject to 
external financial and administrative oversight (see paragraph 6.4.4.4). Supported by this 
well-functioning control environment, actual board (control) task performance meets 
board (control) role expectations. 
 
6.5.2 The key inputs: size and composition of the board 
 
In the previous paragraph, we described how the Company’s directors perceive the roles 
of the board of directors and to what extent the board actually performs these roles. In 
developing our theoretical research framework, we have identified three board 
characteristics which serve as structural input variables for the task performance of a 
board of directors. These are board size, board independence and board diversity. Board 
size and board independence are commonly recognized as key attributes by the various 
theoretical perspectives, while board diversity consistently received high scores during 
our first field study (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the majority of the Company’s directors 
attach great importance to the competences of residing board members and value a 
complementary mix of expertise.  
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Examples R5: A mix of competences is a must to good decision-making. 
 R6: The assembly of competences and the quality of people is of utmost importance for a 
board of a company operating in an environment of rapid technological changes. 
  R10: Diversity amongst the people who sit at the boardroom table and their   
  complementarity are crucial to arrive at good choices and good decisions. 
  
At the end of 2005, the board of directors of the Company counted 17 members and 
compared to the average board size of a Belgian listed company, this number is quite 
large (see paragraph 6.4.4.2.3).   
Half of the board members at the Company are considered to be independent. All the 
other members are non-executives except for the CEO (see paragraph 6.4.4.2.1). The 8 
independent directors fully comply with the definition provided in the Belgian Company 
Code (annual report, 2005).  
As explained in Chapter 5, diversity comes in many forms. Irrespective of the way they 
are labelled, in essence, there are two broad categories of diversity. The first category 
refers to differences amongst board members in overt, biological characteristics which 
are typically reflected in physical features. Such characteristics include age, sex, and 
race/ethnicity. A second category refers to differences in board members knowledge, 
skills, nationality, tenure, attitudes etc. and is less immediately observable. Table 28 
presents some descriptive statistics on diversity regarding the Company’s board of 
directors. The board composition with respect to age, gender, nationality and tenure is 
expressed in terms of the quantity of these characteristics, while the composition with 
respect to knowledge/skills is expressed in terms of the dispersion of that characteristic 
within the board.  
 
Table 28: descriptive statistics on board diversity at the Company 
Visible demographic diversity Informational demographic attributes 
Age  Gender Nationality Knowledge/skills Board tenure 
 Female directors Foreign directors  Mean = 4,5years 
Mean = 55 Absolute number = 3 Absolute number = 2 Blau’s Index         N2 years = 6/17 
Min.39-Max.65 Ratio = 17,6% Ratio = 11,8%   
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Directors’ age ranges from 39 to 65 and the average age is 55. The board of directors 
counts 3 female directors and 2 foreigners. Average board tenure reflects the number of 
years an individual serves on the board of directors (Johnson et.al., 1993). For the 
Company the average board tenure is 4,5 years and directors’ tenure ranges from 1 to 11 
years. 11 directors serve no longer than 2 years on the Company’s board. We also 
developed a measure of board diversity that reflects differences in occupational or 
professional and educational background (Goodstein et. al. 1994, Kosnik, 1990). We first 
created four occupational groupings (CEO, former CEO, expert, financial representative) 
and five educational groupings based on the Company’s directors’ initial formation 
(economics, law, sociology, commercial engineer and civil engineer). Blau’s index of 
heterogeneity was then computed based on the distribution of board members within 
these groups. Blau's index is defined as : 1-ΣPi2  where Pi  represents the proportion of a 
board accounted for by the ith group. The index can vary from zero (indicating all board 
members are the same or complete homogenous) to a high of one (indicating all board 
members are different). With respect to occupational diversity the score is 0,74 while the 
score for educational diversity is 0,79. Both scores point to a high degree of 
heterogeneity.  
 
6.5.3 Board processes: transforming inputs to output 
 
Next to the structural board characteristics, we have introduced three process variables 
into our research framework namely debate, cohesiveness and conflict norms (see 
Chapter 5). The latter is considered as intervening variables which mediate the 
relationships between board (structural) characteristics and board task performance. In 
fact, we believe that these process variables are fundamental to transforming inputs into 
output. Hence, it is necessary to examine the different variables and how they interact to 
perform the transformation process.  
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6.5.3.1 The effects of board size and composition on debate  
 
We approached debate as an open discussion of task-related differences and the 
advocacy, by different board members, of differing approaches to the board tasks (see 
Chapter 5). Defined this way, we assumed that debate expresses itself in a constructive 
manner and we expected that boards of directors expose different levels of debate. In fact, 
we contend that the expression of cognitive conflict is a crucial and beneficial component 
for board effectiveness. A board of directors can only make optimal use of its potential 
through an interaction process whereby board members provide and balance diverse 
perspectives to arrive at a decision. We quantitatively measured debate using a 
questionnaire item on the nature of discussions. The findings indicate that the majority of 
the Company’s directors (70%) perceive the discussions during the board meetings as 
constructive. In addition, we asked the Company’s directors to rate the level of debate 
that occurs using four items on a 5-point Likert type scale (see Table 29). The scale is 
commonly used in literature as a measure for debate (Simons et.al., 1999). We assume 
the scale value 3 to be the theoretical average. Cronbach’s alpha for this four-item scale 
was 0,855. We first computed each individual’s perception of debate and then averaged 
individual-level scores to obtain a board-level score. The average board-level score for 
debate is 3,52. We interpret this score as a ‘moderate to high’ level of debate. 
 
Table 29: level of debate 
Items Debate 
When discussing an issue, clear disagreement is stated  
Board-level score: 
Mean: 3,52  
Std. dev. (0,75) 
Different approaches are proposed to the issue 
Directors openly challenge each other’s opinion 
Discussions of the issue become heated  
 
 
Of importance in this study, is the extent to which the nature and level of debate is 
influenced by the identified structural board input variables. In Chapter 5, we 
substantiated that the effects of board size and composition on debate are not 
unambiguous as they can be both positive and negative.  
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Positive effects. As board size can also be used as a proxy measure of directors’ expertise 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989), a positive effect on debate is expected when a board consists of 
a large number of board members. The availability of a large pool of expertise is assumed 
to produce more perspectives which contribute to the quality of board discussions. A 
similar positive relationship is expected between board independence and debate. Due to 
the absence of close ties to the CEO/management and the company, independent directors 
have the ability to engage in discussions in an unbiased and objective way (Van den 
Berghe and Baelden, 2005). In addition, independent directors are presumed to bring 
along important (external) information about business practices and policies thanks to 
their experiences in other boards. This facilitates discussion and enables problem-solving 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Finally, board diversity is also expected to positively 
influence debate due to the obvious reason that heterogeneous board members are likely 
to produce a broad range of solutions and decision criteria (Schweiger et.al., 1986). 
Heterogeneity is assumed to promote airing of different perspectives and to reduce the 
probability of narrow-mindedness (Kosnik, 1990). 
 
Negative effects. In contrast, the group dynamics literature has shown that large groups 
encounter problems to conduct effective discussions due to communication, coordination 
and organization problems (Surowiecki, 2004; Hackman, 1990). Board largeness may 
inhibit effective participation by directors in board discussions. In this respect, group 
dynamic problems associated with large boards will negatively influence debate. A 
similar negative effect is expected when the board of directors becomes too diverse. The 
greater the diversity of board members, the greater the potential for conflicts and the 
likelihood of ineffective communication resulting from the lack of shared language 
(Golden and Zajac, 2001). 
 
We qualitatively assessed the effects of size and composition by searching the interview 
data. The positive consequences of a large board for debate seem not so prevalent. Still, 
the advantage of the large board is perceived in terms of having a broader range of ideas 
at the board’s disposal. As one director noted: 
R7: Large boards are not cumbersome because they offer more diverse ideas. 
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The qualitative findings appear to be more convincing regarding the occurrence of 
specific group dynamic problems and their negative impact on debate. Many of the 
Company’s directors commented that a large board of directors is difficult to coordinate, 
hereby hindering effective discussion and decision-making.  
Examples   R1: When an issue is discussed and decided upon in the board, it is important to evolve 
to coherence of the decisions. This coherence comes with fewer board members. 
R12: The board is far too big to be effective. Consequently, the board falls into   
separate groups (…) with a smaller board it would be easier to focus the discussions. 
R14: In fact, having too many members hinders good discussions. 
 
In addition, it was noticed that a fraction of directors does not participate actively in 
discussions. This may indicate that the board does not fully draw on the potential of all its 
members. Our findings are consistent with evidence from previous qualitative research on 
boards. Carter and Lorsch (2004), for example, noted that there are often too many people 
in the boardroom to allow meaningful discussion, even if most of the board members are 
knowledgeable and ready to contribute. Large boards exacerbate the time constraints as 
there are too many people who need to be involved.  
 
Also noteworthy are the findings regarding the impact of board independence on debate. 
In fact, the evidence is not straightforward. We expected that the detachment of 
independent directors from the daily business would bring a certain breadth and 
objectivity to the board discussions, however the empirical evidence points rather to 
difficulties in terms of the board’s shortage of in-depth knowledge and understanding of 
the company or its industry. Put differently, it appears that it is not the issue of 
independence as such that makes a difference, but the competence and behaviour of 
directors in general. The use of expertise, the effort to learn about the business and the 
way directors establish their own credibility vary, and hence, influence their contribution 
during discussions.  
Examples R1: A director must adapt himself to the environment in which he operates and try to 
understand the business, the social climate, the economic circumstances…. this is not 
always the case …..there are members who are more experienced and more constructive 
than others.  
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 R 7: (…) and diverging competences imply that the level of detail to deal with during 
discussions substantially varies. 
 R14: The competences in the board appear to be insufficient and that is for none of the 
parties interesting, nor for the board, nor for the CEO, nor for management. 
 
The strong emphasis that is placed on the individual competence of board members, in 
order to have constructive and fruitful debate, has also been recognized in previous 
qualitative research. In essence, the contributions non-executive and independent 
directors can make in discussions are presumed to be functions of general and firm-
specific knowledge as well as of the time they have available. For example, using 
evidence derived from approximately two hundred interviews with (Canadian) directors, 
Leblanc and Gillies (2005), noted that directors commonly assessed many of their peers, 
the outside directors in particular, as not sufficiently knowledgeable about the business to 
make major contributions to board decision-making. They argue that directors, in order to 
make a significant contribution, must have specific monitoring capabilities and some 
specific competencies relating to the strategy that the company is following. Demb and 
Neubauer (1992) have also pointed to the tension non-executive and independent board 
members face regarding the ability to bring in-depth understanding of the company and 
its industry setting, as well as perspectives from the broader business and socioeconomic 
environments, to the table. Apparently, the worldwide attention for board independence 
has surpassed the need for a set of directors who collectively have all the competencies 
that match the company’s needs and hence will lead to good decision-making. Two 
additional observations may explain why we did not find strong evidence on the effects 
of board independence. First, true independence is difficult to define and to measure 
because much of what compromises independence can hardly be detected from the 
outside. The frequently advocated premise is that independence may be more a state of 
mind and depends largely on the individual director’s involvement and the behaviour of 
that director inside the boardroom (Van den Berghe and Baelden, 2005). Second, the 
scarcest resource that many directors have is time. In this context, Goold (1996) 
documents the 10% versus 100% paradox and its applicability to boards of directors. The 
paradox refers to the (unrealistic) fact that boards in 10% or less of their time and energy 
should be able to improve on the decisions of competent executive management who are 
 182
devoting 100% of their time and energy to the business in question. The 10% versus 
100% paradox suggests that the value-added interventions of non-executive and 
independent directors will only occur if they concentrate on issues where they can expect 
to contribute something that management lacks or overlooks. Both practices are difficult 
to trace from the outside and with the currently applied research methods.  
 
Simultaneously, the same scholars argue that proper training programmes for non-
executive and independent directors are a means to make these directors less ill-informed, 
and hence to enhance their effectiveness (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Goold, 1996). 
Although several Company’s directors expressed concerns over their own level of 
knowledge, some value the education programmes provided by the Company in order to 
increase their understanding of the Company, its business, its products etc. 
Examples  R8: As a director, the distance between you and the company is quite big. To look at 
some issue in more depth  increases the engagement of directors… 
R9: A director must be prepared to inform himself and to take training courses regarding 
the activities and products of the company whose board he sits on; each mandate equals 
to study again.  
R13: The company has provided training courses for the directors which is an interesting 
initiative…. In particular, it signals to management that the board is trying to inform itself 
to get to know the business. 
 
Further findings were not very outspoken regarding the expected impact of board 
diversity on debate. Some empirical evidence was found in favour of the added value of 
appointing non-nationals to the board. It was noted that non-nationals bring a broader and 
more international view on the business and the company. They are more detached from 
the Belgian environment.  
Example R1: Regarding the long term, the international vision is still insufficient, members are still 
to much Belgian oriented... attracting foreign directors, or directors with international experience 
are beneficial in this respect.  
 
At the same time, the qualitative evidence points to negative implications stemming from 
communication problems. In particular, the appointment of non-nationals to the board has 
changed the working language which is perceived as an obstacle to some of the directors. 
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Example R14: Some directors are not master of the English language and it is difficult for them to 
express themselves. As a consequence, important nuances get lost during discussions which cause 
some frustrations and hindrances. 
 
A possible explanation for the lack of strong evidence on the effects of different 
dimensions of board diversity is the general emphasis on directors’ competences. As 
discussed above, the individual competence and the way this competence is used, are 
perceived to be more critical for the nature and level of debate then the degree of 
heterogeneity amongst board members. Another explanation relates to the applied 
research techniques. As previously indicated, written questionnaires as well as interviews 
have limitations in revealing the process of board deliberations. Other research 
techniques such as direct observations could shed more light on the extent to which 
discussions benefit from diverse perspectives and backgrounds. The findings by Curral 
et.al. (1999), for example, indicate that the activity level of board members in board 
deliberations varies according to their background and the topic discussed.  
 
6.5.3.2 The moderating role of conflict norms 
 
In chapter 5, we have suggested that conflict norms are a necessary condition for the 
emergence of debate. Conflict norms refer to standards that encourage an openness and 
acceptance of disagreement. We have argued that directors’ behaviour and interaction are 
regulated by a set of informal and unwritten rules. As such, a board culture which 
stimulates open and candid discussions is assumed to be the extra element required to 
take full advantage of the potential provided by board size and composition. We 
quantitatively measured conflict norms using 5 items on a 5-point Likert type scale (see 
Table 30). In fact, the scale we used is an adapted version of a more extensive scale 
commonly recognized in literature as a measure for conflict norms (Jehn et.al., 1997). We 
assume the scale value 3 to be the theoretical average.  The Cronbach’s alpha for this 
scale was 0.688. We first computed each individual’s perception of conflict norms and 
then averaged individual-level scores to obtain a board-level score. The average board-
level score for conflict norms is 3,91. We interpret this score as high conflict norms. 
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Table 30: conflict norms in the boardroom 
Items Conflict norms 
Critical questions are tolerated  
Board-level score: 
Mean: 3,91 
Std. dev. (0,36) 
Differences in opinions are accepted 
Disagreement is dealt with openly in the board 
Disagreement is detrimental to getting the work done by the board* 
Directors try to avoid disagreement at all costs* 
 * reverse-scored 
 
The qualitative findings of the interviews corroborate the results of the written 
questionnaire and point in favour of a culture which permits the airing of opinions. 
Examples R5: There exists an open, direct communication between the members; board members 
speak frankly, discussions are open (…) there exists a very open culture… 
 R13: There is a very good sphere at the table in spite of strong cultural differences! Open 
and rich board culture thanks to its diversity. 
R14: There is sufficient disagreement but it is important that this open dynamic leads to 
something. 
 
Although we found that the board is characterized by a high level of conflict norms and a 
willingness to challenge, we did not find strong direct evidence to what extent conflict 
norms affect the relationship(s) between board size, composition and debate. Still, we 
implicitly interpret the positive findings regarding the nature and level of debate (see 
paragraph 6.5.3.1) as a result of the existence of high standards of openness inside the 
boardroom. In fact, previous qualitative research on boards has already revealed that a 
board’s set of norms, is a powerful driver of directors’ behaviour. These norms tend to 
determine when it is appropriate to speak, how to intervene and which directors’ opinions 
deserve respect. The ultimate goal is to foster high standards that encourage productive 
and open discussion as well as resolve conflicting opinions (Carter and Lorsch, 2004).  
 
6.5.3.3 The effects of board size and composition on cohesiveness 
 
The last process variable that was included into our research framework is cohesiveness 
(see Chapter 5). Cohesiveness is considered to be affective in nature and is defined as the 
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degree to which board members are attracted to each other and are motivated to stay on 
the board. We have contended that a minimum degree of cohesion amongst board 
members is required for a board of directors to operate as a collegial team. We 
quantitatively measured cohesiveness using 4 items on a 5-point Likert type scale (see 
Table 31). In fact, the scale we used is commonly recognized in literature as a measure 
for cohesiveness (O’Reilly et.al., 1989). We assume the scale value 3 to be the theoretical 
average The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.793. We first computed each 
individual’s perception of cohesiveness and then averaged individual-level scores to 
obtain a board-level score. The average board-level score for cohesiveness is 3,66. We 
interpret this score as a ‘moderate to high’ level of cohesiveness. 
 
Table 31: cohesiveness amongst the board members 
Items Cohesiveness 
The directors get along together very well  
Board-level score: 
Mean: 3,66 
Std. dev. (0,43) 
The directors are ready to defend each other from criticism by outsiders 
The directors are ready to cooperate and help each other 
The directors really stick together 
 
Qualitative interview data supports the quantitative findings. A few Company’s directors 
commented on their impression by stating that they experience at least a minimum degree 
of cohesiveness while some other Company’s directors noted that the cohesiveness is 
(still) growing. 
Examples R5: I hear no criticism against one or another and each member seems to act according to 
his own personal feeling and convictions.  
R10: There are very diverse personalities…one may look at the members as belonging to 
the old and new wave but the actual situation is more propitious. 
R12: Even when directors had strongly different views during meetings, they still got 
along quite well afterwards. That is very unusual. 
R15: (…) the cohesiveness is growing. There are some new members on the board and 
the directors are getting to know each other better. 
 
Of importance in this study, is the extent to which cohesiveness in the board is influenced 
by the identified structural board characteristics. In Chapter 5, we substantiated that board 
size and composition trigger negative effects on the cohesion amongst board members. In 
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particular, socio-psychological research on groups, suggests that board members may 
experience difficulties to establish the interpersonal relationships which further 
cohesiveness when board size is high (Shaw, 1976).  A similar negative effect is expected 
from enhanced board independence. By definition, independent directors interact less 
frequently with each other and they are assumed to be less close-knit. Finally, social 
categorization and similarity/attraction theory provide the rationale for the proposed 
negative relationship between board diversity and cohesiveness. Heterogeneity in the 
board is expected to yield dissimilarity amongst board members which lowers 
interpersonal attraction and liking (Tajfel, 1982; Byrne, 1971). 
 
We qualitatively assessed the effects of size and composition on cohesiveness by 
searching the interview data. We found that the coincidence of different factors related to 
the recent change in the board composition hamper the establishment of interpersonal 
relationships and inhibit a sense of connectedness amongst all board members (see Table 
32). In particular, the simultaneous appointment of a large number of new independent 
directors impedes the ability to relate to each other and affects the interaction amongst 
board members. Our data also suggests that (the absence of) informal contacts influence 
the integration of (new) board members. The responses from the written questionnaire 
indicate that there are few informal contacts between the Company’s directors outside the 
board meetings. This is reinforced in the interviews. Several Company’s directors pointed 
out that there is little, or at least were not aware of any systematic contact amongst 
directors outside meetings. Moreover, they are in favour of being provided with 
opportunities to meet each other more frequently in an informal way, indicating a 
willingness to improve the team spirit. Finally, the integration of (new) board members 
seems to be affected by the size of the board. As one Company’s director put it:  
R8: The board is too big to get to know each other well. 
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Table 32: board independence, diversity and cohesiveness 
Board independence Board diversity 
Importance of informal contacts Importance of directors’ tenure 
Examples Questionnaire item Examples
Perhaps a yearly seminar, off site with 
management, could strengthen the 
feeling of belonging to the Company 
and reinforce the ties amongst the 
directors (R5). 
 
There are far too little opportunities to 
meet each other… tutorials are a good 
initiative but pure social events could 
also be organized (R4). 
 
It would be appropriate if the 
company creates the opportunity to 
get to know each other better (R8). 
 
More efforts should be made in 
improving relationships between the 
directors….(R17). 
 
The lunches before or after the board 
meetings are a good thing…. a 
rotation scheme would make it even 
better as it gives directors the 
opportunity to get to know each other 
better (R14). 
The directors often socialize 
with each other off the job:  
29% agree 
24% disagree 
47% undecided 
The board is still ‘young’…. members are not 
yet a team…(R2). 
 
Some directors know each other quite well 
because they have served together for many 
years; the relationships are somewhat different 
regarding the new directors (R8). 
 
For now, the cohesiveness in the board is 
insufficient…new members have entered the 
board and it takes some time for the group to 
adapt (….) the relationship between some 
directors is mature due to other professional 
ties, but for now this is not the case with 
respect to the full board (R17). 
 
 
 
 
Our findings regarding director’s tenure are consistent with previous research on tenure 
heterogeneity in other settings. Research on work groups has suggested that both the 
average length of tenure in a group and the distribution of tenure amongst members are 
relevant to individual and group performance. In particular, studies have shown that 
homogeneity in the tenure distribution directly fosters their social integration because 
similarity in tenure facilitates group members’ mutual attraction and interaction as they 
undergo similar experiences and develop common perspectives (O’Reilly et.al., 1989). In 
addition, the evidence on the effects of changes in board structure is also consistent with 
a phenomenon referred to as “cohort effects” (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Pfeffer, 
1983). The latter indicates that groups whose members are linked by a common date and 
share similar experience or history will think similarly about issues. Put differently, 
directors who joined a board at similar dates are more likely to interact and form cohorts.  
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6.5.3.4 The effects of debate and cohesiveness on board task performance 
 
Debate and cohesiveness are suggested to influence the task performance of boards of 
directors. The effects of debate on the performance of the board’s strategic and 
monitoring role are considered to be beneficial. In essence, the presence of debate 
provides a broader range of viewpoints, formalizes task-oriented disagreement and 
encourages critical evaluation (Eisenhardt et.al., 1997; Schweiger et.al., 1986). The 
effects of cohesiveness are less straightforward. It is argued that the accomplishment of 
complex and interactive tasks requires some level of interpersonal attraction to establish 
the required trust and respect amongst the board members. However, when the board 
becomes too cohesive, board members may face pressure to conform to group 
preferences at the expense of critical exploration of multiple alternatives during decision-
making (Kosnik, 1990). We have used both quantitative and qualitative data to examine 
the relationships between debate, cohesiveness and board task performance. Table 33 
summarizes the findings. Some support could be found in favour of a minimum level of 
coherence between the board members which positively contributes to the performance of 
the board’s tasks. In addition, the results indicate that debate is beneficial and it was 
noted that decisions, in the end, are always made by consensus. Still, some comments 
suggested that there is room for improvement as the potential of debate is not yet fully 
used. As one Company’s director put it:  
R15: More effort should be made to reach a collective view in the board of directors. In some case, 
too many individual points of views are defended. 
 
Moreover, it appears that the degree to which the board fulfils its strategic role may be 
hampered by the nature of the topics tackled during discussions. Both quantitative and 
qualitative data point out that sometimes the board of directors gets too engaged in 
operational issues and that too many details are discussed at board level. The 
interpretation of these findings is two-fold. First, we already observed that high emphasis 
was placed on the board’s competences and concerns have been expressed about the gap 
between the board’s available and required knowledge. This might explain why much 
time and effort is spent on details as the objective is to arrive at a similar level of 
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understanding. Second, consistent with previous qualitative research on boards (Robert 
et.al., 2005), non-executive and independent directors may fail to understand their 
essentially non-executive role. They face the major challenge of not seeking an executive 
role through over-involvement in executive decisions. The following comment by a 
Company’s director illustrates this point of view: 
R15: Directors themselves must understand their role and must keep in mind that they are not 
management but that they are there to fulfil a supporting role in creating shareholder value. 
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Table 33: debate, cohesiveness and board task performance 
Debate Cohesiveness
Questionnaire Examples Questionnaire Examples 
 
Board-level score: 3,52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The board only focuses on the 
strategic aspects of a file, not on 
the operational aspects 
47% agree 
35% disagree 
18% undecided 
 
Beneficial 
 
Even if the files are very complex, there is no formalism.  
Real debate is taking place; the board is not a body that 
ratifies (R10). 
 
There has always been the willingness to reach (as far as 
possible) a consensus of vote that prevents disagreement 
or disappointment when the decision is taken (R5). 
 
 
Unfavourable 
 
Some directors want to go into the details, or put 
differently, feel called upon to engage in the daily 
management…this creates some resentment in the board 
(R3). 
 
The discussions in the board are still too detailed (…) 
going into details may at times be good but it may not 
become an obstacle (R10). 
 
Sometimes the board gets too engaged in operational 
issues, too many details are being discussed (R12). 
 
There are being topics discussed in the board that should 
not come to the board in the first place because they do 
not have the adequate strategic level (R15). 
 
Too many details receive attention in board meetings, the 
board should only discuss major outlines (R14). 
 
There are always board members who want to act as 
managers (R8). 
 
Board-level score: 3,66 
 
 
 
The directors trust each other 
53% agree 
18% disagree 
29% undecided 
 
It appears to me that there is a great openness 
and the will to work together for the benefit of 
the company. The board members are 
motivated and there exists a desire to add 
value (R5). 
 
 
 
The board showed its maturity when times 
were difficult…there were good open 
discussions and the majority of the board 
members were trying to come to a solution as 
a group (R15). 
 
The board has done well… there are no 
quarrels (R9). 
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6.5.4 Board roles and contingency factors 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we examined to what extent structural board 
characteristics and process variables influence the task performance of the board of 
directors. In addition, our empirical evidence points to the existence of two important 
contingencies that appear to be critical for the board’s ability to fulfils its roles. 
 
A first category of potential contingencies that is suggested by the current findings 
concerns the board’s relationship with corporate management. There is a widespread 
agreement that the board of directors works with and through the CEO and his 
management team (Conger et.al., 2001; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Of pivotal 
importance is the communication between the board of directors and management. In 
carrying out its duties, a board of directors needs to be well informed at all times, and 
information is of particular importance when a company operates in a high velocity 
environment (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). Especially, non-executive and 
independent directors can never be as well-informed as management and they depend 
to a large extent on the goodwill of the latter to obtain relevant and timely information 
(see Chapter 5). Management is presumed to provide all relevant business and 
financial information for a board of directors to function effectively. Nadler (2004) 
noted that there are two effective ways of preventing a board from carrying out its 
duties, notably providing a board with too little or too much information. He referred 
to this phenomenon as the “dark side” of communication meaning that these practices 
are both effective ways of keeping a board in the dark. Of concern is that board 
members must be able to do more than just ask good questions. They must be 
sufficiently informed to challenge and contest management’s view (Carter and 
Lorsch, 2004). In this respect, a lack of sufficient information is expected to limit a 
board’s task performance. By means of the written questionnaire, we asked the 
directors to rate various dimensions of the board’s information flow on a 5-point 
Likert type scale18. We approached the information needs of the board as they are 
related to the board’s responsibilities. Table 34 shows the results.  
 
                                                 
18 The 5-point likert scale was labeled as follows: strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree, 
strongly agree.  
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Table 34: information as key aspect of  board-management communication 
  
Evaluation of board information 
 
Agreement* 
 
N=17 
General The directors are sufficiently informed to play their role and to 
make sound decisions 
10 (59%) 
The documentation is relevant 12 (70%) 
The documentation meets the requirements and expectations 10 (59%) 
Specific with respect to 
the board’s monitoring 
role 
Financial information is sufficiently detailed 14 (82%) 
FIN – opinion meets the requirements 13 (76%) 
Legal - opinion meets the requirements 14 (82%) 
Information on the Company’s risk profile is sufficient 11 (64%) 
Specific with respect to 
the board’s strategic role 
Information on the strategy is sufficient 9 (53%) 
Information on possible alternatives to a resolution is sufficient 8 (47%) 
Information on the telecom market is sufficient 10 (59%) 
Information on the Company’s products is sufficient 8 (47%) 
Information on the Company’s network is sufficient 8 (47%) 
* For this type of Likert scale we did not count any mean scores but rather the number of directors who either 
agree or strongly agree is indicated. 
 
The quantitative findings suggest that the opinions of the Company’s directors are 
rather mixed. The directors appear to be quite satisfied with the information provided 
to the board that enables them to perform their monitoring tasks. In contrast, 
approximately half of the board indicated that the information falls short in helping 
the directors to enhance their insights into strategic issues and as such hampers the 
board of directors in fulfilling its strategic role. The latter is consistent with our 
qualitative findings. In essence, information builds trust or differently put, trust is 
considered to be an indicator of information flows. Interview comments point to the 
fact that insufficient communication between management and the board creates 
tensions and distrust which is perceived to be dysfunctional.  
Examples R2: Especially, better communication is required between the board and 
management. A culture of trust is to some extent missing. 
R4: I feel some distance between the board and management… the team spirit is 
missing, there is less confidence and latitude.. consequently someone is more rapped 
over the knuckles.  
R9: There is a lack of communication between management and the board, board 
members do not know everything. 
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Trust in board-management relationships appears to be an important notion which has 
also been recognized by other scholars (e.g. Roberts et.al., 2005; Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003; Westphal, 1999, Aram and Cowen, 1995) and many board members 
identified trust as an important ingredient for board effectiveness during our first field 
study (see Chapter 4). Lewicki et.al. (1998) contend that trust and distrust are not 
opposite ends of a single continuum. The implication of this view is that it foresees 
the possibility of the coexistence of trust and distrust: “social structures appear most 
stable where there is a healthy dose of both trust and distrust -a productive tension of 
confidences exists (Lewicki et.al., 1998:450). In this respect, Roberts et. al (2005) 
argued that trust or distrust should be understood as the condition and consequence of 
continuous processes of accountability between the board and management. Their 
analysis points to the fact that trust is two-directional. Open communication by 
management seems to be a source of trust for outside and independent directors. 
Without appropriate information it is impossible for non-executive and independent 
board members to develop a confidence that management is focusing on the right 
indicators of business conduct and performance. Similarly, management perceptions 
of engagement and behaviour of non-executive and independent directors in support 
of management functioning seem to affect confidence and trust in the added-value of 
the board, and hence encourage (or discourage) information flows (Roberts et.al., 
2005; Carter and Lorsch, 2005). 
 
A second category of potential contingency factors that was identified by the present 
study concerns the board’s relationship with the company’s major shareholder. The 
relationship between shareholders and the board has received far less attention than 
the board-management link. Corporate governance experts noted that shareholders – 
for a variety of reasons – are not successful at communicating their preferences to 
boards (Montgomery and Kaufman, 2003). Although this criticism has often been 
uttered in an Anglo-American governance context, our findings suggest that the 
absence of direct links with shareholders might also affect the performance of boards 
in governance contexts characterized by major block holdings. In particular, an 
incomplete understanding of the main long term (strategic) objectives of the major 
shareholder(s) (and the minority shareholder(s)), as well as of their priorities, may 
become an obstacle for defining the focus the board has to adopt. Some comments of 
the Company’s directors illustrate this point of view. 
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Examples R1: Regarding the major shareholder , it is clear that the board and management 
should be better informed on its strategy…. It is crucial because all strategic 
decisions oriented to the long term must be prepared in advance, a merger for 
example, one does not get into this from one day to the next.  
R7: The biggest difficulty the board and management face is the obscurity regarding 
the major shareholder’s strategy and objectives. 
R8: It appears to me that there are only few (individual) contacts between the non-
executives and the major shareholder, probably it would be appropriate that the latter 
calls them together to explain its strategic accents. 
R17: A fundamental issue relates to the fact that the major shareholder does not 
directly reside in the board, there are no communicating vessels. A direct link is 
missing… 
 
This interpretation is consistent with previous qualitative research findings on boards. 
The study by Hill (1995) revealed that boards felt the need to maintain good 
communication with their major shareholders. In particular, dialogue with 
shareholders related to significant developments in corporate strategy, including take-
overs, has been valued. 
 
6.6 Discussion 
 
The objective of the case study was to examine how different determinants of board 
effectiveness interrelate and whether board processes have an impact on the task 
performance of the board of directors. A predefined research model for board 
effectiveness provided theoretical guidance. Clearly, an examination of a single case 
study should not be expected to provide definitive evidence on the adequacy of the 
research model. The board of directors studied shows some features which are 
commonly found amongst most boards of Belgian listed companies while at the same 
time, the board faces some specific challenges due to the Company’s business 
environment and governance structure. As such, some particular evidence may be 
case-specific but at the same time evidence can be found which enables 
generalizability of our findings. In essence, the results of the case study suggest two 
important issues. 
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First, the field study showed that structural board characteristics are a fundamental but 
insufficient condition for board effectiveness. While the standard theories in board 
research attach exclusive attention to structural board attributes as proxies for 
understanding board effectiveness, our study indicates that competent people and the 
interaction amongst people are more critical for the effectiveness of boards. Our 
findings suggest that an effective board should be able to rely on a mix of 
competences that are in accordance with the needs of the company. In addition, an 
effective board should be able to forge a relationship amongst a group of strong 
individuals that will permit the sharing of information, the questioning and evaluation 
of actions while at the same time avoiding the trap of becoming too close-nit and 
familiar that vigilant behaviour is undermined. Furthermore, it appears that there are 
certain fundamental conditions that must be present in order for these dynamics to be 
achieved: mutual respect amongst directors and executives, openness in the exchange 
of information, trust and constructive debate on issues. These findings imply that a 
behavioural perspective is more appropriate for studying boards of directors rather 
than a traditional input-output model. Behavioural studies focus on actors, processes, 
decision-making, relationships and interactions inside and outside the boardroom 
(Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005). In contrast, the commonly found input-output models 
in board research are used to study the direct relationship between structural board 
characteristics and performance outcomes, assuming that the behaviour and conduct 
of directors can be successfully inferred from the board’s demographic characteristics. 
Our study suggests that the relationships and interactions cannot be fully studied by 
using only proxies of actual board behaviour. 
Second, our field study showed that the effectiveness of boards in performing their 
roles depends on contingencies which relate to the other actors in the corporate 
governance tripod. The board of directors does not operate in isolation and its latitude 
depends on its relationship with the shareholder and the CEO/management. The first 
relationship has commonly been approached in academic governance literature as a 
relationship of ownership and control resulting in varying views on the influence of 
shareholders. The prevailing view is that fragmentized share ownership leads to a 
mass of unidentified shareholders who fail to exert much influence over boards. 
Dispersed shareholders are very detached from the company and mutual 
communication is often lacking. As a consequence, of main concern in literature is the 
alignment of both directors’ and management’s financial interest with those of the 
 196
shareholders. At the other end of the spectrum remains a system of block holdings in 
which major shareholders have the potential to exert strong influence over boards. In 
this context, much attention is paid to the problems of private benefits and rent-
extractions. However, in both cases little interest and arguments are found on the 
value of establishing and maintaining good communication with shareholders 
(Montgomery and Kaufman, 2003). Our findings suggest that the lack of 
understanding of (major) shareholder preferences as well as the lack of  clear 
communication lines create a barrier to the effectiveness of boards in carrying out 
their roles. Similar to the shareholder-board relationship, the board-management 
relationship has been subject to considerable debate and has traditionally also been 
conceptualised as a power relationship. The theoretical approaches vary substantially, 
ranging from the premise of control to collaboration (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003). As a result, boards of directors have been pictured along a spectrum of 
‘ceremonial’ to ‘operating’ reflecting a shift of power from complete CEO-
domination to a strongly involved board. Our findings suggest that effective boards 
need to establish a working relationship with the CEO/management that is 
constructive and collaborative but whereby board members are not afraid to confront 
and challenge issues. The paradoxical combination of trust and conflict appears to be 
the extra ingredient required to gel competent management and competent board 
members into an effective board. These findings suggest the need to develope a 
contingency perspective in studies of boards of directors. Generally speaking, this 
perspective recognizes that corporate governance designs and conceptionalizations are 
embedded in a broader institutional and social context (Aquilera and Jackson, 2003). 
When studying boards of directors, it can be argued that both contextual factors (such 
as ownership structure, industrial environment, firm life cycle) and internal and 
external actors (such as management, shareholders and other stakeholders) need to be 
taken into account.  
 
6.7 Reconsideration of our research framework: a system view on 
board effectiveness  
 
Although the findings of our study point in favour of our initial process-oriented 
approach, they also suggest that our model is not wholly appropriate for 
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understanding the effectiveness of boards. In addition, it appears that the effectiveness 
of boards is shaped by a complex web of interdependent variables whereby it is 
difficult to isolate the effects of the separate constructs stemming from theoretical 
assumptions. Taking these observations into account, we reconsider our initial 
research framework by proposing a system view on board effectiveness. In particular, 
we suggest that it would be more appropriate to conceptionalize a board of directors 
as a dynamic, open social system. From this perspective, board effectiveness is 
approached as the result of a set of interrelated elements, whereby a change in one 
element will affect other elements. Besides, the more these different elements are 
aligned with each other, the more likely it is that the system will produce outcomes 
that make a board effective. Furthermore, the board of directors is considered as an 
open system, meaning that it interacts with its external and internal environment. 
 
6.7.1 Basic systems characteristics 
 
Considering the board of directors as a system implies that the board will display a 
number of basic system characteristics (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004(b); Nadler and 
Tushman, 1980). A first characteristic is internal interdependence which refers to the 
fact that changes in one component of the board will have repercussions for other 
components. For example, our study showed that the simultaneous appointment of a 
large number of new, independent directors (change in board composition) affects the 
cohesiveness amongst the board members. Second, the board has the capacity for 
feedback, meaning that the board has the potential to use information about its output 
to become a self-correcting system. For example, in our study the Company’s board 
has used information about its actual task performance to (gradually) reduce the 
number of directors19 as well as to approve a concrete action plan for additional 
adjustments. The latter includes, generally reproduced, a reconsideration of the 
committee-policy, improvement of the communication between the board and 
management and the establishment of a new format for the information flow to the 
board. This action plan is being implemented step-wise. Third, the board, as a system, 
is characterised by equilibrium - that is a state of balance. When an event pushes the 
system out of balance, it will react to bring itself back into balance, although the latter 
                                                 
19 At the end of 2006, board size was reduced from 18 to 16 members.  
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could take a substantial period of time. We take the same example of the major 
change in the board composition in our study. This major change had lead to some 
kind of instability in the relationships, as it takes some time for the group to adapt to 
the new circumstances reflecting different personalities, knowledge, skills, behaviour, 
information needs etc. But over time, the board will move again towards a state of 
equilibrium. A final system characteristic is adaptation. The board has the willingness 
to adapt to changing environmental conditions or organizational demands. For 
example, in our study the board of directors is faced with a rapidly changing business 
environment and in response it has made some changes in its composition.  
 
6.7.2 A congruence model for board effectiveness 
 
Next to its basic characteristics, a system can be described by three basic concepts, 
namely input, process and output, whereby the greatest emphasis is placed on the 
process part (Nadler and Tushman, 1980). In this respect, a system view on board 
effectiveness is consistent with the input-process-output approach which we applied 
in our initial research framework, but it enables us to add extra dimensions to the 
model (see Figure 14).   
Input. The input in our model refers to the board’s resources that are available 
through the board members. Board members may be described by size, composition, 
competence and structure. Board size refers to the number of board members, while 
board composition refers to the configuration of the characteristics amongst board 
members. Insider/outsider ratio is the usual configuration but configuration of various 
dimensions of diversity (such as age, tenure, gender etc.) or competences is also 
included. Board competence represents the sum of the board members’ expertise, 
knowledge and skills. Relational or social capacity or capabilities may also be 
included as competence. The concepts of board capital (Hilman and Dalziel, 2003) or 
board intellectual capital (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004(b)) are close to our concept of 
board competence. Finally, board structure refers to the configuration of board 
members into board committees. 
 
Processes.  The processes in our model refer to the interactions and behaviour 
amongst the board members, which transform the input into output. We have 
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identified three board processes, namely cohesiveness, debate and conflict norms, but 
we recognize the fact that this list is not exhaustive. For instance, the use of power 
(Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998), or other dimensions of the decision-making process 
(Golden and Zajac, 2001) could be included. 
 
Output. The output in our model is how successful the board is in performing its dual 
role set.  
 
Contingencies. Because we view the board as an open system, interacting with its 
internal and external environment, we introduce two contingency factors into our 
model. These are board-management interactions and board-shareholder interactions. 
As previously argued, the board of directors does not operate in a vacuum, but it 
interacts with other actors in the corporate governance tripod. The most important 
actors are the top-management team and influential shareholders, but in some cases, 
influential stakeholders may also be considered as important actors. Whatever the 
roles the board chooses to perform, it can only accomplish this by interacting 
effectively with the CEO/management and the influential shareholders. These 
interactions may take place both inside and outside the boardroom and are 
characterised by an apparent paradox of trust and distrust and various types and 
degrees of power. 
 
Boundaries. Each board of directors has to operate within a set of ‘givens’, which are 
outside the board’s direct control and which determine the boundary conditions of its 
effectiveness (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004(b)). We propose a set of 4 external factors 
that a board of directors has to face: the legislative and societal environment, the 
industrial environment, the type and life-cycle of the firm. The legislative and societal 
environment refers to the set of laws, rules and customs established by the society and 
which provide a board of directors with different powers or constraints. The industrial 
environment exposes different degrees of complexity, dynamism and technological 
change which impose different challenges to a board of directors. The type of the firm 
will determine the purpose and objectives of the firm while the major phases of a 
firm’s development reflect past, current and future events. Both aspects are assumed 
to have an impact on the board of directors.  
 
 200
As mentioned above, we conceptualize board effectiveness as the outcome of 
different components that interact with each other. Of key importance is the overall 
alignment or ‘fit’ between the specified components (Nadler and Tushman, 1980). In 
other words, the congruence model for board effectiveness is based on how well its 
components or ‘pieces’ fit together. The basic hypothesis of this model is that the 
greater the total degree of congruence or fit between the various components, the 
more effective the board will be — effectiveness being defined as the degree to which 
actual board task performance is similar to expected task performance. The different 
components can fit well together and function effectively, or fit poorly and lead to 
problems, dysfunctions, or performance that is below potential. Conceptualizing 
boards of directors this way, implies that attention is still paid to the interconnection 
of structural and behavioural factors, but that we expand the initial model by 
introducing additional components and by emphasizing the dynamic nature of board 
effectiveness. 
 
Figure 14: a congruence model for board effectiveness 
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6.8 Conclusion  
 
 201
Our initial goal was to enhance our understanding of how different factors, especially 
process variables, determine the effectiveness of a board of directors in performing its 
dual role set. Guided by a theoretical framework, we have used a single case study to 
examine the relationships amongst a set of predefined variables. The empirical 
findings highlighted the fact that our initial board model is rather incomplete. 
Although we have found support for structural and process variables as important 
determinants of board effectiveness, we were confronted with some unexpected 
findings. In particular, the formation of board committees, the fit between board 
competency and organizational needs as well as the board interaction with 
management and major shareholder(s) appeared to be additional factors that may 
hamper or facilitate the board of directors in executing its dual role set.  The overall 
result of our study was a reconsideration of our initial board model. We have 
proposed a congruence model for board effectiveness whereby we conceptionalized 
the board of directors as an open social system, made up of various components that 
interact with each other. It is argued that the degree of congruence between the 
components dictates the effectiveness of a board. Although the direct empirical 
evidence for this model was found at one board of directors at one period in time, it 
clearly points to the need for including behavioural and contingency perspectives in 
board research as well as for exploring multiple theoretical lenses. In understanding 
how board effectiveness is shaped by various interconnected components, we will be 
in a better position to further understand the complex relationship between the board 
of directors and firm performance. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters have outlined the importance of the board of directors as an 
internal governance mechanism and examined the determinants of board effectiveness 
both conceptually and empirically. Chapter 2 introduced the broader concept of 
corporate governance and described the particularities of the Belgian corporate 
governance environment. Chapter 2 also explained the great interest in the board of 
directors and discussed the different theories underpinning board research. Chapter 4 
provided the analysis of the first field study which was aimed at exploring the broad 
spectrum of criteria, perceived to contribute to the effectiveness of boards. The 
findings were then used to develop a theoretical research framework in Chapter 5. The 
model reflects an input-process-output approach placing great emphasis on the more 
‘intangible’ aspects of board effectiveness. Chapter 6 empirically challenged this 
process-oriented model by means of a case study of a Belgian listed company. It has 
documented the nature of the relationships amongst the (structural) input and 
(behavioural) process variables as well as their impact on the task performance of the 
board. The analysis has resulted in a reconsideration of the initial framework and, 
relying on a system perspective, a ‘congruence’ model for board effectiveness is 
proposed. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 represent the core of our study and unfold along a 
carefully chosen qualitative-oriented research methodology, explained in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
 
This final chapter builds on the findings of the previous chapters to provide an 
overview of the main conclusions regarding the two research questions addressed in 
this dissertation. It also discusses the implications for science and practice. The last 
section outlines the limitations of the study and gives directions for further research. 
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7.2 Main findings and conclusions 
 
As Forbes and Milliken (1999) note, understanding the nature of effective board 
functioning is amongst the most important areas of management research. Despite the 
fact that the board of directors is the top decision-making body in corporate life, there 
is relatively little known about the way boards actually operate. This stands in glaring 
contrast with our knowledge on what boards of directors are supposed to do. 
Succinctly put, the board of directors is responsible for the overall well-being of a 
company. Corporate governance reforms encompass various measures aimed at 
assuring board effectiveness in directing and monitoring a company. In addition, 
different forces (major corporate failures, growing directors’ reliability, spread of 
shareholder activism etc.) and parties (institutional investors, rating agencies, media 
etc.) have put increased pressure on companies and their boards to fulfil their 
governance responsibilities. The practical relevance of studying boards of directors 
has triggered many scholars to investigate the relationship of boards and corporate 
performance. However, mainstream board researchers have remained at a 
considerable distance from board practice, resulting in only a shallow insight of the 
‘what’ (the work) and ‘how’ (the process) of boards of directors (Leblanc and Gillies, 
2005). Much of today’s forces, regulations and codes are directed at improving 
corporate governance through the upgrading of the board’s functioning. 
Consequently, the significant question to answer is: what determines the effectiveness 
of boards? For this dissertation, we have translated this question into two main 
research objectives: (i) to investigate the key factors that potentially contribute to 
board effectiveness and (ii) to examine the influence of board processes on the task 
performance of boards of directors (see Chapter 1). Both research questions have 
been approached from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective, involving 
boards of directors in Belgium. We organize the discussion of our main conclusions 
along the two objectives of this dissertation. 
 
 
7.2.1 Insights into the key drivers of board effectiveness 
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In Chapters 1, 4 and 5 it was highlighted that mainstream board research has relied on 
a limited number of structural board measures for studying the effectiveness of 
boards. Moreover, as agency theory dominates corporate governance and board 
research, board characteristics have been operationalised in light of the extent a board 
of directors is able to act independently from management. In particular, board size, 
the ratio of inside/outside and independent directors, as well as a separation of the 
positions of chairman and CEO, have commonly been used as proxies in studies to 
investigate the direct relationship between boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance. Given the great importance attached to these characteristics, we have 
also included them in our study. However, the findings of the empirical studies have 
provided a more elaborate understanding of what determines an effective board by (i) 
pointing out additional structural board features and (ii) directing attention to the more 
intangible aspects of board conduct. 
 
The study found support for structural board characteristics… 
 
The field study in Chapter 4 has highlighted the importance of board composition. It 
was revealed that directors value a mix of board members’ roles in terms of 
executives, non-executives and independent directors, but its relative importance 
appears to be surpassed by diversity and complementarity (in skills and expertises) as 
well as overall competence. These latter aspects ranked systematically amongst the 
highest in directors’ perceptions of what constitutes a good corporate board. The 
impact of diversity on the effectiveness of boards has been further analysed in our 
theoretical research framework (Chapter 5) and empirically examined in the case 
study (Chapter 6). Based on existing literature, it was noted in Chapter 5 that the 
concept of diversity embraces many dimensions and that the effects of diversity are 
rather equivocal as they can be both beneficial and detrimental. The case study in 
Chapter 6 has - to some extent - documented the importance of board diversity by 
pointing out the (negative) impact of directors’ tenure heterogeneity on group 
dynamics. Furthermore, it has also reinforced the critical importance of board 
competence, in terms of having sufficient and adequate knowledge and skills on an 
aggregate level. These findings challenge the common emphasis placed on board 
independence as a key measure for the effectiveness of boards. In Chapter 4 it was 
stated that independence is the cornerstone in corporate governance debate and 
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research, and it is clear that the reform movement has put board independence 
forward as a unifying theme to improve the governance of companies (Westphal, 
2002). Surprisingly, we found little evidence in our empirical studies on the 
independence issue. It appears that directors themselves attach less importance to - at 
least the structural operationalisation of - board independence. Still, they have stressed 
the importance of an independent state of mind. Moreover, including a sufficient 
number of non-executive and independent directors has been recognized as a way to 
broaden the knowledge base of a board of directors (Chapters 4 and 6). The 
conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that an appropriate board 
configuration is contended to be a first condition for board effectiveness. Rather than 
approaching the composition of a board exclusively in terms of the proportion of 
independent directors, an appropriate board composition must be interpreted as the 
optimal fit between a diversified mix of knowledgeable and competent people, the 
roles the board wants to fulfil and the independence requirements imposed on the 
company.  
 
Another structural measure put forward to enhance the effectiveness of boards are 
committees. Today’s best practice governance principles as well as many listing rules 
demand the installation of board committees, particularly for those areas where the 
potential for conflicts of interest is the greatest (audit, nomination and remuneration). 
Especially, in the wake of many accounting scandals and unbridled CEO 
compensation, the requirements for audit and remuneration committees have been 
strengthened. In Chapter 6 it was noted that the basic rationale for the establishment 
of committees is a more efficient use of time, by dividing up the work amongst the 
directors. Board committees should allow for more in-depth discussions and the 
development of a specialized understanding. Although board committees have been 
set up by most (listed) companies in Europe and the US (see Chapter 2), academic 
research on their impact is scarce and mainly focused on audit committees (e.g. Spira, 
2002; Daily, 1996). The findings of our empirical studies with respect to board 
committees are rather mixed. In the analysis of our field work, presented in Chapter 4, 
we could not find any indication of the importance of committees for board 
effectiveness. The establishment of board committees was not once mentioned as top 
of mind criterion for a good board of directors. Due to the lack of academic and 
empirical evidence, this structural aspect was not included in the initial research 
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framework (Chapter 5). However, the case study in Chapter 6 has shed more light on 
the impact of (some) board committees on the task performance of boards. In 
particular, it has shown that an audit committee, when certain conditions are 
fulfilled20, is of great importance for the successful execution of a board’s monitoring 
role. However, the relevance of a strategic committee for the performance of a board’s 
strategic role appears to be less straightforward. The (negative) side-effects of board 
committees (e.g. information asymmetry, dilution of board power) are perceived to be 
the greatest for a strategic committee, and hence, surpass the benefits committees are 
supposed to yield. The conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that board 
committees are likely to enhance the effectiveness of boards but not at all costs, nor at 
all times. Board committees show the full advantage for supporting a board in a 
successful execution of its roles only when they are (i) consciously installed and used, 
(ii) properly designed, and (iii) if there is sufficient and timely reporting to the full 
board. These are fundamental conditions for minimising the side-effects and 
maximising the benefits of board committees. 
 
A final structural characteristic that has been examined is the size of the board. As 
explained in Chapter 4, board size is considered, both in academic research and 
corporate governance reforms, as a key determinant for board effectiveness. In fact, it 
is a commonly used proxy for the board’s independence, together with available 
resources and expertise. This reasoning highlights the potential advantages of a large 
board. Chapter 5 has further elaborated the effects of board size and stressed the 
negative impact on group dynamics when boards become too large. In spite of the 
earlier reported mixed academic findings regarding board size (Chapter 4), the 
perceptions of the directors appear to be rather in favour of a limited number of board 
members. The results from the field study in Chapter 4 indicated that the size of the 
board was amongst the least frequently mentioned criteria for a good board of 
directors, but in the cases where it was mentioned, directors commented that a board 
of directors should not be too large in order to function effectively. This perception is 
supported by the empirical evidence from the case study in Chapter 6. The board 
under study was quite large, compared to the average board size in Belgium, US and 
                                                 
20 The conditions for the well-functioning of the audit committee in this case study was its composition 
(independent and competent members, lead by an independent chairman), meeting frequency (min. 6 
times, and shortly before the board meetings), good and timely reports to the board and the support of 
strongly developed internal control systems. 
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UK (see Chapter 2), and it turned out that this triggered various effects on the task 
performance of the board. Particularly, the directors stressed the negative implications 
of such a large board for group dynamics, and hence, indirectly for board task 
performance. The conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that a relatively 
smaller board size is an additional condition for board effectiveness. Needless to say 
that a relatively small board size does not comprise a fixed absolute number. Rather, it 
should be defined as a sufficient number of directors to balance the needs, in terms of 
a required mix of knowledge or other resources, but with respect for the basic precepts 
of group dynamics and functioning. 
 
… but suggests that intangible or behavioural factors may be the most critical 
determinants of board effectiveness.  
 
In Chapters 4 and 5 it was explained that part of the inconclusive findings of research 
into board-performance links can be attributed to the use of incomplete (input-output) 
models for the study of board effectiveness. Moreover, it was noted that the common 
ignorance of potential intervening variables is difficult to maintain given the 
emergence of a new research stream that, step by step, provides a better understanding 
of the inner workings of boards of directors. The findings from our empirical studies 
have also directed attention to the importance of ‘non-structural’ board characteristics 
for the effectiveness of a board.  
 
The evidence from the field work, presented in Chapter 4, suggests a prominent role 
for intangible or more behavioural factors as determinants of board effectiveness. A 
first factor relates to the discussions inside the boardroom. In Chapter 2, it was noted 
that the degree to which boards of directors engage in real discussions is still subject 
to considerable debate. In particular, some scholars believe that boards only act as 
rubber-stamping devices without real questioning or discussing of the proposals put 
forward by management. In contrast, it appears that directors themselves value the 
occurrence of debate during board meetings. During the first field study, a good board 
of directors was frequently perceived to be a board that exposes real, in-depth, 
objective discussions (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 has taken this finding into account by 
including debate as an intervening variable in our research framework. Moreover, 
based on TMT literature, it was suggested that debate, or the expression of task-
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related differences, is critical for decision-making on complex tasks, as it is the case 
with boards of directors. This concept was also examined during the case study, and 
the findings supported the basic insights (Chapter 6). In particular, it appears that 
debate should manifest itself in a constructive way and should lead to concrete 
decision-making in order to enhance board effectiveness. A second factor relates to 
the board’s culture. The term board culture refers to the informal rules which regulate 
board and directors’ behaviour. As put forward by the directors, culture encompasses 
many aspects such as openness, exposure and tolerance of critical attitude etc.. It is 
perceived to be of compelling importance for the effectiveness of boards (Chapter 4). 
Supported by insights from the literature on group effectiveness, board culture was 
then conceptionalised as ‘conflict norms’ and as such included in our theoretical 
framework. In Chapter 5, the role of conflict norms for board effectiveness was 
investigated from a theoretical point of view. It was suggested that the norms 
regarding conflict at force in a boardroom will dictate the extent a board engages in 
real discussion, and hence, is able to make optimal use of the resources provided by 
structural board characteristics. The case study in Chapter 6 supports this notion as the 
analysis pointed in favour of a board culture characterised by rather high conflict 
norms which permits the airing of opinions and stimulates open and candid 
discussions. The conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that structural 
board characteristics indicate the potential of a board of directors while its culture 
and its exposure to constructive discussions are the catalysts that unlock or lock this 
potential. It is through board deliberations that diverse perspectives are consolidated 
in a critical and independent judgment of management proposals, while the culture at 
force is presumed to support an environment in which these deliberations can take 
place. 
 
Another aspect that was brought to our attention is the impact of cohesiveness 
amongst the board members. In Chapter 5, it was documented that the concept of 
cohesiveness is one of the most extensively studied variables in group settings. Based 
on literature on group effectiveness, it was argued that the degree of cohesion plays a 
vital role in the communication between board members and the way they collaborate 
as a team. It was suggested that both ends of the cohesiveness-continuum may 
produce negative outcomes for board effectiveness. Succinctly put, no coherence in 
the board would prevent the exchange of information required for good decision-
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making, while too much cohesiveness brings the danger of group thinking. The 
evidence provided by the empirical studies on the relevance of the concept of 
cohesiveness in a board context appears to be less outspoken. Issues related to the 
interpersonal relationships amongst board members (such as the right chemistry, trust 
and respect, informal contacts etc.) were spontaneously mentioned by directors as 
important criteria for a good board of directors, but when put at the test with other 
criteria, they systematically received the lowest rankings (Chapter 4). Additional 
comments revealed that directors view the importance of cohesiveness in the sense of 
the need to cherish a professional relationship amongst board members that 
encompasses trust and respect. It was noted that this does not imply a need for 
developing personal friendships or social fellowship. Also the case study has shown 
that directors value a minimum degree of cohesiveness in the board and that it is 
important to establish a sense of connectedness amongst directors, in particular when 
new board members are appointed (Chapter 6). The conclusion that can be drawn 
from these findings is that a certain degree of cohesiveness may act as an extra 
condition to forge interactions amongst a well-designed mix of board members which 
in turn builds trust - required for openness in information exchanges - while at the 
same time stimulating the occurrence of (task-related) disagreement and candid 
discussions. 
 
Finally, a feature that bears special attention is board leadership. Chapter 4 has 
explained that the latter is commonly approached as a structural measure of board 
effectiveness. In spite of the fact that diverging theoretical perspectives exist as the 
extent to which the positions of CEO and chairman must be combined or separated in 
order for a board to be effective (Chapter 2), most corporate governance reforms have 
pushed for a separation of responsibilities. However, relying on insights from our 
field studies in Chapters 4 and 6, it appears that board leadership as a structural 
characteristic is of inferior importance compared to the behavioural dimension of 
board leadership. The role of the chairman was amongst the most cited criteria in 
directors’ perceptions of a good board of directors and, more specifically, directors 
noted that the chairman actually dictates the course of board meetings. Additional 
findings relate to the role of the chairman in the board’s decision-making process. It 
was indicated by the directors that for a board to be effective, a chairman should not - 
by all means - seek consensus. Further investigation revealed that the notion of 
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consensus is open to diverse interpretations and often confused with the concept of 
unanimity. Of essential importance in directors’ perceptions is that boardroom 
deliberations do not depart from consensus in order to fully capture the benefits from 
diverse perspectives, but in the end the board should reach a decision that is supported 
by all the board members. Surprisingly, directors themselves did not once refer to the 
issue of a joint or combined leadership structure as a condition for the effectiveness of 
their boards. The conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that the 
leadership style of a chairman, irrespective of whether this function is performed by 
the CEO or not, plays an important role in the conduct of board meetings. Its 
importance stems from the need to resolve apparent paradoxes inherent in the 
interactions amongst board members (e.g. open candid discussion while dealing with 
conflicting opinions, expression of dissenting views while maintaining coherence, 
reaching consensus after highly diverse views etc.) as well as to stimulate and 
preserve high standards of openness in the boardroom.  
 
7.2.2 The influence of board processes on a  board’s  task performance  
 
In the discussion outlined above, the importance of intangible and more behavioural 
factors for the effectiveness of boards was put forward by presenting evidence of the 
potential impact of a board’s culture, boardroom debates and board members’ 
cohesiveness. These findings led to further investigation into how and to what extent 
the internal working of boards might influence the board’s task performance. In 
Chapter 5 it was noted that mainstream board research has primarily focused on the 
direct relationship between board structure and board or company outcomes, and that 
only few studies have considered the impact of internal board processes on the 
effectiveness of boards. The findings of our study have shed more light on the 
explanatory power of board processes for a successful execution of board tasks by 
documenting the inevitable connection between structural board characteristics and 
boardroom dynamics. Moreover, they have brought to the attention two important 
categories of contingencies on which board effectiveness depends.  
 
The study showed that the interaction and relationship amongst the board 
members impacts the way the board of directors performs its tasks… 
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In Chapter 5, the potential impact of a limited number of intervening process variables 
on the performance of a board’s strategic and monitoring role has been elaborated 
from a theoretical point of view. A process-oriented board model was developed, 
drawing the indirect relationships between the board’s structural input variables and 
the board’s output. In particular, it was suggested that the emergence of debate is 
beneficial for the performance of board tasks because it formalises task-oriented 
disagreement and encourages critical evaluation of management proposals. In 
addition, it was noted that the effects of cohesiveness are not straightforward. 
Especially when members become too close-knit, it may undermine vigilant and 
critical behaviour, and hence, undermine a successful execution of board roles. The 
evidence from the case study in Chapter 6 has shown that it is difficult to isolate the 
effects of the separate variables (pictured in the theoretical research framework), as 
the effectiveness of a board is shaped by a complex web of interdependent factors. In 
essence, the findings have pointed out that the board of directors is not an entity that 
functions independently of its members. It is a group of people urged to work to 
together to fulfil board functions in a collective manner. The extent to which the board 
is successful in executing its expected roles, depends not solely on the individual 
competences of board members (chapter 4 and 6) but also on how these competences 
are leveraged by the way the individual directors interact inside and outside the 
boardroom. Chapter 6 has noted that an unequal level of directors’ competence (in 
terms of experiences and insights into the business) influences the nature of 
boardroom deliberations and, subsequently the degree to which the board is able to 
fulfil its roles. It was also highlighted that informal contacts are perceived to further 
coherence or the “team spirit” amongst board members. This permits the sharing of 
information and as such contributes to board task performance. Cohesiveness and 
debate are two expressions of how individual board members interact (behaviourally 
and verbally), within the context of the board of directors, aimed at collectively 
performing the strategic and monitoring tasks. The conclusion that can be drawn from 
these findings is that, rather then treating the board of directors as an abstract body, 
the board of directors should be approached as a social unit, in which the combined 
action of individual member features and interactions amongst the members, define 
its internal working and, in the final end, the effectiveness of the board in performing 
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its tasks. As in many things, the effectiveness of a board of directors depends on the 
collective performance of its members. 
 
…but also found that a successful execution of board tasks depends on a board’s 
relationship with management and with its (main) shareholders. 
 
In essence, corporate governance is about the division of power and organising 
accountability between the three actors in the corporate governance tripod: the 
shareholders, management and the board of directors (Chapter 2). As demonstrated by 
the case study in Chapter 6, the board of directors does not operate in a vacuum, and 
for a successful performance of its tasks, the board can not be isolated from 
management and the shareholder(s). The relationships between these three anchors 
have been subject to considerable debate and are commonly conceptualised as power-
relationships (Chapter 2). First, the board-management relationship has often been 
approached in black and white terms, namely as a relationship of boss versus 
subordinate. Driven by various forces21, the widespread view is that 
CEO/management can not be trusted because they may not act in the shareholders’ 
best interests, even engaging in potentially damaging behaviour. Boards of directors, 
in particular independent directors, are presumed to act as ‘policemen’ to keep 
management in control. The evidence presented in Chapter 6 has shown that the 
relationship between the board of directors and management is much more complex. 
In particular, it appears that both collaboration and control are key to developing an 
effective working relationship between the board and management. A determining 
issue in this relationship is the communication between the two parties involved. 
Chapter 4 has already pointed to the importance of the information flow for the 
effectiveness of boards. Directors perceived the information that is provided before 
the board meetings as vital for a board to function well. The evidence from the case 
study has reinforced these findings (Chapter 6). It was noted that timely and sufficient 
information, that serves both the board’s monitoring and strategic role, as well as 
openness in communication are essential for a successful performance of board tasks. 
Moreover, an additional issue that was brought to our attention is the importance of 
                                                 
21 Forces include, among others, the popularity of agency theory, a research tradition based on US-
practices and embedded in a US-governance context; not to mention the impact of the recent wave of 
corporate malpractices. 
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trust in board-management relationships. In the first field study, trust between the 
board and the CEO/management was ranked high amongst the most important 
ingredients for an effective board of directors (Chapter 4). The case study in Chapter 6 
has shed more light on the impact of trust. It was pointed out that trust is an important 
indicator for the information flow. Building trust, and subsequently, enhancing 
openness in information exchanges, implies the same (behavioural) standards for both 
directors and management. More specifically, outside independent directors should 
not seek to assume an executive role while management should not seek to minimize 
the role of the non-executives by hiding or witholding information. The conclusion 
that can be drawn from these findings is that, instead of approaching board-
management relationships in hierarchical terms, the board of directors and 
management should develop a partner relationship that is characterised by open 
exchanges of information, a coexistence of trust and critical monitoring as well as a 
clarity about the role of the board vis-à-vis the CEO.  Even when the board has the 
appropriate structure and processes in place, it is contended that a lack of information 
will hamper the board of directors in executing its roles successfully. Moreover, trust 
and latitude are equally important in the board-management relationship as well as a 
mutual understanding of each others roles and responsibilities.  
 
Second, the board-shareholder relationship has also been subject to considerable 
debate. Succinctly put, dispersed shareholdership, leading to a multitude of non-
influential shareholders versus concentrated ownership, leading to strong, powerful 
majority shareholders, are the opposite ends on a single continuum. In both cases, the 
power bias is the source of different governance “diseases” such as management 
entrenchment (dispersed shareholdership) and extraction of private benefits 
(concentrated shareholdership). Consequently, a major part of the corporate 
governance debate and the governance reforms concern the design of required checks 
and balances (Chapter 2). However, in Chapter 6 we have noted that the value of 
establishing and maintaining good communication with shareholders is an issue that 
has received far less scrutiny. This phenomenon has been referred to as the ‘missing 
link’ in the corporate governance triangle, indicating that strong accountability 
between shareholders and the board of directors is often lacking (Montgomery and 
Kaufman, 2003). Our study, conducted in a corporate governance environment, 
characterised by concentrated ownership patterns and long-term committed 
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shareholders, challenges this notion. In such a context, shareholders with an important 
stake (will) commonly sit in the boardroom (Chapter 2), and by definition, maintain 
close and active connections with the board of directors. In contrast, the relationships 
of the board with minority shareholders or large shareholders who are not directly 
present in the boardroom are more complicated. In many instances, there is fewer or 
no direct contact between these shareholders and directors (who serve on their behalf). 
For these shareholders it is more difficult to articulate their goals and make their 
preferences known to the board, while for the latter it is more difficult to understand 
what shareholders want. During the first field study, directors commented that a good 
board of directors is able to translate the main shareholder’s strategic ambitions to 
management. The evidence of our case study has also highlighted the importance of 
clear communication between the board and its major shareholder as well as a good 
understanding of the major shareholder’s (strategic) preferences for a successful 
execution of the board’s strategic role (Chapter 6). The conclusion that can be drawn 
from these findings is that the board of directors must develop proper communication 
lines with shareholders, in particular with the most influential shareholder(s), while 
preserving the required independence to prevent abuses by the influential 
shareholder(s). It is contended that shareholders, both majority and minority 
shareholders, also breathe expectations regarding the performance of board roles. 
Bringing actual performance in line with these expectations requires an informed 
board. For major shareholders, who are on the board, the exchange of information of 
their objectives is quite straightforward. For those shareholders who are not on the 
board, the board of directors should enter into communicative relationships to assure 
clear understanding of mutual objectives and concerns. In addition, it is important that 
the major shareholder(s) look with an impartial eye towards improving the company’s 
future. Only then can directors be effective fiduciaries and good bridges to other 
(minority) shareholders. After all, the role of the board of directors is to safeguard the 
interest of all shareholders.  
 
7.3 Implications of the study 
 
Supported by the main findings and conclusions outlined above, our research has 
important implications for science and practice. First, we discuss the implications for 
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management science. Second, we provide an overview of the implications for 
practitioners, such as companies, institutional investors, other market parties or policy 
makers.  
 
7.3.1 Implications for management science 
 
This research makes a number of contributions to management science. A first 
contribution stems from the study of boards of directors in a non-US context using an 
alternative research methodology. In spite of the intense research interest in 
corporate governance systems and mechanisms around the world (Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), most (empirical) studies on boards of directors have been carried out 
using samples of large US corporations and are inspired by quantitative US research 
traditions (Huse, 2005). The latter implies that scholars have mainly applied board 
data, retrieved from publicly available resources, or - to a lesser extent - questionnaire 
data obtained from management. This approach has contributed to the knowledge on 
boards of directors but scholars have acknowledged that alternative research methods 
are necessary to make considerable progress in board research. Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) stated: “Thus far, secondary references and surveys, completed by 
management, have dominated the literature. We recognize the importance and 
richness of these data sources, but we urge researchers to consider incorporating 
directors’ views in the study of board behaviours, supplemented by the researchers’ 
secondary data with their observations of board attributes.” (p.330) Although their call 
dates from almost two decades ago, qualitative studies on boards of directors as well 
as research of boards in European contexts are still very scarce. The lack of these 
studies is caused by the fact that (i) access to boardrooms and directors remains 
difficult both in the US and in Europe; and (ii) the European governance environment 
does not constitute a homogeneous unit. Compared to the US, Europe embraces a 
greater diversity in terms of ownership patterns, organization of boards (1-tier and 2-
tier), size and use of stock markets etc. (Van den Berghe et.al., 2002). The larger 
variation amongst European countries may hamper board research, as scholars are 
faced with relative small samples (per country) and enhanced complexity when 
controlling for context in cross-sectional or cross-country studies. In our study, we 
were able to examine the determinants of board effectiveness through a direct contact 
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with boards and directors in one country. As such, our research contributes to reduce 
the identified gap in existing board literature by studying boards of directors in a 
Belgian context using a qualitative-oriented research approach (mixed methods and 
case study design). 
 
Second, our research contributes to corporate governance and board literature by 
documenting an indirect route, including novel research areas, for investigating 
board-performance links. Mainstream board research has tended to overemphasize the 
direct link between board characteristics and financial firm performance (Daily et.al., 
2003). The latter has been used as a proxy for empirical testing of a board’s 
effectiveness in protecting shareholders’ interest (Coles et.al., 2001). In addition, most 
scholars have focused on a limited number of structural board measures for 
investigating the impact of boards on the performance of firms. Years of research into 
these direct causal relationships have resulted in conflicting results, raising doubt on 
the explanatory power of these input-output models for the study of boards. In 
addition, although scholars recognize that the human dynamics of boards are as 
important (if not more) as the structural composition of boards in determining their 
effectiveness (e.g. Sonnenfeld, 2004), these aspects have rarely been included in 
empirical analyses. A common feature of this stream of research is the treatment of 
the board of directors as a “black box”. This resulting gap in knowledge has triggered 
the awareness to look for indirect board-performance links, to explore intervening 
variables as well as to better understand how boards of directors actually function. 
Our research has omitted a direct link between the board of directors and corporate 
financial performance by proposing an input-process-output model for board 
effectiveness. Our model is not unique in its nature, as other notable scholars have 
provided similar (indirect) modelling of board effectiveness (Huse, 2005; Nicholson 
and Kiel, 2004; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Still, our 
research contributes to literature as it strongly relies on extensive field work for the 
development as well as the validation of the model. In particular, an exploratory field 
study has been used to evaluate the usefulness of existing models in literature and to 
carefully select relevant constructs (which go beyond the ‘usual suspects’ (Finkelstein 
and Mooney, 2003) of board effectiveness) in order to build an own theoretical 
research framework. Next, we have subjected our framework to an empirical 
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challenge by means of a case study. This has generated a refined model that is 
substantiated by contemporary field study of board effectiveness.  
 
A third contribution provided by our research is the response to calls for board studies 
using a pluralistic theoretical lens (Daily et.al., 2003; Lynall et.al., 2003; Hilman 
and Dalziel, 2003, Johnson et.al., 1996; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). There is no doubt 
that agency theory dominates corporate governance and board research. Agency 
theory is concerned with resolving conflicts between the agent (management) and the 
principal (shareholder). It owes its popularity to the fact that it is a relatively simple 
theory, relying on an old, widespread (economic) notion (self-interested behaviour of 
humans) (Daily et.al., 2003). As such, conceptualisation and empirical studies of 
board effectiveness have mainly been concentrated on how to protect shareholders 
from (potential) managerial abuses of corporate resources. A board’s monitoring role 
and the empowerment of the board, by increasing its independence from the CEO, 
have received the most research interest. Although other theories are recognized in 
corporate governance research, their use in empirical studies remains inferior to the 
agency perspective. Moreover, theoretical foundation in board research is to a large 
extent fragmented as most studies apply only one single perspective. However, it 
appears that this approach has provided academics with insufficient insights into 
actual board functioning (Daily et.al., 2003). In fact, board effectiveness is such a 
complex phenomenon, that not one theoretical perspective can fully capture all 
dimensions. Our research has embraced various theoretical perspectives both in 
conceptionalising board effectiveness as well as in explaining empirical findings. 
Some examples: the study combined agency and stewardship theory to define the 
board’s dual role set (monitoring and strategic function); insights from resource 
dependency theory are relied upon to discuss the notion of board diversity; system 
theory is introduced to develop a ‘congruence’ model for board effectiveness etc. The 
co-existence of multiple theories has allowed for a more complete board model and a 
richer understanding of how boards can be (un)successful in the execution of their 
roles. 
 
Finally, our research contributes to other research streams, in particular the 
literature on organizational demography. An impressive amount of field research 
exists on how group demography impacts group processes and performance. It has 
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been well-documented that the demographic composition of groups can influence 
their effectiveness both directly and indirectly (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). 
Especially, more recent studies have been quite successful in bringing the explanatory 
power of intervening process variables to researchers’ attention. However, when 
studying the ‘group’ phenomenon within an organization, scholars have traditionally 
focused on work groups and top management teams (TMT). The empirical definition 
of TMTs varies considerably and in some cases, executives who serve on the board of 
directors are included (Carpenter et.al., 2004). So far, the literature on group and TMT 
effectiveness has directed little research attention to the study of boards of directors. 
Similarly, mainstream board research has no tradition of considering a board of 
directors as a group or team. One reason may be that boards of directors expose some 
specific features which distinguish them from other organizational groups (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). Still, there is a growing belief that effective boards are those who are 
able to function as high-performing teams (e.g. Nadler et.al., 2006; Charan, 2005; 
Carter and Lorsch, 2004). Our research approaches the board of directors as a team 
and examines the relevance of a limited number of constructs, frequently found in 
group and TMT studies, in a board context. Furthermore, our research also used 
concepts from social categorization and similar/attraction theories to predict the 
effects of diversity when applied to boards. As such, our research is an attempt to 
bridge the gap between two research streams and traditions. 
 
7.3.2 Implications for practitioners 
 
7.3.2.1 Companies  
 
Two general observations are of concern when discussing corporate governance at a 
company level. It is clear that corporate governance is not an end in itself, but a means 
to achieve the corporate objectives and strategy. Corporate governance needs to put in 
place the structures and processes which make it possible for a company to pursue its 
strategy and hence improve its performance. One of the most important governance 
devices, in this respect, is a company’s board of directors. Boards of directors are 
assumed to create value by enabling management to make better decisions and to run 
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the company more effectively than would be the case if management would act on its 
own. At the same time, companies are facing the pressure for good governance from 
the shareholder community and from the public at large. Increasingly, various market 
parties are demanding companies to implement rigorous corporate governance 
principles in order to achieve better returns on their investments. The often cited 
McKinsey studies have shown that an overwhelming majority of investors are 
prepared to pay a premium for companies with high governance standards. In this 
respect, installing the proper corporate governance mechanisms provides the company 
with a competitive advantage in attracting capital, reducing the financial risks for 
investors, and consequently, the cost of capital (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003). 
In response to both observations, we believe that the contribution of our study for 
companies is two-fold. 
 
First, the study provides a better understanding of what factors may contribute or 
hamper the board in performing its dual role set (monitoring and stewardship). As 
such, the findings could serve the purpose of board evaluations. Board evaluations 
are considered to be one of the most promising tools for enhancing board 
effectiveness, and subsequently, stimulating good corporate governance practices. Not 
surprisingly, board evaluation is a common recommendation in many, if not all, 
corporate governance codes. The purpose for boards is to assess their own 
performance in order to get feedback on how well they are doing. A well-conducted 
board evaluation should give a clear picture of the strengths as well as the 
opportunities for change and improvement. Moreover, a formal board evaluation 
signals to the external world that the company is willing to comply and live-up to the 
highest standards of governance. However, in practice, companies are still struggling 
with questions on how to conduct a(n) (self-)assessment that goes beyond a 
mechanical process of checking off items on a list that ultimately has little real value 
for the board. Our study has identified different variables and relationships which 
appear to be of critical importance for the effectiveness of boards. As such, it provides 
a first answer to the question as to what kind of issues to address in value-adding 
board evaluations. 
 
Second, our findings with respect to board composition (input) and board inner 
working (process) may have practical relevance for the selection of (new) non-
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executive, independent directors. For years, the recruitment of these directors has 
taken place in an informal way, which stands in glaring contrast to the professional 
selection procedure of top management. In many cases, the boardroom has been 
populated with directors attracted from the ‘old boys network’ without paying much 
attention to directors’ qualifications. In the wake of the many corporate governance 
reforms, this practice is changing due to the growing request for independent 
directors. When searching for non-executive independent directors a more careful 
screening of the qualities required - with respect to the question of independence - is 
happening. In contrast, the use of a formal selection profile, taking into account the 
required competencies that directors must have to be effective on a board, is not yet 
common practice. Our study has pointed to the importance of having an appropriate 
mix of competences on board in line with the roles the board is expected to fulfil as 
well as in line with the needs of the company. Our findings substantiate the often 
heard call of other scholars to develop a competence matrix when selecting new board 
members (e.g. Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Cascio, 2004). These matrices are practical 
instruments for matching directors’ characteristics with the key areas of expertise 
needed, currently as well as in the future, in order for the board to function 
effectively. Still, a company must be aware that the validity of such matrices is not 
perfect as they do not measure the behaviour and interpersonal skills of directors. The 
will to engage in constructive debate, to embrace or challenge the existing norms and 
to develop the ‘chemistry’, are not guaranteed by expertise and knowledge. Our study 
has shown that the ability of directors (‘can-do’) and the behaviour (‘will-do’) are 
both critical factors for a board to be effective. As such, both aspects should deserve 
equal attention in the selection process, although we acknowledge the fact that the 
latter is more difficult to assess accurately.   
 
7.3.2.2 Institutional investors and other market parties 
 
For decades, institutional investors have been prominent actors in fostering and 
enforcing good governance. They believe that the governance of a company affects 
the financial risks of their portfolio. Issues of corporate governance are put on a par 
with financial indicators, when evaluating investment decisions. Furthermore, 
institutional investors pay much attention to the board of directors for safeguarding 
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their interests. The growing interest of institutional investors in the corporate 
governance practices of companies has stimulated the emergence of governance and 
board ratings. For some years, the scoring of corporate governance has been used in 
most capital markets. Rating systems are increasingly considered to be strategic 
instruments not only for potential investors but also for creditors and even for the 
public at large (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003). However, institutional investors 
and rating agencies operate at a distance from the boardroom, making it nearly 
impossible to evaluate the way the board of directors performs its roles. They draw 
confidence from board features that are visible from the outside (for example, the 
number of independent directors) and treat them as prerequisites for an effective 
board.  
 
Our study sheds more light on the key determinants of board effectiveness and has 
highlighted the danger of limiting attention to structural board measures. We found 
that the effectiveness of a board is shaped by a complex web of variables that 
encompasses both structural and behavioural aspects. Moreover, the study has shown 
that board effectiveness depends on the interaction with other actors in the corporate 
governance tripod. We believe that these findings have three important implications 
for the external evaluation of board effectiveness, as done by institutional investors 
and rating agencies.  
 
First, the evidence of our study stresses the need to refine the scoring criteria used 
by investors and rating agencies to assess the quality of a company’s board of 
directors. Any system of assessing board effectiveness implies a tension between 
objectivity and subjectivity, and faces a trade-off between (easy to address) ‘hard’ and 
(difficult to address) ‘soft’ factors. Unfortunately, in many cases, market parties 
follow a “box ticking approach” to measure boards of directors, an approach which 
we consider scarcely advisable and even unfair (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003). 
Including the more intangible side of board practice implies a broader and different 
evaluation approach as well as closer and more frequent contact with the company 
and its board members.  
 
Second, our study provides some scientific foundation for the weighting 
methodology underlying external evaluations. Most institutional investors and rating 
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agencies assign weights to the evaluation indicators. Different weights are given to 
detailed criteria and/or global categories in the scoring devices depending on their 
priority (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003). Until now, these priorities have been 
determined by discrete parties, especially investors, without strong academic backing 
regarding the explanatory value of the criteria and their assigned weight. For example, 
when assessing board composition, much attention is paid to the appropriate mix in 
terms of inside, outside, independent directors. Our findings have highlighted the 
importance of diversity and complementarity in directors’ expertise and knowledge, 
and suggest a reconsideration of the relatively high weight assigned to board 
independence.  
 
Third, the study also suggests building in sufficient flexibility when assessing the 
quality of boards of directors on a global scale. Critique has already been uttered on 
the use of a ‘one size fits all’ approach in assessing corporate governance and board 
practices of individual companies. Our study of boards of directors in a Belgian 
context has pointed to the impact of the governance environment and the ownership 
structure on the organisation and functioning of boards. More specific, our findings 
have indicated that the effectiveness of a board results from a fit between many 
components, and that the ‘ideal’ configuration will vary according to important 
contingencies while also depending on a set of boundary conditions. Many of the 
most influential institutional shareholders and rating agencies have Anglo-American 
roots and base their evaluations on ‘best practices’ from an Anglo-American 
governance context. Moreover, their investment strategies are commonly aimed at 
large public companies, whose size exceeds that of many European listed companies. 
Assessing the effectiveness of boards with the same standards, conceptions and 
measures in all circumstances appears to be inappropriate and may create a false sense 
of confidence. The real challenge for rating agencies is to find the right balance 
between the degree of globalisation in their scoring (to compare companies on a 
worldwide base) and the degree of differentiation (to take into account national and 
company differences). 
 
7.3.2.3 Policy makers 
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Corporate governance issues are of international interest and have influenced the 
public policy dialogue globally. Of common interest is the stimulation of a 
governance environment for  (economic) wealth creation and to safeguard the 
competitiveness of businesses and financial markets. As many corporate failures have 
shocked the world, the regulatory context has changed rapidly in order to address 
corporate governance-related risks and abuses, hoping to rebuild trust. It must be 
noted that the reaction of policy makers in the US and Europe evolved differently. 
While the US opted for a more prescriptive and legalistic approach to governance 
regulation, Europe reacted with a more flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach, 
perceived as offering a ‘lighter’ regulatory environment (Dallas, 2006). It is not our 
ambition to launch a discussion about the most effective regulatory framework. In 
contrast, it is striking to see that notwithstanding the different approach, the 
governance reforms in the US and in Europe breathe similar calls for further 
strengthening board independence and the control function of board of directors. Both 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law (e.g. corporate governance codes) are seeking to enhance the 
effectiveness of boards and place great emphasis on changes in visible, structural 
characteristics in order to (re)install confidence. In this respect, there appears to be no 
difference with the behaviour of investors and rating agencies (see discussion in 
paragraph 7.3.2.2). Our study is a modest attempt to provide some academic evidence 
for current and future governance reforms from two perspectives. 
 
First, our research has begun to identify some of the key issues that promote effective 
boards. The key issues span individual and group levels, as well as structural and 
behavioural levels. As mentioned before, most of these issues are difficult to grasp 
from the outside and even harder to regulate, apart from the question whether there is 
a need to regulate these issues at all. We believe that ‘soft law’ is a valuable 
instrument but our study suggests to policy makers and other bodies involved, to 
embrace a broad and flexible perspective in designing, adapting and monitoring 
corporate governance codes. A broad perspective refers to the fact that policy 
makers should strive for (national) recommendations which can stand the test with 
international standards while at the same time promoting more ‘intangible’ aspects of 
board and governance practices. A flexible perspective refers to the fact that policy 
makers should go beyond the international tendency of focusing almost exclusively on 
the monitoring role and on empowering the control capabilities of a board. As our 
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study also highlighted the role of the board of directors in the strategic process, more 
attention should be paid to directing reform efforts at stimulating or enhancing a 
board’s strategic capabilities. The Belgian Corporate Governance Code, for example, 
already reflects this broad and flexible approach. It provides rigorous prescriptions 
regarding structural aspects, like board independence; but it also includes a relatively 
broad range of guidelines regarding leadership of the board, board room culture, 
individual director’s behaviour and board interaction with management as well as 
with shareholders. Furthermore the Code departs from the assumption that striving for 
a proper balance between entrepreneurship and control as well as between 
conformance and performance is key in developing an appropriate governance model. 
 
Second, policy makers should reflect about ways to balance the benefits and costs of 
governance reforms. They can do so by focusing their efforts on measures that 
enhance actual board effectiveness and that - at the same time -  are perceived to 
enhance effectiveness by those parties operating at a distance from boards. A concrete 
example can be found in the wave of (legal) propositions to increase the ratio of 
women on boards of directors. From a corporate governance point of view, this 
evolution looks promising because it is aimed at (i) broadening the pool of directors, 
opening the ‘old-boys’ network by forcing companies to look for female candidates, 
(ii) bringing in new, different insights to board room discussions as it is common 
knowledge that men and women approach things differently, and (iii) seeking a 
‘balanced’ board composition in terms of a more fair representation of society. 
However, the danger in the plea for greater gender diversity is that it may serve 
political rather than governance purposes, while at the same time imposing additional 
costs for many companies to live up to these requirements, without really contributing 
to the effectiveness of their boards. Our study has pointed out that gender is only one 
(minor) dimension of board diversity and that attention should be paid to a mix of 
adequate competencies when composing a board of directors. In this respect, we 
suggest that policy makers change the narrow focus and incorporate the issue of 
gender representation into the broader debate of enhancing board diversity. 
Furthermore, given the emphasis our study places on board competence, policy 
makers could stimulate companies and individual directors to take training courses in 
order to enhance or refresh specific knowledge. Governments could do so by 
introducing tax-friendly mechanisms, such as the ‘education cheques’ previously 
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issued by the Flemish government in Belgium. Board diversity and competence are 
characteristics presumed to contribute to the effectiveness of boards and, combined 
with sufficient transparency on a director’s track record (for instance in the annual 
reports), are possible to evaluate from the outside. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the study 
 
The interest to study the determinants of board effectiveness encompasses an ambition 
to come as close as possible to the actors involved in the work of boards of directors. 
The conceptualization and understanding of how the effectiveness of boards is shaped 
by a complex web of interdependent variables also requires a close access to the 
directors’ interpretations of their actions and interactions with others. This puts 
challenging demands on researchers when it comes to selecting and using appropriate 
methods to gather empirical material as well as to balancing the necessary ethical 
considerations. Our study was carefully designed in order to establish consistency 
with the existing knowledge in the field, the research questions and the methods used 
(Huff, 1999). Still, it is stated that it is not possible to do an unflawed study (Scandura 
and Williams, 2000). As usual, specific choices had to be made to carry out the study 
and any choice has inherent flaws. Our study faces some limitations, related to both 
the research methodology and the scope, which need to be recognized.  
 
7.4.1 Methodological limitations 
 
Our study is characterised by a coordinated qualitative research methodology and as 
such  strongly relies on qualitative data. This type of study is still rare in board 
research, even if there are some exceptions (e.g. Huse et.al., 2005; Leblanc and 
Gillies, 2005). Notable reasons for the lack of such qualitative studies are difficulties 
to obtain access to directors or boardrooms and the large workload they often demand. 
Thus, being able to conduct such a research can be considered to be a contribution in 
itself (Daily et.al., 2003). However, the use of qualitative data is quite challenging 
because it is often criticized to be less objective compared to quantitative data. The 
qualitative data, included in our study, was entirely retrieved from field interviews. 
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Interviewing is one of the most acknowledged and useful ways of investigating how 
actors experience and interpret their everyday life (Fontana and Frey, 2005; Stake, 
2005), and is presumed to be critically important for helping to understand complex 
organizational phenomena, such as boards of directors (Judge and Zeithalm, 1992). At 
the same time, this implies that the topic under study (board effectiveness) is based on 
the perceptions of the selected respondents. Research into director’s own perceptions 
of their role(s) is suggested as a future avenue in board research, rather than searching 
for ‘objective’ measures of effective boards (Johnson et.al., 1996). However, as with 
all interview-based research, there is no sound argument to assure that perceptions 
accurately reflect reality (Hill, 1995). In addition, it is well-known that research based 
on self-reporting may suffer from a phenomenon known as social desirability. The 
latter refers to the inclination either to present oneself or an issue in a manner that will 
be viewed favourably by others and/or to preserve a self-esteem (De Pelsmacker and 
Van Kenhove, 2005). Especially, when sensitive issues are being surveyed (e.g. the 
relationships amongst the board members), there exists a risk that answers are biased 
and confound results. The social desirability bias may be enforced by the lack of 
random selection of the respondents in our study. There exists the possibility that 
those who participated in the study did so due to their interest in corporate 
governance. As a consequence, the respondents may have not provided an entirely 
accurate or unbiased characterization of board effectiveness and its determinants. The 
threats of subjectivity and social desirability are both inherent to field studies and can 
not be fully avoided. However, it is important to pay attention to these aspects and to 
limit the potential bias as much as possible. A commonly accepted manner to tackle 
the risks and problems associated with qualitative field research, is the technique of 
triangulation (Jick, 1979). Triangulation can be applied to many elements of research 
methods, including strategies, settings for data collection, and sources of data 
(Scandura and Williams, 2000). To increase the (internal and external) validity of our 
study and the reliability of our findings we place great emphasis on triangulation in all 
of these three dimensions. On the global level, we have combined two different 
research strategies (mixed methods research design and case study design) for 
conducting the field studies. On the sub-level, we have used multiple sources of data 
(qualitative and quantitative) and multiple investigators were brought in for collecting 
the data during the interviews. Thus, in both (empirical) parts of our study, we 
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combined a variety of evidence either to elaborate (as part of the mixed methods 
research design) or to corroborate (as part of the case study design) the findings.  
 
A second methodological limitation is related to the choice of a case study as the 
research strategy for the second part of our study, which is the validation of our board 
effectiveness model. One of the most heard critiques on case study research is the lack 
of generalisation. The latter refers to the extent to which the results and conclusions 
can be transferred beyond the particular context in which they were generated  (Yin, 
2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). Applied to our research, some factors must be considered in 
relation to the study of a single board of directors. Although our focus is justified and 
has shown important benefits, caution is required when generalising the case study 
results to other boards of directors. It is important to remember that boards of 
directors do not constitute a homogeneous population. There are several features and 
circumstances that make boards similar but at the same time, there are also many 
features and circumstances that cause differences between board of directors. The 
proposed relationships were studied for a board of directors facing many challenges 
related to the Company’s governance structure and its business environment. Strictly 
speaking, our case study findings are only generalisable to other boards with similar 
characteristics and who are confronted with similar challenges. There are reasons, 
however, that our case study may have broader applicability to research on other 
boards of directors. In particular, Yin (2003) clarifies the problem of generalisation by 
distinguishing between statistical and analytic generalisation. The former, which is 
common for survey research, requires a representative sample of the population. By 
means of statistical frequencies and tests, generalisation to the population is obtained. 
The latter, which is typically found in case study research, does not require a 
(statistical) representative sample because this kind of generalisation is aimed at 
expanding and generalising theory. Having said this, our empirical and theoretical 
interpretations put forward by the case study can not be generalised to a wider 
population of boards of directors in a statistical sense. Rather than generalising to a 
population of boards, the aim has been to generalise to theory and to create conceptual 
and theoretical notions that are potentially applicable and transferable to other 
contexts. During the case study, analytical generalisations through the use of existing 
theory and earlier relevant studies have been made systematically and step by step in a 
transparent way. In particular, we have compared our findings, based on the search for 
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patterns and relationships, with our research framework as well as with literature 
discussing similar findings in various contexts. This allowed us to reconsider our 
initial board model by refining the assumptions and the proposed relationship amongst 
the variables. As such, our theoretical model can be used as a point of departure for 
other researchers who wish to examine the issue of board effectiveness, in other types 
of firms or in other environmental contexts. We acknowledge the fact that the 
differences amongst firms and environments reinforce the importance of examining 
variation in the effectiveness of boards across a variety of populations, while larger 
samples are needed to test the robustness of our results and our model. In this respect, 
the applicability and transferability of the results to wider populations in a more 
statistical sense, remains a question for further research using other research methods 
and analytical techniques. 
 
7.4.2 Scope limitations 
 
The scope of our study is limited by at least four decisions. First, we have focused our 
study on the determinants of board effectiveness. We have looked into the ‘drivers’ 
of board effectiveness, how they interact and how they may influence the board in 
performing its roles. We have not investigated any kind of relationship with firm 
performance, as has been the case in many other studies on board of directors. As 
such, we are unable to conclude upon the way the effectiveness of boards influence 
firm performance.  
 
Second, we have limited the field study to boards of directors of Belgian 
companies. Focusing on boards of directors in a non-Anglo-American context has the 
potential to provide additional insights on the effectiveness of boards in other 
governance environments. In addition, it helps to evaluate the applicability, in other 
research settings, of commonly used board concepts and theories which originate 
from the corporate governance discussion and research in the US. At the same time, 
particularities of the Belgian governance environment as well as the cultural setting, 
may influence the way board members perceive the effectiveness of their boards. 
Hence, caution is required when comparing empirical findings from studies that are 
conducted in different contexts.  
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A third scope limitation relates to the time-frame of the study. The empirical study in 
both parts of our research, is conducted at one moment in time. Our findings prove 
valuable insights into the concept of board effectiveness and its determinants, but we 
still give a one shot picture. As any organizational phenomenon, boards of directors 
are not a static given nor do they operate in static circumstances. The evolving 
character of environments and organizations as well as increased public pressure on 
boards of directors makes any findings on the effectiveness of boards very temporary.  
 
A final limitation of the research is our limited ability to grasp the complexity 
associated with opening the “black box” of actual board functioning. Therefore, we 
had to build in limitations to the number of variables that could be studied. For 
example, we have only focused on three intervening process variables for a better 
understanding of how group dynamics impact the execution of board roles. Although 
the board of directors is considered to be a decision-making group, we did not 
investigate the process nor the style of the decision-making. The characteristics 
related to decision-making may also influence the effectiveness of boards in 
performing their roles and as such, provide valuable variables to be additionally 
included in board research.  
 
7.5 Directions for future research 
 
Research often raises more questions than it answers. A positive aspect of the 
limitations described in the previous section, is that they generate ideas for future 
research. We will address a number of avenues for future research that we consider 
especially worthwhile to explore. 
 
A first step in future research on the topic of board effectiveness should be the 
validation of our theoretical model on a larger scale. The main purpose of the 
study was to identify, by means of extensive field studies, the key determinants of 
effective boards and to examine how they interact. The rationale for the study stems 
from a belief that traditional proxies do not fully capture actual board conduct 
resulting in incomplete input-output models. We have found support to include 
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additional proxy variables for the study of board effectiveness and put them together 
in a more comprehensive research model. In this respect, it is advocated to validate 
the new proxies and the research framework that are suggested by this study. The 
suggestion for further research in this area unfolds along three lines. First, a similar 
qualitative-oriented research can be useful to validate the research model for different 
types of firms, for different stages in their life cycle and for different (financial) 
circumstances. The central postulate of the research model is an overall fit between 
the various components. It can be stated that a specific configuration of board 
attributes that are beneficial for one company, for one period in its life cycle or for 
one kind of circumstance may turn out to be detrimental for another. Family firms, 
high-tech, venture-backed companies and non-profit organisations are some examples 
of companies which expose different governance structures and processes (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2002; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Hence, the application of the 
notion of board effectiveness may vary according to the type of firm. Similarly, the 
stage of a firm’s life cycle (e.g. entrepreneurial versus maturity) (Lynall et.al., 2003) 
as well as its situation in times of crisis versus going concern (Daily et.al., 2003) are 
different circumstances that may impact the particular congruence between board 
inputs, processes and output. Including different firm types, from various life cycle 
stages, operating under different (financial) circumstances would shed more light on 
the conditions under which a board of directors can or will be effective in performing 
its roles. Second, we suggest the use of other research strategies that are more 
suitable for sample generalisation. In particular quantitative research methods, such as 
survey research, can cope with large samples and allows the making of statements for 
a larger population. Quantitative research techniques are designed to test the identified 
relationship amongst the variables on a large scale and are thus well-suited to check 
the robustness of our proposed proxy variables as well as test the model, in general. 
Third, we suggest expanding the research sample of Belgian boards of directors to 
include an international scope of different countries. At first glance, it would be 
interesting to apply our research model to Anglo-American boards of directors as they 
have traditionally been the focus of mainstream corporate governance research. In 
addition, it is worthwhile to investigate boards of directors in other European 
countries. Within Europe, the corporate governance environment differs substantially 
and boards of directors in some countries are organised in a different way (two-tier 
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board structure versus one-tier board structure). An enlarged sample would further 
improve the quality and the robustness of the proxy variables and the research model. 
 
A second step in future research is the need to link board effectiveness with 
financial performance. A large amount of empirical literature on boards of directors 
examines how board characteristics relate to profitability. We have referred to the 
difficulty to study this kind of direct relationship between board inputs and company 
performance. It was noticed that firm performance is a complex issue, hard to measure 
and that it is finally the outcome of many inter-locking factors. For this reason, we 
have focused on the study of board effectiveness assuming an indirect link between 
board inputs and corporate performance outcomes. Nevertheless, more insight into the 
relationship between board effectiveness and a company’s financial performance 
would be useful. In this study, board effectiveness has been approached as the 
successful execution of a dual role set. Although, we advocate a certain balance 
between the board strategic and monitoring tasks, it is acknowledged that the 
predominance of one role over the other may vary amongst companies. In this respect, 
we suggest to further investigate the implications of the predominance of either the 
strategic or monitoring role on the financial performance of a company. For example, 
it can be investigated whether companies show better performance outcomes, in terms 
of higher growth rates when their boards put great emphasis on their strategic 
function. It is equally interesting to investigate whether a strong emphasis on the 
board’s monitoring and control tasks will result in a more stable performance but at 
lower levels of growth. Practitioners and (institutional) investors are especially 
interested in the impact of boards of directors and corporate governance on a 
company’s financial performance. Providing more clear evidence of positive financial 
returns from having an effective board or effective governance mechanism would 
convince companies to pay more attention to governance issues and take away the 
existing scepticism. However, this requires a more solid measurement of board 
effectiveness and more elaborated research models. Our study is a modest attempt to 
provide researchers with new measures and a renewed research framework. 
 
A third avenue for further research on the effectiveness of boards is longitudinal 
research.  It is generally accepted that longitudinal research strategies are better 
suited to study processes and patterns of change (Pettigrew, 1990). Our study was 
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limited to one period of time, resulting in a research framework whereby the board of 
directors is considered to be a social system. It was argued that board effectiveness 
results from a state or relative balance (or fit) between various structural and 
behavioural components. However, we believe that any stable fit between structure 
and behaviour is rather temporary and subject to change. In this respect, our study 
proposes an alternative dynamic board model, contrary to the commonly applied static 
research models. The suggestion to study one or more cases over an extended period 
of time, will enable researchers to examine the way the effectiveness of boards 
evolves over time and to display the patterns in a successful execution of board roles 
as they change. In-depth longitudinal studies in which board task performance is 
followed over a longer time period are required to have solid proof and a better 
understanding of the dynamics of effective boards, especially of how ‘ideal’ board 
configurations may evolve. Moreover, this kind of research can provide us with 
enriched insights into the changes that signal a serious decline or increase in board 
performance. 
 
Fourth, further research could be aimed at exploring the value-added of other 
determinants for the effectiveness of boards. Our study has only extracted a limited 
number of variables from the literature but still other variables may be of importance 
to study in the context of boards of directors. We have already touched upon the need 
to examine the style and characteristics of the decision-making process. Moreover, the 
existence of power relationships inside the boardroom, the use of power and the 
leadership style of the chairman are also pointed out to be of particular relevance in 
the context of boards. In this respect, the (qualitative) studies of Pettigrew and 
McNulty (1998, 1995) have already shown how position, skill and will to use power 
sources, affects the contributions of non-executive directors to influence board 
behaviour on matters of substance. Leadership has also been identified by influential 
scholars as an important variable for group effectiveness (e.g. Hackman, 2002). From 
a corporate governance point of view, the discussion on board leadership structure has 
traditionally been focused on splitting or combining the roles of CEO and chairman of 
the board. In contrast, literature on group effectiveness has paid attention to leadership 
styles and how it influences the quality of the decisions. We suggest to further 
investigate how the decision-making style of a board’s chairman may influence the 
 238
effectiveness of boards in performing their dual role set and what kind of leadership 
style is more appropriate when boards emphasize one role over the other.  
 
A fifth avenue for further research is proposed by studying board-management 
relationships. Previous research on the relationship between the board of directors 
and the CEO has mainly focused on the division of power between these two anchors 
(e.g. Pearce and Zahra, 1991). The prevailing view underpinning empirical board 
research is the need for a board to control management by keeping sufficient distance 
from the CEO. The findings of our study have challenged this notion by documenting 
the need to develop a close working relationship with management for a successful 
execution of board roles. More empirical research could further investigate how the 
interplay between collaboration and control in the board-management relationship 
manifest itself for different role sets. For example, a study of Westphal (1999) has 
already shown how collaboration between top managers and outside directors, 
stemming from social ties in CEO-board relationships, enhance the provision of 
advice and counsel in the strategy-making process. In addition, researchers could 
empirically investigate how the coexistence of collaboration and control in the board-
management relationship can trigger either positive or negative dynamics stimulating 
or hampering the effectiveness of boards. Research in this respect, could build on the 
work of Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003), who developed a  conceptual model 
illustrating the occurrence of dysfunctional board dynamics based on reinforcing 
cycles of collaboration and control. They suggest the paradoxical combination of trust 
and conflict as a vital means of enabling self-correcting cycles.  
 
Finally, future research could focus more on the individual level instead of on the 
level of the board of directors. Research on the individual level could then concentrate 
on behavioural and/or psychological characteristics of the individual directors. 
Researchers could build on the work of Leblanc and Gillies (2005) who documented 
the existence of functional and dysfunctional director’s types, based on three 
individual behaviour characteristics. Furthermore, we suggest further examining the 
cognitive styles of individual directors and their impact on how boards of directors 
perform their roles. The concept of cognitive styles, or the way individuals collect and 
process information, has been frequently studied in various settings and is suggested 
to influence the decision-making process within groups (Leonard et.al. 2005; 
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Bouckenooghe et.al., 2005). Research on board effectiveness has been concerned with 
constituting a board of directors with the appropriate mix of directors. Mainstream 
research has applied a rather narrow focus when studying the composition of the 
board of directors. Traditional operationalisations of board composition are closely 
connected with the measurement of director independence and dependence (Johnson 
et.al., 1996). The findings of our study have broadened this scope as they point to the 
fact that board effectiveness strongly depends on the competence and performance of 
the individual directors. Empirically investigating personality features of individual 
directors, which go beyond director independence and competence, would add an 
extra dimension to research on boards of directors and may enhance our 
understanding of how the effectiveness of individual directors contributes or hampers 
the effectiveness of boards. 
 
To conclude, we must note that the list of the above mentioned propositions for 
further research is not exhaustive. They indicate only some of the promising avenues 
in board and corporate governance research. In fact, the extensions (theoretically, 
conceptually, methodologically and in sampling) that can be made to our research 
topic are nearly infinite, which stands in strong contrast to the often finite resources of 
a researcher. We have focused on the determinants of board effectiveness, examined 
the variables already indicated in the literature as highly relevant and studied these 
through the use of rich research strategies. This allowed us to find some interesting 
findings, leading to answers and new questions. 
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8 APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: code list 
 
FAMILY CODES OPERATIONAL DEFINITION 
 
DEBATE/DECISION-MAKING 
  
 occurrence refers to the fact that discussions take place; no rubber-stamping 
  
 
quality 
 
refers to the characteristics of the discussions such as neutral, objective, in-depth, 
open, critical, emotionless, based on facts, to the point …. 
  
 
contribution 
 
relates to the participation in the discussions and the assumption that members 
contribute during the discussions (e.g. sharing of knowledge, information, ideas etc) 
  
decision 
 
refers to the fact that decisions are taken  
 
 
BOARD CULTURE   
  
active involvement 
refers to the fact that a board is interested and involved in the company; it takes 
initiatives, learns and contributes in contrast to a formal, passive board 
  
 
openness 
 
refers to an open culture, the possibility or ability to express an opinion, 
transparency …. 
  
critical 
 
refers to a critical attitude/behaviour 
  
common values or goal 
 
refers to the fact that group members have a common denominator 
  
 
atmosphere-climate 
 
relates to other unwritten rules or standards such as humour, a positive and 
constructive mind, professionalism, passion for excellence …. 
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INDIVIDUAL NORMS   
  
commitment 
refers to the fact that individual members are interested, involved and available 
(sufficient time) 
  
preparation 
 
refers to the fact that individual members are prepared (e.g. read the documents) 
  
 
personality 
 
relates to characteristics of the personality of individual members such as 
humility, ego, attitude, sense of responsibility, integrity, ethical 
  
 
independence 
 
refers to the courage of individual members to speak up and to show an 
independent mind 
   
   
 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONGST THE 
BOARD MEMBERS 
  
  
cohesiveness 
 
refers to the chemistry and the fact that board members cohere 
  
respect 
 
refers to the fact that the board members respect each other 
  
team 
 
refers to the fact that board members operate as a team/group 
  
trust 
 
refers to the trust amongst the board members 
  
 
contact 
 
refers to the interaction, dynamic and the informal contacts between the board 
members 
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BOARD TASKS   
  
context 
refers to the conditions which are necessary to fulfil the tasks (e.g. delegation, 
position within the CG-tripod) 
  
 
control  
 
relates to the monitoring tasks a board is expected to fulfil (financial, legal, 
internal governance etc.) 
  
strategy 
 
relates to the involvement of the board in the strategic process 
  
 
support 
 
relates to the interaction of the board with its management (challenging, 
stimulating, sounding board, advising etc.) 
 
BOARD-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
  
 relationship with 
management 
relates to the contact, symbiosis with and trust in management, as well as to the 
quality of management 
 
BOARD COMPOSITION   
  
competence 
refers to the fact that experienced, high-quality and competent members are 
sitting on the board 
  
complementarity 
 
refers to the fact that members complement each other 
  
 
diversity 
 
refers to the fact that members differ in background, views, experience, 
nationality etc. 
  
 
mix 
 
refers to the fact that various categories of directors are represented (executives, 
non-executives and independent directors) 
  
size 
 
relates to the limitation on the number of directors 
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OPERATIONS OF THE BOARD   
  
meeting 
relates to the characteristics of the board meeting such as frequency, timing, 
presentations, minutes 
  
 
preparation 
 
refers to the fact that the board meeting should be well-prepared in terms of 
agenda and information provided to the members 
  
chairmanship 
 
relates to the quality and role of the chairman of the board 
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Appendix 2: case study protocol 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
A. Introduction to the case study 
 A.1. Purpose of the case study 
 A.2. Theoretical framework for the case study 
  
B. Data collection procedure 
 B.1. Name of the site to be visited, including contact person(s) 
 B.2. Data collection plan 
 B.3. Expected preparation prior to the interviews 
 
C. Themes in written questionnaire 
D. Case study questions 
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A. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDY  
 
 A.1. Purpose of the case study 
 
The overall purpose of the case study is to examine the determinants of board effectiveness. The main 
research question to be addressed is: how do board processes influence the task performance of boards of 
directors? We will focus on the more intangible and behavioural aspects of board conduct. The objective is 
to get a better understanding of how structural and non-structural factors are interconnected to form a 
complex set of interrelated criteria which actually shape the effectiveness of boards in performing their key 
tasks. 
The case study fits within the project of board evaluation the Company has decided on. As a listed 
company, the Company is subject to the Belgian Corporate Governance Code and has agreed to assess its 
board of directors. The Company’s main goal of introducing an evaluation process is to come to a more 
performant “output” of the board, in line with the best practices on corporate governance in Belgium. 
 
 A.2. Theoretical framework for the case study 
 
The research framework, underlying the case study, follows the input-process-output approach and strongly 
relies on the corporate governance literature as well as on the literature on group effectiveness. The central 
thesis is that board effectiveness is concerned with the outcomes of the board of directors and that these 
outcomes are directly and indirectly influenced by the make up of the board and by specific board 
processes. Figure 1 illustrates the research framework.  
 
Figure 1 : conceptual framework for the study of board effectiveness 
Process variables
Cohesiveness
Debate
Conflict norms
Context variables
Input variables
Board size
Board independence
Board diversity
Output variables
Board task 
performance
Gap-analyses
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B. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
  
 B.1. Name of the site to be visited, including contact person(s) 
 
Board of Directors (composition September 2005): 17 members – one vacancy 
 
 
Table 1: composition of the Company's board of directors 
Name Category Directors 
since 
Term 
expires 
Language Gender Age 
Director A executive 2003 01/03/2009 F Male 50 
Director B NED-MS* 2004 01/03/2009 N Male 52 
Director C NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 N Male 54 
Director D NED-MS 1996 23/12/2006 N Male 39 
Director E NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 F Female 55 
Director F NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 F Male 57 
Director G NED-MS 2003 30/09/2009 F Male 59 
Director H NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 N Male 59 
Director I NED-MS 1994 23/12/2006 N Male 52 
Director J independent 2004 AGM 2010 F Male 61 
Director K independent 2004 31/12/2006 F Female 45 
Director L independent 2004 AGM 2010 E Male 51 
Director M independent 2004 31/12/2006 F Male 65 
Director N independent 2004 31/12/2006 N Male 62 
Director O independent 2004 31/12/2006 E Male 63 
Director P independent 2004 31/12/2006 N Male 52 
Director Q independent 2004 AGM 2010 N Female 53 
One vacancy** independent      
 * NED-MS denotes non-executive directors representing the major shareholder 
 ** the vacancy for one independent director has not been filled after the departure of director  
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B.2. Data collection plan 
 
In performing the field research,  multiple sources of evidence or the technique of data triangulation will 
be used. Field data will be collected using a self completion questionnaire completed with individual 
interviews. The latter will be done by the researcher, assisted by the Company Secretary, and will take 
place during October and November 2005. All the board members will be involved. The results of the 
evaluation project must be presented to the board of directors in December. 
 
 Time frame 
 
   inquiry  + interviews                   data analysis 
 
 
 
 19/10/05     01/12/05 15/12/05 
Approval survey instrument                 Presentation of the results to  
by NRC                               the BoD 
 
 Survey instrument 
The self completion questionnaire is the result of a continuous interaction between the researcher and the 
Company. The survey instrument must meet the requirements of the case study as well as serve the 
particular objectives of the board evaluation project. Consequently, the questionnaire covers issues that are 
of relevance to both parties. In order to minimize potential biases in the responses -due to the different 
national languages-, the questionnaire is written in English.  
 
The questionnaire must be approved by the Company’s Nomination and Remuneration Committee in its 
meeting of October 19th. Once approved, the Company Secretary will send the questionnaire to all its board 
members. The individual responses serve as an input for the interviews. The processing and the analysis of 
the overall survey data will be done by the researcher.  
 
 Individual interviews 
The researcher and the Company agreed to use focused interviews, in which each board member will be 
interviewed for one to 11/2 hours. Focused interviews are –to some extent- of an open-ended nature 
(=asking about a fact or manner as well as opinions about events) and assume a conversational manner but 
in fact the investigators follow a certain set of questions derived from this protocol. 
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The interviews will be held in the director’s mother tongue. (Note: the interviews will not be recorded) 
 
Interview data will be processed and analysed by the researcher. The results of both sources of evidence 
(inquiry and interviews) will be reported back to the Company in an anonymous way. 
. 
 Schedule 
Name Interview date Location Time Comments 
Director A 25/11/05 Brussels 8.30-10.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director B 2/12/05 Brussels 11.30-12.30 Questionnaire ok 
Director C 1/12/05 Brussels 16.00-17.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director D 24/11/05 Antwerp 14.30-16.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director E 17/11/05 Brussels 14.00-16.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director F 18/11/05 Brussels 11.00-12.30 Questionnaire ok 
Director G 18/11/05 Brussels 15.30-16.30 Questionnaire ok 
Director H 29/11/05 Hasselt 10.00-11.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director I 30/11/05 Brussels 9.00-10.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director J 25/11/05 Brussels 14.30-16.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director K / / / Questionnaire ok 
Director L 24/11/05 Telephone call 10.00-11.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director M 24/11/05 Brussels 11.30-13.00 Questionnaire ok 
Director N 17/11/05 Brussels 15.30-18.30 Questionnaire ok 
Director O 10/11/05 Telephone call 15.30-16.30 Questionnaire ok 
Director P 18/11/05 Deseldonk 13.30-14.30 Questionnaire ok 
Director Q 9/11/05 Ghent 9.30-11.00 Questionnaire ok 
 
 
 
 B.3. Expected preparation prior to interviews 
 
The following reading materials are proposed in preparing for the interviews: 
 
 General background information  
Being a SA under public law, the Company operates in a highly regulated environment. In studying the 
board of directors it is useful to get insight into the legal context. In this perspective, Law 21 March 199122, 
the Company Law, and the Articles of Association are recommended. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Wet betreffende de hervorming van sommige economische overheidsbedrijven 
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 Corporate governance information 
The annual report and the website of the Company incorporate a separate corporate governance chapter. In 
addition a Corporate Governance Charter is currently being developed. Other relevant documents include 
the Charters of the various Board Committees. 
 
 Board information 
Two previous evaluations of the board of directors have taken place: (i) an introduction round by the 
chairman in October/November 2004 and (2) an analysis on the Company’s Corporate Governance 
Structure by a law firm in February 2005. A summary of the results can be found in the Company’s 
Briefing Note (5 July 2005). 
 
C. THEMES IN WRITTEN QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
- Composition of the board 
- Relationships between the non-executive directors 
- The functioning of the board of directors 
- The information you receive as a board member 
- Role and mission of the board  
- Relationship between the board and the shareholders 
- Relationship between the board and management 
- The board’s culture 
- Board committees 
 
 
D. CASE STUDY QUESTIONS (additional for interviews) 
 
 
Reminder:  the questions formulated below are supplementary to the statements in the written survey. 
Depending on the individual answers, some aspects will be more emphasised and discussed in-depth. 
 
The questions in this protocol serve as a guide for the interviews and occur at two levels: 
LEVEL 1 : this level relates to the questions asked to specific interviewees and reflects the verbal line of  
  inquiry 
LEVEL 2 : this level relates to the questions asked in relation to the individual case and these questions are  
  posed to the investigator. They reflect the mental line of inquiry 
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Note: to understand the difference in levels, think about a detective. The detective has in mind what the 
course of events in a crime might have been (Level 2) but the actual questions posed to any witness or 
suspect (Level 1) do not necessarily betray the detective’s thinking.  
 
 
General  
 
Level 2 : What determines an effective board?  
 Level 1: If a director serves on several boards of directors in different companies, ask the director 
 to think of a ‘good’ board and a ‘bad’ board. What are the 3 (or 5) most important features of the 
 ‘good’ board? Similarly, what are the 3 (or 5) most important features of the ‘bad’ board? 
 
Level 2: Is the Company’s board of directors an effective board? 
 Level 1 :  How does the board of the Company compare with other boards you serve on (or have 
 served on)? Would you think of the Company having a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ board? What are the 
 strengths of the board? Similar, what are the major weaknesses? What aspects of the board could 
 be improved? 
 
Role of the board  
 
Level 2 : Do the board members share a common vision on the role of the board? 
 Level 1: What is the most important role of the board of directors? Is the board fulfilling that role? 
 In what ways should the board’s role be expanded or  reduced? What are the factors that influence 
 the extent to which the board performs its role? 
   
Level 2 : Does the board have a clear understanding of its responsibilities? 
 Level 1 : How involved is the board of directors in the strategy process? How involved should it  
 be? If you think of recent important strategic decisions, has the board been involved too much/too 
 little? 
 How involved is the board of directors in monitoring the company and the CEO/management? 
 How involved should it be? Do you feel the expression “being in control” applies to the board?  
 Is the supervision of management in proportion to the delegated authorities (does the board 
 monitor what it delegates)? Are the board’s methods of measuring management performance 
 sufficient/adequate? 
 What is the role of the committees in this respect? How do they contribute to the performance of 
 the board’s tasks? 
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Board discussions and decision-making 
 
Level 2 : Does the board draw on the diversity of its members to make decisions that optimize its 
performance? 
 Level 1: How do you perceive the quality of the discussions? Is there a difference between the 
 discussions that take place in the board versus those in the committees (remark: only relevant for 
 committee members)?  
 Is each board member participating? Is each board member being heard? Do the discussions and 
 decisions sufficiently benefit from the potential of the present board? 
 Is the board acting independently in the discussion/decision-making or are the discussion/
 decisions being influenced/dominated by specific “interests” or persons?  
 Are “hidden agenda’s” part of the discussion/decision-making? 
 
Board culture 
 
Level 2 : How do ‘intangible’ aspects such as culture, climate and the relationship amongst the 
directors influence board effectiveness? 
 Level 1: Is there openness in the board? Do certain (thorny) issues have to be discussed outside  
 the board room? Are board members at ease to express their own views (even if they deviate from 
 the majority)? Does this low/high degree of openness have an impact on the way the board 
 performs its tasks? Would a change in the composition of the board, change the climate in the 
 board? 
 How would you describe the relationship amongst the (non-executive) directors? Is there sufficient 
 cohesion and chemistry? Does this have an impact on the way the board performs its tasks? 
Role of the chairman 
 
Level 2 : How does the chairman influence the working of the board? 
 Level 1:  How would you describe the role of the chairman? Does the chairman stimulate or hinder 
  a climate of constructive dissent? Does the chairman put a stamp on the decision-making? 
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Appendix 3: questionnaires 
 
EXAMPLE OF THE FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE (in Dutch) 
 
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 
Hieronder vindt u een lijst met tien stellingen. De stellingen omvatten diverse aspecten die de 
doeltreffendheid van de raad van bestuur kunnen beïnvloeden. “Board effectiveness” wordt 
daarbij gedefinieerd als “de mate waarin de raad van bestuur zijn strategische en controlerende 
rol vervult”.  Deze stellingen zijn gebaseerd op een uitgebreide literatuurstudie en eerder 
uitgevoerd kwalitatief onderzoek. De bedoeling is dat u volgende stellingen naar 
belangrijkheid rangschikt in dalende orde (1 MEEST belangrijk – 10 MINST belangrijk).  
 
 
OPDAT DE RVB ZIJN STRATEGISCHE EN CONTROLERENDE ROL ZOU KUNNEN VERVULLEN IS 
HET BELANGRIJK DAT …… 
RANGORDE 
Er in de RvB zowel leden van het management, onafhankelijke bestuurders als 
vertegenwoordigers van de aandeelhouders zetelen 
10 
De bestuurders goed voorbereid zijn 5 
Alle bestuurders actief deelnemen aan de discussies  4 
De bestuurders constructief kritisch ingesteld zijn 3 
Er vertrouwen is tussen de raad van bestuur en CEO/management 9 
De voorzitter consensus nastreeft 1 
De informatie voldoende en tijdig is 2 
Afwijkende visies getolereerd worden 8 
Er complementariteit is op vlak van achtergrond, expertise en ervaring 7 
De bestuurders goed met elkaar opschieten 6 
 
 
Uw e-mail : ……………………………………………… 
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EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE (in Dutch) 
 
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS : DEEL 2 
Hieronder vindt u een lijst met tien stellingen. De stellingen omvatten diverse aspecten die de 
doeltreffendheid van de raad van bestuur kunnen beïnvloeden. “Board effectiveness” wordt 
daarbij gedefinieerd als “de mate waarin de raad van bestuur zijn strategische en controlerende 
rol vervult”.  Deze stellingen zijn gebaseerd op een uitgebreide literatuurstudie en eerder 
uitgevoerd kwalitatief onderzoek. De bedoeling is dat u, vanuit uw bestuurservaring, aangeeft 
welke aspecten in de praktijk het meest voor verbetering vatbaar zijn. Gelieve deze in 
dalende volgorde te rangschikken (1 MEEST voor verbetering vatbaar – 10 MINST voor 
verbetering vatbaar).   
 
 
 RANGORDE 
De informatie is voldoende en tijdig 5 
De bestuurders zijn constructief kritisch ingesteld 6 
De bestuurders zijn goed voorbereid  1 
Alle bestuurders nemen actief deel aan de discussies  4 
Complementariteit op vlak van achtergrond, expertise en ervaring 2 
Er is vertrouwen tussen de raad van bestuur en CEO/management 8 
De voorzitter streeft consensus na 9 
Afwijkende visies worden getolereerd  7 
Mix management, onafhankelijke bestuurders en vertegenwoordigers van de 
aandeelhouders 
3 
De bestuurders kunnen goed met elkaar opschieten 10 
 
 
Uw e-mail :……………………………….. 
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Appendix 4: detailed analysis of themes 
 
Table A: detailed overview of elements of theme 1 
Board composition Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Diversity 30 28,85% N=31 
Complementarity 27 25,96% N=27 
Competence 25 24,04% N=25 
Mix (executive/non-executive) 10 9,62% N=11 
Size 7 6,73% N=7 
Total 99 95,19% N= 101 
 
 
 
Table B: detailed overview of elements of theme 2 
Board culture Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Openness 17 16,35% N=17 
Active involvement 15 14,42% N=15 
Atmosphere-climate 11 10,58% N=12 
Common values or goal 6 5,77% N=7 
Critical 4 3,85% N=4 
Total 53 50,96% N= 55 
 
 
 
Table C: detailed overview of elements of theme 3 
Operations of the board Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Preparation 23 22,12% N=27 
Chairmanship 18 17,31% N=18 
Meeting 8 7,69% N=9 
Total 49 47,12% N= 54 
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Table D: detailed overview of elements of theme 4 
Board tasks Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Strategy 15 14,42% N=17 
Support 9 8,65% N=9 
Context 5 4,81% N=6 
Control 5 4,81% N=5 
Total 34 32,69% N= 37 
 
 
 
Table E: detailed overview of elements of theme 5 
Debate/decision-making Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Quality 10 9,62% N=11 
Occurrence 10 9,62% N=10 
Contribution 5 4,81% N=5 
Decision 3 2,88% N=3 
Total 28 26,92% N= 29 
 
 
 
 
Table F: detailed overview of elements of theme 6 
Individual norms Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Personality 9 8,65% N=10 
Commitment 8 7,69% N=10 
Independence 6 5,77% N=6 
Preparation 2 1,92% N=2 
Total 25 24,04% N= 28 
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Table G: detailed overview of elements of theme 7 
Relationship amongst the 
board members 
Number of 
respondents 
who mentioned 
this element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Cohesiveness 8 7,69% N=8 
Contact 5 4,81% N=5 
Team 5 4,81% N=5 
Respect 3 2,88% N=3 
Trust 2 1,92% N=2 
Total 23 22,12% N= 23 
 
 
 
 
Table H: detailed overview of elements of theme 8 
Board-management 
relationship 
Number of 
respondents who 
mentioned this 
element 
% of respondents 
(N=104) 
Frequency this element is 
reported 
Relationship with management 6 5,77% N=7 
Total 6 5,77% N= 7 
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Appendix 5: frequency tables 
 
 Table I: frequency table of importance ranking scores for the full sample (N=150) 
Determinants of board effectiveness 1* 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10** 
           
The board of directors includes a mix of 
executives, independent directors and non-
executives representing the shareholders 
24,0% 11,3% 5,3% 6,0% 8,7% 7,3% 8,7% 8,7% 8,7% 11,3% 
The board members are well-prepared 8,7% 12,7% 18,7% 18,7% 16,7% 10,7% 7,3% 5,3% 1,3% 0,0% 
All directors actively participate in the 
discussions 
4,0% 4,7% 10,7% 11,3% 12,0% 12,0% 12,7% 13,3% 12,7% 6,7% 
Board members show a constructive critical 
attitude 
10,7% 18,7% 16,0% 18,0% 8,0% 16,0% 6,7% 3,3% 1,3% 1,3% 
Trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management 
25,3% 12,0% 13,3% 8,0% 8,0% 9,3% 10,7% 7,3% 4,7% 1,3% 
The chairman seeks consensus 2,0% 2,0% 3,3% 2,0% 7,3% 7,3% 16,0% 16,7% 31,3% 12,0% 
The information is sufficient and on time 5,3% 14,0% 13,3% 12,0% 16,0% 13,3% 9,3% 8,7% 4,7% 3,3% 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 3,3% 2,7% 8,7% 12,0% 12,0% 15,3% 14,0% 19,3% 11,3% 1,3% 
Complementarity with respect to background, 
expertise and experience 
15,3% 20,0% 10,0% 10,7% 10,7% 7,3% 10,7% 8,0% 5,3% 2,0% 
Board members get along very well 1,3% 2,0% 0,7% 1,3% 0,7% 1,3% 4,0% 9,3% 18,7% 60,7% 
* score 1 denotes ‘item is most important’  
**score 10 denotes ‘item is least important’ 
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Table J: frequency table of corrigible ranking scores for the full sample (N=75) 
*score 1 denotes ‘item needs most improvement’ 
** score 10 denotes ‘item needs least improvement’ 
Determinants of board effectiveness 1* 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10** 
           
The board of directors includes a mix of 
executives, independent directors and non-
executives representing the shareholders 
13,3% 6,7% 8,0% 6,7% 4,0% 6,7% 9,3% 10,7% 18,7% 16,0% 
The board members are well-prepared 20,0% 25,3% 18,7% 12,0% 12,0% 6,7% 1,3% 0,0% 2,7% 1,3% 
All directors actively participate in the 
discussions 8,0% 14,7% 20,0% 20,0% 4,0% 10,7% 9,3% 6,7% 4,0% 2,7% 
Board members show a constructive critical 
attitude 4,0% 9,3% 14,7% 21,3% 13,3% 13,3% 8,0% 8,0% 2,7% 5,3% 
Trust between the board of directors and 
CEO/management 0,0% 5,3% 5,3% 4,0% 10,7% 8,0% 21,3% 16,0% 20,0% 9,3% 
The chairman seeks consensus 0,0% 2,7% 5,3% 1,3% 16,0% 13,3% 12,0% 14,7% 16,0% 18,7% 
The information is sufficient and on time 29,3% 17,3% 10,7% 5,3% 13,3% 4,0% 5,3% 5,3% 5,3% 4,0% 
Divergent opinions are tolerated 6,7% 4,0% 4,0% 8,0% 12,0% 18,7% 20,0% 14,7% 10,7% 1,3% 
Complementarity with respect to background, 
expertise and experience 17,3% 13,3% 10,7% 16,0% 12,0% 12,0% 2,7% 8,0% 4,0% 4,0% 
Board members get along very well 1,3% 1,3% 2,7% 5,3% 2,7% 6,7% 10,7% 16,0% 16,0% 37,3% 
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Appendix 6: the Company’s corporate governance model 
 
 
 
 
CEO
Management 
Committee
Board of Directors 
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speaking 
members
French 
speaking 
members
AC NRC SBC
AC = Audit and Compliance Committee
NRC = Nomination and Remuneration Committee
SBC = Strategic and Business Development Committee
Chairman
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auditors          Members of 
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Election/dismissal
Government 
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(S)election/dismissal
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